PROPOSAL: Enhancing Community Engagement and Governance Participation via Voting Rewards

Governance
1

Enhancing Community Engagement and Governance Participation via Voting Rewards

Proposal Summary

This proposal outlines the introduction of a reward mechanism for voters in the Polkadot governance system, aiming to increase voter participation and decentralize influence within the governance framework. Here’s how it would work:

Reward Pool: Allocate 1.75% of the current inflation rate to create a voting reward pool. This allocation ensures that voting incentives are sustainable without significantly impacting the staking rewards.

Voting Rewards
Proportionality: Rewards will be distributed proportionally to the amount of $DOT used for voting. Some will not vote which will make the voting rewards pay out higher for those that do vote relative to maintaining the current staking system. This is beneficial to ALL people that want to be active in governance and will vastly increase voting turnout

PolkadotDAO X Handle:
Purpose: To foster community awareness and engagement, a new official X (formerly Twitter) handle will be created and managed by the Polkadot DAO.
Functionality:
Information Sharing: Posting all proposal details, including summaries, full texts, and links to further discussion platforms like Polkassembly or Subsquare.
Notifications: Sending out reminders about upcoming votes, voting periods, and deadlines via X posts.
Engagement: Encouraging users to turn on notifications for real-time updates, thereby increasing engagement.

Mobile Application:
Development: An Android and iOS app will be developed to simplify the voting process, making it accessible and convenient for users to participate in governance from their mobile devices.
Features: The app would include features for easy proposal browsing, voting, and tracking of one’s voting history and rewards.

Rationale:

  1. Increased Participation: By rewarding participation, we expect an increase in voter turnout, which is crucial for a decentralized governance model. This will lead to decisions that more broadly represent the community’s consensus.

  2. Decentralization: Smaller token holders might feel more encouraged to participate, reducing the disproportionate influence of large holders (whales) on governance outcomes.

  3. Community Building: The PolkadotDAO X handle and the mobile app serve as tools for community building, providing a centralized platform for information and interaction, which is less fragmented than current methods.

  4. Sustainable Engagement: Unlike staking which requires constant participation to avoid penalties, voting incentives allow for sporadic but impactful participation, aligning with the lifestyles of many community members.

Implementation Steps:

Approval: This proposal must pass through standard Polkadot OpenGov procedures, gaining community approval through referenda.

Development & Integration:

  • Development of the mobile app.
  • Setting up the X handle, with initial posts and strategies for follower growth.
  • Adjustment of the inflation rate to fund the reward pool.

Launch: Roll out the X handle and mobile app simultaneously with the implementation of the reward system.

Monitoring & Adjustments: Continuous evaluation of the system’s effectiveness in terms of voter turnout and community feedback, with adjustments made accordingly.

Conclusion:

This proposal aims to transform how governance in Polkadot functions, making it more inclusive and participatory. By rewarding voting, we not only enhance community engagement but also ensure that the governance reflects a broader spectrum of the community’s interests. This move towards increased participation and transparency could set a precedent for other DAOs in how to effectively manage decentralized decision-making.

Call to Action:
Please vote in favor of this proposal to foster a more engaged and decentralized Polkadot community. Remember, your participation in governance is what truly drives our ecosystem forward.

1 Like
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I can’t seem to find this proposal on Polkassembly or Subsquare, so I’m not sure how to vote for or against it–have you actually issued a proposal or is this just the discussion phase? (If the latter, Polkassembly’s Discussion track might be appropriate.)

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Conceptually, paying ( let’s not use the euphemism of rewarding ) to an individual or entity to cast a vote, is my opinion an atrocious aberration in a (liberal) participative system which will introduce perverse decision mechanisms ( similar or worse to the ones in the system where to vote is obligatory, which in that context to cast a vote is a right) , bot farming, and other degenerations.

2 Likes
4

I understand your concerns about the potential risks of incentivizing voting, but I think we should reconsider the bigger picture. Right now, a small number of whales have the power to shape outcomes that may not reflect the majority’s will. Isn’t that already a “perverse decision mechanism” in itself?

If we aim for a truly participatory system, shouldn’t we be focused on finding ways to encourage the voices of more members—especially those whose lives are busy with work, family, and other responsibilities? Incentivizing participation could actually strengthen the legitimacy of our decisions, giving people a reason to be more actively involved. Of course, we’d need safeguards to prevent abuses like bot farming, but if we don’t make governance accessible to all, aren’t we just leaving the door open for whales to overpower the community’s true will?

Your priority seems to be on avoiding theoretical risks, but if we don’t take action, we’re left with a system where the majority is effectively silenced. Isn’t finding ways to empower the broader community worth the effort?

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This would be a problem if OpenGov were based on a one-person/one-vote principle, but it’s based on a one-token/one-vote principle (with conviction multipliers of course), so it seems the system is functioning as designed. And those whales, after all, have a lot riding on the success of the network; they have “skin in the game”.

I can’t say I like it when a referendum I oppose is pushed through by one or two whales, of course, so I do understand your impulse for sure.

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Let’s start with language clarification:

concept - an idea or a principle that is connected with something abstract

theoretical - “that could possibly exist, happen or be true, although this is unlikely”

Both oxford dictionary acceptions.

Diving into the topic.

Various points:

Data

I cannot see your proposal/discussion where I expect to see some data with number of accounts and amount of dots correlated with the data if these accounts have voted at least once or no. This can give the exact map and situation of the turnout.

** To vote or not to vote **

I understand that is a concern among openGov participants the low participation in Governance of all the rest of token holders.

I think first we should understand why people don’t vote:

  • Maybe there are not interested
  • Maybe they don’t want to signify themselves casting votes
  • Maybe they don’t understand the Polkadot politics and they dont want to be involved, because takes time
  • And/or other reasons.

All of the are OK, as in Polkadot a holder in not obliged to cast a vote ( like in democracies of some countries)

Without this data at hand, very difficult to get in an open-ended system, it will be impossible to understand the why of the current turnout, and the ways of “solving the problem” of low turnout.

If we aim for a truly participatory system, shouldn’t we be focused on finding ways to encourage the voices of more members—especially those whose lives are busy with work, family, and other responsibilities? Incentivizing participation could actually strengthen the legitimacy of our decisions, giving people a reason to be more actively involved. Of course, we’d need safeguards to prevent abuses like bot farming, but if we don’t make governance accessible to all, aren’t we just leaving the door open for whales to overpower the community’s true will?

The actual system is actually truly participative and accessible in the propositive part ( everyone can put a referenda to vote), everyone can put a referenda in top of the table to be voted.

On the voting part, is were the system is unbalanced becuase protects the interested of the people more economically involved in to the network, which if I were a individual or collective with a heavy economical participation on the system, I will be OK with it. More or less like feudalism, if I am in the top part of society the system is fine, if I am on the bottom part of it I would not be so happy about it.

But the unfairness ( for the normie/peasant) of the vote system, doesn’t mean than a turning the voting right into labor is an apropiate decision. The concept of monetarily incentive voting is a political aberration proper of banana republics with populist regimes, that will bring bot farming, malicious players that will cheat the system ( becuase they can and they don’t care) and in the best of the cases, a legion of Polkadot iliterate mass with no idea of what they are voting but they will have free DOT ( as free in beer ) if they click Yes/No/Abstain on every referenda. And this “mass” can be also convinced, manipulated, “vote buyed” by leaders of opinion, whales, or threat actors to turn tides in other directions.

The first objective of whose stay in power is, actually, to stay in power: so don’t expect power holders to vote in favor a revolution.

If we want to build a better Polkadot civil society, this should come from the wills and energy of the Polkadot holders by themselves than a external monetary incentive. For building this society is necessary (Polkadot) Education, Free Speech, Social Compromise, Mission alignment and other values.

4 Likes
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Just as IRL reference:

It is possible that they were also in times of Nasser, but I cannot find the reference.

Rewards will be distributed proportionally to the amount of $DOT used for voting.

And, this also has no sense in your logic, as the whales will be rewarded more of the total of the pool, as they have most of the % of the tokens, so the wealth will continue to accumulate (or be extracted if we use Marx terms) upwards, and no downwards.

Sorry, I don’t see any sense to this proposal.

3 Likes
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Maybe we can randomly reward someone.

To tackle bot farming, it’s common to implement a threshold. For instance, a minimum of 100 DOT.

Additionally, since we use the conviction vote, we might consider adjusting the reward ratio based on conviction levels. For example, starting at x3, with a higher lock duration increasing their chances…

But anyway, I’m also hesitant about whether we should introduce a reward mechanism.

1 Like
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What about the idea to base reward rates not on the amount of individual DOTs used in governance voting, but on collective total DOT used in governance.

Instead of the following
If Alice and Bob both have 100 DOT, and only Alice votes with her 100 DOT then only Alice receives rewards and Bob receives nothing

Consider
Alice and Bob both have 100 DOT. Between them 100 DOT should be used for voting to allow maximum reward. It is up to them to decide how to split the voting participation.

This sets an ideal governance participation rate but does not individually penalize or incentivize any one actor. Careful market study would need to be performed to identify an ideal voting rate.

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Honestly, I think we are dealing with the consequence - “low participation”, instead of dealing with the causes. Throwing money into the problem inspired by game theory without the understanding the problem is not the right thing do.

Until we have the right data ( account balance and voting action ), and the reasons of why people doesn’t vote, designing everything else is a waste of time and prone to provide a diagnosis of the wrong problem. What we are seeing is a fact, but we don’t understand the reasons of why is happening. There high risk of that we are providing a cure to the wrong diagnosis.

The question to answer in front of the mirror is:

  • Is this “reward voting mechanism” a method to increase participation in opengov or just the passive-aggresive approach to say “we are not happy with the current voting system because it leave us out”.

Calling the things by their name is the first step to find the right solution.

3 Likes
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People in crypto like gambling. I really like this idea. It would incentivize voting participation. It seems the biggest issue people have is participants randomly picking to get the reward. We need to come up with ideas about how to mitigate this. If we can achieve mass participation we will become more valuable as a network, users will increase, and engagement will impressive. This might be one of the most important issues we have right now, at least from my perspective it is.

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Thank you for your insightful comments, wabkebab. You raise excellent points about the root causes versus the symptoms of low participation in our governance model. Here’s my take:

Enhanced Participation Benefits:

  • Increased User Base: More active participation naturally attracts more users, creating a vibrant community.

  • User Retention: Active involvement makes users feel valued and part of something significant, encouraging them to stay longer.

  • Higher Engagement: When users see their contributions making a difference, they engage more actively.

  • Fun and Community: A lively, involved community can transform governance into an enjoyable experience, rather than a chore.

The Domino Effect:

  • User Dependency: The health of Polkadot fundamentally relies on its user base. If only large holders (“whales”) remain, we risk losing the diversity and dynamism that make our ecosystem robust.

  • Treasury Impact: User participation directly affects treasury health, which in turn impacts development funding. A decrease in participation can lead to a less vibrant development pipeline.

The Bigger Picture:

  • This isn’t just a minor issue; it’s existential. The sustainability and growth of Polkadot hinge on its community’s engagement. We need to delve deeper:

Understanding the Problem:

  • Data Collection: We must gather comprehensive data on why users aren’t voting. Is it due to lack of awareness, complexity, or perhaps lack of incentive?

  • Avoid Misdiagnosis: Without proper diagnosis, any solution might just be a placebo. We need to ensure we’re addressing the real issues.

Reflective Questions:

  • Is the Reward Mechanism Helping? Or is it merely a band-aid over a more systemic issue? We need to assess if this mechanism truly boosts meaningful participation or if it’s just a roundabout way to voice dissatisfaction with the current system.

Your call to name things correctly and understand the underlying issues before jumping to solutions is spot on. Let’s keep this conversation going, explore the root causes, and collaboratively work towards meaningful solutions. Your participation and thoughts are greatly appreciated as we navigate these challenges together.

13

Based on this, I would feel the first step is to survey the market and collect a list of reasons DOT holders have as to why they do not participate in governance.

Once a full list is collected, we can boil the responses down to common options and host a simple poll and a more comprehensive survey on market sentiment.

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:woman_shrugging:

(…)

1 Like
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Is this something you plan on doing? If so, very curious about methodology and reporting.