Two-Factor Majority Voting - worth considering?!

A very interesting topic on another blockchain discussing possible options to level the voting field and kill the ambitions of a mystery whale that started to blast votes last minute opposite of consensus, which most believe are distraction tactics.

Two Factor Majority would require both votes to pass:

  • Supermajority Requirement: A proposal might need 67% (or as high as 75%) approval from token holders.

  • Participation Requirement: At least 51% of the total unique voters must approve the proposal.

This approach helps ensure that major decisions have strong support from both large and small stakeholders, reducing the risk of whale dominance.

Has there been any discussion on the Two Factor Majority option? It seems much easier to comprehend and implement than the quadratic vote option.

You say “on another blockchain” but I literally just posted about 2/3 majority voting 5 days before you posted this. Lol.

Do you know - I know where to look, but don’t know how to find the answer - how many proposals were voted on by more than 50% of token holders?

It’s easy to create “unique voters”. It would only result in unnecessary blockchain bloat as Yay/Nay sides race to create enough voters to meet that requirement.
Am I missing something obvious?

We cannot realistically make governance depend upon total issuance.

It’s unlikely any referenda ever passed 50% of token issuance, maybe the initial sudo removal that launched polkadot, or maybe the transferability vote that followed, but even those sounds unlikely.

We’ve a 50% targeted staking rate, and a 2/3rd honesty assumption, so de facto 33.3% of issuance could do absolutely anything they like, although sometimes less. Also 17% of issuance could brick, but that’s recoverable. Avalanche and Cosmos the same. 18.66 % of ETH can do absolutely anything they like. And proof-of-work is much much worse: https://www.crypto51.app/ lol

It matters if tokens get locked doing other things, like governance, and how staking locks run. Avalanche, Cosmos, and Polkadot were around somewhat longer than some of the others, so they likely all had longer unbonding periods initially, which likely lowered staking rates long term. Also crowd loans lowered ours.

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@ghost - I missed your post, but great to see similar ideas! I was intrigued by the 2 factor majority requiring both majority of votes and majority of voters to pass the referendum.

@somedude - I will track down the info, but new wallets or inactive wallets for a time period (30 days?) were not eligible to vote - (I didn’t check how inactive was defined, but based on insights on avg user connects wallet for verification on a monthly basis). The super majority were applied to treasury related referendums over $500,000. They have not had a lot of proposals that pass, but that was intentional - loosening restrictions is much more manageable than the opposite.

Every community has complaints and most have bad actors/whales - which has been been a good experience, as I can appreciate Polkadot’s OpenGov and the progress over the past year.

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That’s gonna be a tough one… If it becomes valuable enough, a service appears.
It may cost $10K to develop, and you need just 4 customers who pay $5K each to make a nice ROI. For anyone standing to gain $500K from a vote, 1% of that would be a very reasonable “proposal booster”.

Account/wallet/address age: this week I had two “seasoned” Discord accounts (from 2023) who tried to scam me and I’m pretty sure they haven’t been in good standing all this time. I think they were created, made to join a discord, lied dormant to appear “not new”, and activated as-needed. Discord member since 2023? Cool, let’s chat! Except it’s a scammer. I also think some of them post random AI crap to “participate” from time to time. Sometimes ask a stupid question or two (sadly, you can’t tell them them apart from average community member) so you can’t root them out without potentially excluding a real (newbie) member…

This will be like anti-spam and anti-virus rules: if they’re published, it’s just a matter of testing your virus or malware until you pass undetected.

@hwaktua and @somedude - I was looking for the article I shared with you hwak, this was what started our conversation: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2305.17655v2

@burdges …. Thanks for the response, that makes sense. Are there any options or ideas that could be applied and define the majority of voters and majority of votes that could be applied for a 2 Factor vote that could be applied Polkadot? (Just curious if you had any thoughts or ideas)

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Two-factor is a deceptive name here:

2FA means iuncreasing users security by making them use multiple “authentication factors” aka “credentials broadly interpreted”. This uses a single “authentication factor” in two ways, with zero impact upon security.

This is a form of two-choice-rule-voting, but as noted above neither rule makes any sense, even by itself much less together.

Around topics that make sense…

A treasury proposal is a yes/no, but if an election has multiple candidates then Arrow’s impossibility theorem covers two-choice-rule-voting like everything else. If you’ve multiple elected bodies, then you might apply different choice rules for electing each, so political parties cannot so easily evolve towards exploiting the choice rules. I’ve never seen a social choice theory paper discuss this.

We already have these collectives who provide additional input, so you could imagine some “activity” meta-collective that restricts treasury proposals somewhat:

  • If you’re a fellow then your activity vote is your fellowship level divided by the total fellowship levels across the system.
  • If you’re a parachain team then your activity vote is the weighted moving average of your coretime spending divided by the weighted moving average of the total coretime spending across the system.
  • If you’re a validator operators then your activity vote is the weighted moving average of your rewards divided by the weighted moving average of the total rewards across the system.

Activity votes would thus be 1/3rd developers, 1/3 coretime consumers, and 1/3rd validator operators. Any governance vote then needs a simple majority in both activity votes and DOT votes, or maybe some more complex things depending upon recent spending.

We’ve plenty of iffy complexity in the voting system now, especially conviction, so maybe anyhting like this should be part of some larger analysis of what sense different ideas make?