There’s something paradoxical about trying to decentralize by… concentrating. That thought kept running through my mind as I was reviewing the numbers from the current Decentralized Voices cohort. We have been delegating 42 million DOT & 180k KSM worth of voting power to various DAOs from the community so they could act as highly active participants in OpenGov. The goal was clear: allow more responsible, thoughtful people in the Polkadot ecosystem to meaningfully influence governance decisions.
After a year, it’s working – if imperfectly. We’ve seen new voices, new groups, and a new culture of engagement emerge in Polkadot’s governance space.
Now, as we assess the current DV cohort’s performance and consider what comes next, we find ourselves at a crossroads. Was DV a temporary measure to jump-start wider participation - a “necessary centralization of the few to inspire the many” or did it simply create a new elite class of voters, “concentrated whales” in their own right?
This forum post dives into the data and the community’s perspectives, reflecting on what DV has achieved, where it fell short, and how we might co-create its next phase.
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DV Cohort Highlights: Participation & Outcomes
Over the current cohort and throughout the first month of delegation, the six DV delegates have been busy. They deliberated on dozens of Referenda and cast hundreds of votes. The delegates have different styles – some vote on nearly every proposal, others abstain more often. But interestingly, they mostly vote the same way as the broader voting community.
Our latest internal examination shows roughly 18.9% of outcomes would flip if we counted out the DV votes. In other words, DVs generally reinforce the majority voting view, but not always. After all, if that “changed outcome” number were 0%, there would be no point to having DVs at all – the fact that it’s nearly 19% means they carry real influence.
When the DV delegates do diverge from the crowd, it’s rare: fewer than 1 in 30 referenda saw the DVs’ majority vote split from the eventual result. In those handful of cases, proposals passed or failed even though most DVs opposed (or supported) them. Usually, though, the delegates add weight to the prevailing outcome. This balance – amplifying community voices without routinely flipping the vote – seems to be DV’s sweet spot. It is central to DV’s net impact.
There’s no one “right” way to vote, but these differences in participation matter. They reveal that even within this small group, we have diversity - not just of geography or background, but of temperament, risk tolerance, and governance ethos.
Now, on the positive side as well: DV clearly shook something loose in the governance landscape. Since it launched, we’ve seen better scrutiny of treasury proposals. Spending has tightened. Requests are more likely to be pushed into structured bounties instead of being waved through ad hoc. That’s a good trend. Several delegates have been especially rigorous in asking the hard questions: “Is this worth funding?” “Why is this urgent?” “Where’s the delivery?” “What are the metrics?” That kind of pressure matters. It’s discipline and it’s contagious. This is a structural win, although hard to measure quantitatively.
Even more importantly, DV seems to have inspired others. New DAOs formed around governance, including region-specific groups in Eastern Europe, China, and Latin America. Suddenly, people who never saw themselves as “governance folks” were stepping in. And I’d argue that part of that is the DV halo effect. People saw that it was possible to be taken seriously and get a seat at the table. You just had to show up, organize, and demonstrate thoughtfulness.
Perhaps the biggest success is cultural. DV has redistributed possibility. For example, Vikk from the Hungarian DAO once observed: “many new DAOs have emerged in the past few months and are actively participating in the decision-making process…I’m guessing this is because they’d like to be elected as a Decentralized Voice in the future.”
Of course, no experiment is perfect. Some issues have cropped up. A few community members have found that by joining multiple delegatable DAOs, they can multiply their influence. In practice this means the same players can essentially vote several times across different groups. As one commentator noted, this bundling of influence “stands in direct opposition to the original mission” of DV. It’s a real concern: if DVs simply create another elite class of multi-DAO whales, we haven’t really solved the centralization problem.
Another open question that has not been answered yet is accountability. DV delegates don’t vote with their own DOT; rather, they are delegated with W3F DOT. On the one hand, this shows trust; on the other, there’s no automatic penalty if someone votes irresponsibly (although all votes can be manually reviewed). The program’s rules do demand that delegates explain their votes and abstain on proposals where they have conflicts of interest.
Without consequences, how do we ensure accountability? We have called for abstentions in those cases, others called for public declarations. But there’s no rulebook, and maybe there should be. Suggestions include strict one-DAO-per-delegate policies, mandatory declaration of ties, or even formal penalty systems. In a system that’s supposed to be transparent and trustless, we’re relying a lot on unwritten ethics.
In theory, self-policing and public scrutiny should keep delegates honest. But some wonder: if a delegate makes a bad call, who pays the price? They don’t lose funds or reputation the way a normal voter would. This disconnect bothers people, and it’s worth figuring out whether additional guardrails are needed.
And this is where it gets philosophical
Because DV lives in this liminal space between direct democracy and delegated trust. On the one hand, we want every token holder to vote. On the other hand, we know most people won’t. So we delegate to active people, to thoughtful groups, to “voices.” But the moment we do that, we shift from participation to representation. And that’s not evil, it’s just a different kind of system. One with different risks and benefits. DV tried to thread the needle: amplify community voices without creating a new ruling class.
But can you do that perfectly? Can you hand out power without creating hierarchy? I’m not sure.
The Web3 Foundation does not want to be the sole voter on proposals. It wanted to distribute its influence to the community to responsible, thoughtful civic actors. In that sense, DV isn’t a delegation experiment only; it’s a governance mentorship. A cultural investment. A parachute, maybe, for a governance system that’s still learning to land.
The question now is: do we keep the parachute? Do we cut the cords and hope we glide? Or do we redesign it altogether?
The Road Ahead?
So now we’re here. The program is well underway, the results are mixed but meaningful and the time has come to decide: what next?
I keep thinking about the tension in the room and in previous conversations about the future of DV. There’s no clear consensus, not really. Just different undercurrents pulling in different directions. On one side, people are energized, DV brought new people into governance, fostered deliberation, even helped curb some reckless treasury spending. On the other hand, there’s growing unease: overlapping memberships, questions of accountability, fears we’ve just created a new form of soft centralization.
And maybe that’s the clearest sign the experiment was real: it stirred the water. It forced us to ask questions we weren’t ready to answer yet.
Below we sketch three broad options for DV’s next phase. These are just starting points for brainstorming, not final proposals. We welcome all creative and constructive suggestions. Think of these as conversation starters: mix and match ideas, imagine hybrids, or throw in something completely different. If you have a bold new governance model that supersedes DV, we want to hear it!
Scenario A: Sunset the Program
Core idea: End DV after the current cohort. Acknowledge that while DV had positive effects, its structural flaws now outweigh the benefits. Return to a pure token-holder voting system.
Key features:
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Decentralized Voices as a formal program concludes.
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The foundation may continue participating in governance, but without dedicated community delegates.
Scenario B: Expand & Distribute
Core idea: Double down on DV but spread the power more thinly. Add more delegates, each with a smaller DOT allocation, to reduce individual sway and further broaden representation.
Key features:
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Increase the number of DV delegates (for example, 10 or more instead of 6).
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Give each delegate a smaller stake (e.g. 1–2 M DOT each rather than 7 M).
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Prioritize diverse representation (more regions, different focus areas or communities).
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With more voices and each holding less power, the overall influence is distributed more widely.
Scenario C: Reform & Co-create DV 2.0
Core idea: Redesign DV in partnership with the community. Fix the problems while keeping DV’s catalytic energy. Think of it as DV 2.0 co-created with everyone’s input.
Key features:
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Introduce community-nominated or elected delegates alongside appointed ones.
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Set term limits or rotate delegates periodically to prevent any one group from entrenching power.
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Formalize conflict-of-interest rules (e.g. mandatory public declarations, clear abstention requirements).
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Require delegates to bond some DOT as “skin in the game,” aligning incentives with their votes.
Create a mentorship pipeline: pair veteran governance groups with up-and-coming ones to train new DVs.
Again: these scenarios are not exhaustive, they’re conversation starters. Imagine hybrids (for example, combine expansion with some reforms) or totally new ideas. Maybe DV could evolve into something no one’s thought of yet. The point is to brainstorm. All suggestions – even wild ones – are welcome.
Why this post? and what’s next?
This post isn’t presenting conclusions; it’s asking questions. We’ll take the community’s feedback and use it to draft a few non-binding “wish-for-change” referenda in OpenGov. These polls won’t immediately alter the rules, but they’ll gauge sentiment on where to go next. Your input here will directly shape those questions.
So please: critique these ideas, propose improvements, or propose entirely new paths. If you see a blind spot in our thinking, call it out. Let’s leverage the diversity of our community – veteran governance minds and new voices alike – to co-create the next chapter of Decentralized Voices.
