There is undoubtedly the push for removing the DV program influence right now and perhaps morphing it into a DV-lite sort of program which is fair if that is the wish of the W3F who is the original delegate party that allows the existence of the DV program. There is already the rationale that the DV work should not be seen as a complete focus but rather a partial focus of the DVs.
As presented by Ryan
https://x.com/ThePhunky1/status/1915804178674290960
DV work is heavy so morphing this program into a DV-lite activity should be done taken certain considerations.
As a potential pitfall of removing it altogether (Scenario A) is the danger that legitimate dangerous referenda such as 824 pass:
https://x.com/Cointelegraph/status/1920252470556590514
In this case from our side we presented the evidence about dubious character and a potentially harmful project to other DVs directly (something we don’t normally do due to our non-interference policy) but this kind of referendum glows hard and it’s impossible to ignore and to not alert other DVs and voters so that they also vote against it.
If the DV program is to sunset completely then a W3F alternative that defends against these pitfalls is required. DVs in a way work as a last line of defense against extremely harmful referenda which must be fulfilled by other party.
A counterargument is to have entity A or B vote which would fulfill the role naturally but as we all know these governance attacks are bound to become more sophisticated over time so a last line of defense is needed at present due to OpenGov’s design. Leaving this issue unattended certainly will open the way to new potential extremely harmful governance attacks.
For the reduction of delegation to 1-2M DOT and the increase in number of delegates to 10 (or any variation thereof) it was already tried so that scenario carries heavy warnings. Many of these parties were never to be seen again in the voting arena, development or decision making. Trying it again with potentially more “mature delegated voters” might work but we already know the pitfalls of this approach so we have to be aware of them.
As others have already correctly identified on the comments, alternatives are the inclusion of a rule of “no voter overlap” between DVs as well as other highly delegated voters or entities with high voting power or members thereof. We already have two precedents, Giotto as a DV candidate (Candidacy as a DV Delegate - Giotto De Filippi) and Scytale Digital as DV (Decentralized Voices: Cohort 2 - Scytale Digital). Love to both parties and what they do or did but if the idea is to multiply the diversity of DVs and points of view then the best idea is to not delegate to parties and their members that can already tilt the OpenGov balance by themselves or that have already substantial voting power delegated to.
A requirement for abstentions or a vote against if the recipient of funds is a member of a DV might also work but this will definitely be discussed in depth here.
Hopefully also DV non-interference clauses get added to it.
A variation of scenario B
Many think that the DV delegation is way too high so it discourages holders to vote. Reducing such delegation to 1-2M DOT or even less and keeping the same number of DVs could achieve this goal as well. This could also be subject to change for whatever the reasons in the next cohort.
More Wild Ideas
W3F Vote override
The W3F already has rules in place that discourages bad behavior like malfeasance. So if Saxemberg wants 13.47M DOT from the treasury (all available DOT at the moment), makes a referendum and votes in favor, it will make the W3F to undelegate Saxemberg.
However, vote override for non-malicious votes if they really deem it necessary could be an option. So if there is a vote that requires change because the W3F thinks its a must then the W3F will take an executive vote overriding the delegation of the DVs. This would also remove decision making power from the DVs.
If such decision making cannot be done by the W3F, then an alternative entity could be created in order to cast those votes. The Internet Computer already has this in place with the ICA (Internet Computer Association) which is in some way already takes direct decisions on its governance.
DV delegation DOT firesale.
This is a variation based on the previously proposed idea by Transistor’s Peter which is to have the DV allocation open for sale to accredited investors, institutional investors over a certain threshold at a discounted price.
https://forum.polkadot.network/t/transistor-version-0-1-political-philosophy-for-decentralized-voices-candidacy
So the DOT delegated to the DVs is permanently reduced as long as large investors have bought a given amount of it. In such a way, investors get to vote, invest at a certain percentage discount and get rid of that pesky DVs delegated power permanently. Obviously details of this fire sale have to be attractive for both Polkadot as well as the investors.
Just some thoughts about this and possible ways forward.