Time to say goodbye to Decentralized Voices

Governance
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Good Intentions Gone Astray

The Decentralized Voices (DV) program was brought into being for to achieve more balanced governance decisions through the distribution of voting power within our community.

However, the recent developments show clearly that it works against the principles for which it was originally constructed.

What we observe now is a pattern whereby various DAOs possess memberships that overlap with one another. Through this concentration, certain members of the community can exercise their influence over multiple DVs at the same time, thereby multiplying their voting power by three or even four times.

Such a bundling of influence stands in direct opposition to the original mission of the program, which was to prevent centralized control.

Further, a well-known whale wallet, that previously was able to sway voting, has sold a significant portion of their DOT, and can no longer wield the same influence.

Since the DV program now enables exactly the sort of power concentration it was meant to hinder, we must conclude that the initiative no longer fulfills its intended purpose.

Although we recognize the positive intentions at its beginning, the current implementation no longer works as designed.

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This makes sense to me. Abolishing the program would also, in theory, allow W3F to focus resources on more pressing matters.

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tl;dr: Giotto is gone. DVs are no longer needed :slight_smile:

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Hello! This is Vikk from the Hungarian Polkadot DAO, one of the Decentralized Voices (DV) in the current cohort.

The current plutocratic system (1 DOT = 1 vote) embedded in OpenGov unfortunately cannot yet be replaced with another system, as there is no fully functioning alternative, such as quadratic voting. This is mainly because Sybil attacks cannot be effectively mitigated in a fully decentralized manner. (Check this very long, but really interesting discussion about quadratic voting on OpenGov: Quadratic Voting for Polkadot Governance)

I believe the DV Program is currently necessary to increase voter participation and reduce voting apathy—an issue that affects all DAOs, regardless of the blockchain they operate on. The DV Program serves as a great incentive for smaller communities like ours, helping us gain recognition within our local community in Hungary. I can already see the benefits: members of our community are becoming more aware of OpenGov and are starting to consider delegating their votes to us. Slowly but steadily we can gain more voting power from our community members and if W3F undelegate their DOTs, there would left some voting power delegated to our multisig.

From the perspective of an elected DV, the program is valuable—it incentivizes us at the Hungarian Polkadot DAO to increase awareness, expand our outreach, and attract new delegations. Not to mention, I can see that many new DAOs have emerged in the past few months and are actively participating in the decision-making process. I’m guessing this is because they’d like to be elected as a Decentralized Voice in the future.

So, long story short: IMO, the main problem in OpenGov is voting apathy. The DV program aims to increase voting participation. If the program disappears, voting apathy will remain consistent. If you have ideas on how to increase voting participation without the DV program, let us know. :slight_smile:
Looking ahead, I see a possible evolution of the DV Program in which more entities gradually receive smaller portions of voting power from W3F. Over time, this could be the key to fostering a more balanced, inclusive, and fair voting system within Polkadot OpenGov.

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If DV is to remain it should be setup in such a way that it cannot be abused.

Having prominent community members voting in several DAOs, and influencing the members of several DAOs, defeats the purpose of DV.

A strict rule should be, you can only be active in one DAO and not vote or influence in many DAOs as is happening now.

Also if a DAO member is the recipient of an OpenGov proposal, then the whole DAO should abstain. Otherwise this can quickly escalate into horse trading between DAO members.

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Regardless of whether Giotto is around or not, the DV program creation was targeted more towards the aim of increasing the total number of voters overall and not just because a single whale was around so it’s got more to do with increasing the total voting percentage than A or B whale voting.

With that being said, there is a point we agree here and it’s the heavy overlap of participants across delegated DAOs not being the ideal condition for delegated governance. This is not a problem exclusive to Polkadot though, it’s a common issue with many governance systems that now includes on-chain delegations (Arbitrum has a similar problem with some of the core Arbitrum team exerting heavy influence through other delegation groups).
The projection of influence from groups or specific individuals into other groups is also something that should be minimized as much as possible but that is a whole other discussion.

These reasons are what made us include this item for our operations back in 2020 (but only archived as early as 2023)

We are not part and will never be part of any DAOs, BORG, private groups, forums or validator alliances that will plan things or direct things for us. Nor we will seek “social validation” or “peer pressure” from certain groups so our independence of action from any outside pressure will be guaranteed at all times.

This is an item that we had anticipated and we believe it should be a common denominator for all W3F delegations moving forward. The issue is simple, when a group receives influence from another group or other members thereof, this group becomes highly correlated with the former. Even it could go as far as the original and uncorrelated members becoming disillusioned with the group that was their own. Consequently, losing independence of action and thinking. Most commonly, the second group starts acting on behalf of the first group or its members if the influence is severe.

Consequently, we agree on the fact that all DV delegations should seek to be as uncorrelated in the human resources / voters as possible. In that way, we could reach a wider audience and wider interests.

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Agree with @Vikk on this point that DV’s can be broken up into multiple groups based on Seniority, with new participants being awarded smaller amounts - possibly even reducing slightly ‘original DV’s’ to help create an even more level playing field.

However - the DV’s that have stood the test of time need be rewarded for their efforts, not removed.

It has been a net positive for DV’s to exist (imo) and would like to see this continue into the future.

J.

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I fully agree with that statement. The intention was good, making votes more diversified and not controlled by single whales, but eventually we found ourselves where the DV’s themselves become those concentrated whales

In addition, there are more flaws in the program, and the main one imo is the lack of skin in the game. The program should require locking funds from any elected DV (similar to the validator DN program who should lock 7500 DOT for being nominated by W3F)

Beyond that, it’s better to choose tens of DVs to have much higher distribution and not only few with very high concentrated power (and without skin in the game)

As long as all those flaws remain, I truly believe it’s time to shut down this program

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DV’s should have an auditable list of users and timestamp of entry that can be compared. Influential users will have a single entity, as being famous is a type of personhood in itself. DV’s with overlapping users should lose being a DV. It’s up to them to solve it. I feel this should be enough until personhood is here.

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DV4 has been announced by now. But still worth paying attention to the issues of overlapping votes, as raised here. Case in point is ChaosDAO, whose members are sitting in multiple other DVs in cohort 3. Yet another reason NOT to re-elect them now.

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Hey folks! Karam here, the new Governance Coordinator with Web3 Foundation.

Even though I have just joined W3F earlier this month, I have truly been captivated by the DV program premise and goals. I had tens of conversations with the community and always open for more feedback and comments. This post caught my eyes so I thought I will drop some thoughts. I do believe that the Decentralized Voices’ benefits far outweigh its challenges, and it is the kind of governance experiment Polkadot needs right now.

First off, let’s cut to the chase: DV is about putting power in the hands of the many, not polish some theoretical utopia. Yeah, we’ve got some DAOs with overlapping memberships; a few passionate folks juggling multiple discord channels and hopping between groups, but direct accountability in small groups slams the door on backroom deals harder than any centralized bureaucracy ever could.

Power to the People: DAOs like ChaosDAO (~45 active voting members, over 120 in governance discussions) and KusDAO (~99 voting members) and many others, aren’t just faceless entities, but rather they’re real communities or even as some might say “passionate cults”. Each DV entity has at least 7 members, but many have dozens or hundreds.

Innovation thrives in diversity, different communities stress-test ideas, refine policies, and build what actually works for their needs. That’s how we’re crafting a self-sustaining ecosystem, not some brittle top-down monolith. In fact, we have been having several conversations with academics and graduates of Polkadot programs who are working towards forming DAOs and participating in OpenGov. This is another great side-effect of having such programs.

Now, could we over-engineer this? Sure. We could ask DAOs to wall off like gated communities, and micromanage votes. But that’s the dark side of advocacy and governance, claiming to be permissionless while slapping stop signs on every DAO door. That’s not our approach. W3F does its best to be hands-off, only intervening in cases of bribery or other clear violations of the program’s integrity. We trust these humans behind wallets to vote their conscience and participate in good faith.

Here’s the other thing; individuals grinding across multiple DAOs aren’t schemers, but rather they’re believers. They’re the ones burning midnight oil in governance forums and channels, pushing proposals, and yes, arguing for what they think matters. Is that an overlap or a bug? I believe this is conviction squared.

Consequently, every DV delegate shares one non-negotiable trait: they eat, sleep, and breathe Polkadot’s success, just read through their voting philosophies and check their participation behaviors. Every one DAO vote is multiples of humans hashing it out.

The Bigger Picture:

DV is a program that is truly creating a culture shift. We’re seeing:

  • Treasury Stability: Net inflows! Responsible spending! Topic-specific bounties!
  • Global Participation: From Hungary to East Africa, communities are waking up to governance.
  • Balanced Representative Design: DV’s community-driven model just indeed introduces diverse perspectives into the governance process. We’re closer to quadratic voting’s vision, where passion matters as much as token bags, to create a truly inclusive environment.
  • Hybrid Governance: We’re blending the best of on-chain democracy with off-chain discourse. It could be messy, but so is real democracy

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Bottom line: DV isn’t flawless, but scrapping it would be like throwing out a working parachute because the straps itch. Let’s fix the straps. We are always one email away from you, and open for any feedback and advice.

So yeah, we’ll keep iterating. Maybe add DOT locks. Maybe tweak membership rules. We’re here to prove open systems out-innovate closed ones every damn time.

Stay decentralized

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Just read the thoughtful piece by @Zendetta and agree with most point. One thing that is missing in DV in my opinion is term limits. The US President (and the Presidents of most other developed countries) can do a maximum of two terms, and this is a very important feature of a functioning democracy!

Even for the biggest fans of Chaos DAO out there, the fact that they’ve been DV twice already should be a strong indication that now is the time to delegate to someone else. As Karam says, “stay decentralised”, so let’s rotate the delegations.

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Looks like Decentralized Voices are exiting stage left—guess even the most vocal pioneers need a break from the mic. Time for the next act to step up and remix the Polkadot playlist!

Enter Eagle DAO—ready to amplify voices, champion decentralized governance, and inject new energy into Polkadot’s evolving symphony. With their passion for community engagement and innovative thinking, they’re poised to honor DV’s legacy while composing the next verse. The stage is set—let’s see how they rock it! :eagle:

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Hi, here is a former DV cohort 2, I am a favor that those members who belong to more than one DAO should have influence only in one, the influence in several DAOs makes this user have more decision power and balances the slope in his favor, the problem of DV is not whether Giotto is or is not there now, the problem of DV is the hypocrisy of the users who cry when there are users in two DAOs but do not say anything when their friends are in 3 :slight_smile:
The solution? Either delegate on DAOs in which the members are not in multiple DAOS or be really honest with the community, abstain from other DAOs and take the role in several DAOs but now is if we should believe that they will do it
Less trust more truth

The community itself should have two fingers to be sincere and not two-faced!

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In the last year it´s possible to see like the attention on OpenGov is being reducing by DV effect:

  1. Individuals do not put energy on proposals because the size of influence it´s to big when a DV get in.

  2. OpenGov is not attracting users and this is a big problem, the attention is on DV´s daos; and if WF3 always select the same Daos is not helping on decentralization, it generates that the same Daos gain more and more followers for rewards interest.

  3. Lack of feedback and comments, it´s possible to see like there are a lot of proposals where the porcentage of comments is very low in comparations with discussions happening in daos and proponents aren´t being able to check those discusions. It´s no the better way that if there is a space for comments next to the proposal information, the proposal owner have to go to twitter, to telegram or discord to try to check if there is any information about the proposal.

Some ideas to solve this:

+Keep the DV but just for special cases where is possible to see a not healty vote process but request DV´s comments in almost all proposals.

+Try to implement something to give rewards for individuals participations in the same way that Daos with delegate votting power. This option will help to reduce the effect to be part of one just for economic intentions.

My dm is open is someone want to talk more… =)

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As the new Governance Coordinator, I find your response to the issue of multiple DV voting concerning.

Rather than critically engaging with what is clearly a significant issue for many within the ecosystem, your reply brushes it aside in favor of motivational rhetoric and an optimistic personal perspective.

While I appreciate the commitment of individuals contributing across multiple DAOs, framing this as simply “conviction squared” rather than addressing the fundamental concerns misses the mark. This isn’t just an abstract philosophical debate—it’s a governance challenge that requires scrutiny in the path toward fair processes.

Putting aside my own views on duplicated DV voting, the approach taken in your response feels disconnected from community concerns and risks undermining trust in governance processes.

That said, I do agree with other points you’ve made, and I hope you take this as constructive feedback. Addressing these sorts of concerns with more critical analysis rather than dismissive optimism would strengthen confidence in the governance framework overall.

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Rather than critically engaging with what is clearly a significant issue for many within the ecosystem, your reply brushes it aside in favor of motivational rhetoric and an optimistic personal perspective.

While I appreciate the commitment of individuals contributing across multiple DAOs, framing this as simply “conviction squared” rather than addressing the fundamental concerns misses the mark. This isn’t just an abstract philosophical debate—it’s a governance challenge that requires scrutiny in the path toward fair processes.

gm Murphy :slight_smile:

First, thanks for your response the constructive feedback. I think the tension you identify does mirror the core paradox in blockchain governance’s hardest questions: which is how to cultivate organic collaboration without enabling covert centralization. However, I personally think that the DV program’s design intentionally voices perspective membership rules not out of naiveté, but to prioritize anti-fragility, and therefore allowing communities/DAOs to self-organize while having structural safeguards like minimum member thresholds, mandatory transparency frameworks, conflict-of-interest disclosures and others.

To me, these measures force power into the open, while also acknowledging the possible existence of marginal inefficiencies (like what I mentioned before: e.g. passionate contributors engaging multiple DAOs), as the cost of avoiding a worse outcome: stasis from over-policing human coordination and complexity, especially when you actually can’t “technically” do it. What would stop these individuals from creating yet another discord account?

I am not trying to brush over the fact that this does exist, we are looking into ways to push groups to have safeguards against it, but I still believe that centralized power thrives when participation is restricted, not when it’s contested. Over-policing risks calcifying power into shadow hierarchies, and that is why my feedback was in fact to push everyone to actively engage, and proactively apply to DV, or find ways to voice out your feedback.

Moreover, the program is only one year old and has gone through several iterations and will continue to iterate based on all the feedback we are receiving and our strategic analysis. My “motivational rhetoric” is not a claim that it is perfect.

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Very quick.

Mixed feelings about the Decentralised Voices program. Although the initial premise I is good, to avoid concentration of power, I find some parts of the implementation of it than can be improved, maybe by introducing some checks and balances to scope clear limitations and duties towards transparency.

  1. Extend the mandate a bit longer and instead of renovating the full DV program at the same time, renovate half of the DV program at the start of these months, and the other half at mid-mandate, but maintaining the mandate for everyone of time of the tenure months. This way, every half mandate period, half of the DV are renovated. Example: If the DV mandate is 4 months, every 2 months half of the DV are renovated.

This ensures some kind of continuity as there is always DVs that are in the loop of what is happening and can debate with the new-coming delegates. This also prevents certain behaviors of some actors waiting the full renovation of the DVs, submitting/resubmitting proposal to when a certain DV cohort is favorable to their interests.

  1. Restriction of mandates. Establish clear limitations of the program ( how many times the same community/DAO can be elected), and for sure: same community/DAO cannot have 2 consecutive mandates. No matter how good they are doing it.

The last two points can be understood as controversial:

  1. I can imagine why the DV program is restricted to DAO/communities, but does this not limit to the same carousel of the same actors rolling on the seats of power again and again?

  2. Provide transparency on the DV selection process.

And as has been addressed before, the introduction of DV program de-incentives direct DOT holder governance participation, because no matter how much you debate in openGov, the plebs have a voice but no vote. So, at some point, I understand that even the holders engaged in OpenGov, prefer to spend their times somewhere else.

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