Thank you Karam for your post!
I think it’s really great that you’re inviting the community into this important discussion. Please allow me to share my thoughts on this. These are my personal opinions and do not represent the views of the DAO I am part of, which currently is an elected DV.
1. Concentration vs. Coordination
Too much power in too few wallets; too little, and DVs can’t block bad actors.
My thoughts: Yes, I agree that it would be beneficial to increase the number of DV recipients while reducing their individual voting power. However, I also agree with @flez that the overall delegated voting power across DVs should be increased from the current 36M DOT (6 entities * 6M DOT).
2. Transparency & Conflict of Interest
Overlapping memberships, self-funding votes, unclear disclosures.
My thoughts:
The only viable way to reduce the chances of overlapping memberships across multiple DVs is for W3F to delegate voting power strictly to DV candidates who vote on OpenGov exclusively through multisigs (or some other on-chain tool, which unfortunately does not yet exist on the Relay Chain; Maybe @olanod from Virto Team could solve this missing puzzle, with their on-chain DAO management tool, Kreivo)
Multisig-based DVs are inherently more transparent, as the signatories can be verified on-chain. In contrast, Discord or Telegram-based DV groups can be easily manipulated, and there’s no clear way to identify members who may belong to multiple groups.
3. Skin in the Game Without Pay-to-Play
Bonding enough DOT to feel consequences, but not so much that we exclude talent.
My thoughts:
An alternative approach to “skin in the game” could be the introduction of a non-monetary penalty mechanism, essentially a new way to punish bad behaviour, with the retention of some non-monetary benefits.
For example, DVs could be offered a limited number of guaranteed tickets to Polkadot events, along with travel and accommodation reimbursements (e.g., 10 tickets). These benefits, funded by W3F or the Treasury, would be a gesture of recognition and support. If a DV demonstrates poor behavior, these benefits could be withdrawn partially or entirely by W3F. This method provides consequences without penalizing those who may not be financially well-off. After all, 1000 DOT might be a minor amount for some DV candidates but a major hurdle for others.
While not as severe as slashing the bonded DOT, this model could still effectively motivate DVs to act with humility and responsibility. Similar non-monetary incentive systems are widely used in traditional multinational companies to incentives employees and could be adapted to fit our governance culture.
It would be also interesting if we start to gamifying the DV experience, not just through DOT rewards, but also with other forms of recognition like achievements, grants, NFTs, or similar incentives, could significantly boost motivation and passion within DVs.
4. Voice Diversity
Six DAOs ≠ the world. Regions and disciplines must expand.
My thoughts:
Agreed, this is a great point.
5. Governance Fatigue
400+ referenda per cohort is brutal; individuals burn out, DAOs slow down.
My thoughts:
Hundreds of referenda per cohort can be extremely difficult for DVs to evaluate effectively. In the Hungarian Polkadot DAO, we have only 7 members, which is why we explicitly stated in our DV proposal that there will be proposals we do not vote on. This isn’t a sign of weakness (as some argue: “Why give so much voting power to such a small DAO?”), but rather an acknowledgment of our limitations. A 7-member DAO cannot vote on everything. That’s why I believe setting the minimum participation rate at 50% would be a reasonable rule for upcoming cohorts also. I don’t think this number should be raised (even though many are pushing for it), because smaller DVs would become fragmented, the quality of decisions would suffer. We should also consider scenarios where a DV group does not feel confident making informed decisions on certain topics. In such cases, our DAO sometimes chooses not to vote, which may lower our participation rate, but we do this intentionally, to avoid interfering with decisions better left to those with the relevant expertise.
Thoughts on the Proposed Solutions
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DV-Light (individual guardians/advisors):
This is a solid approach. If candidates are selected based on professional expertise in specific areas, it could significantly lead to more precise votes. -
Re-sized DV-DAOs:
Yes, it’s time to expand the number of DV DAOs. Please also consider implementing retention of non-monetary benefits as a new type of “skin in the game” model. You could even combine it with monetary slashing in proportion to a DV’s financial background. I think that the right mix of incentives and penalties can foster high-quality DV behavior. -
Community Engagement:
Absolutely necessary, this must be prioritized. -
Automatic Sunset:
This is an important topic. What average on-chain turnout ratio should we target? 15–20% of total supply? Or higher? It might be worth establishing a clear KPI so we can track improvements and know when it’s time to phase things out or evolve the DV program more drastically.