Polkadot Staking Changes: Progress & Timeline

This post is intended to update the community on how changes to staking, and specifically the Dynamic Allocation Pool (DAP), are shaping up. As part of that, we also want to put the various planned changes into a clearer time frame. Most of what is outlined here builds upon previous discussions and proposals, including Proposal: DAP, Roadmap for the Dynamic Allocation Pool, WFC DAP Phase 1, and Changes on Polkadot in March 2026. This post also proposes the initial allocation for Validator incentives and Nominators for the budget split update coming in the following months.

Generally, this is an ambitious endeavor and things are constantly evolving, so everything remains subject to change. Time frames in particular are difficult to commit to, but we are doing our best. Things are moving very quickly as Parity is laser-focused on launching Polkadot into a new era with Products for People. While we try to keep changes to the plan to a minimum, we still believe it is best to adjust things whenever a better option presents itself.

As usual, every proposed change needs to be ratified by OpenGov voters, our plan is a mere suggestion on how to move forward.

What Is Planned

As a brief summary, the proposed changes are essential for creating a sustainable economic model and reducing protocol costs without compromising economic security. On this path, Polkadot has already updated its issuance curve, and work has begun on implementing an issuance buffer to make more efficient use of the available resources, which also includes building a reserve for future use.

Allowing a dynamic adjustment of outflows through the issuance buffer, or DAP, two key stakeholders are most affected: nominators and validators.

Validators
Validators see the most structural changes, centered around separating their reward streams into dedicated budget components. This eventually allows us to better separate the costs of operation from compensating for security.

  • Self-stake incentives: Validators will be encouraged to have more ā€œskin-in-the-gameā€ through self-stake requirements, as outlined in the Incentive for Self-Stake proposal.
  • Operational cost coverage: Validators will eventually receive a fixed stablecoin payment to cover their operational expenses, decoupling infrastructure costs from staking rewards.

Note: Since the budget split and self-stake incentives will arrive before stablecoins can be distributed through the DAP, validators receive unlocked DOT through the self-stake incentive mechanism.

Nominators

  • Nominators will see a reduction in staking rewards, which are compensated by a removal of the slashing risk and an unbonding period of at most 2 days.

Under this new model, costs can be reduced significantly by drawing the economic security directly from the skin-in-the-game of validators. For more details, please refer to The relationship between Issuance and Economic Resilience.

Network Sizing:

Beyond these changes, we are also planning to scale the number of active validators based on demand for cores on the coretime market, smart-contract and other bandwidth requirements.

Timetable

The changes are currently planned to be enacted in the following order:

Date What Description
April Validator Min Commission 10% Validators will be temporarily compensated through a minimum commission of 10%. This will continue until a budget split between validators and nominators is implemented.
End of May Minimum Self-Stake for Validators enforced by the protocol A minimum self bond of 10k DOT will be enforced to secure the network. Non-compliant validators will face significant risk of chilling.
End of May Nominator Benefits Once the network is secured by validator compliance with the minimum self-stake requirement, nominators will benefit from becoming unslashable and gaining a faster (2-day) unbonding period.
Mid June Budget Split Adding rewards in unlocked DOT for self-stake of validators to ensure their skin-in-the-game. Once the issuance buffer pays stablecoins, these DOT rewards will be vested for a year, while the stablecoins cover operational costs. With this change, the commission system will be removed as it is no longer needed. See Budget section for details about expected rewards for nominators and validators in the initial budget period.
EOY Fixed Stablecoin Payment Fixed stablecoin payment for validator’s operational costs in addition to vested DOT for self-stake.
EOY Adjustment of the size of the active validator set based on market demand This enables more efficient use of the available resources by scaling the number of validators based on the demand for cores, smart contract interactions, and product infrastructure demand.

More details in the next section.

Timeline (Past)

March 14th

The annual issuance of DOT has decreased from 120 million to ~55.8 million DOT as part of the new issuance model with DOT supply capped at 2.1 Billion DOT. The issuance is now set on a trajectory to decrease further every two years (see https://dotless.xyz).

March 23rd

Runtime upgrade 2.1.1 has been enacted on Polkadot, introducing the first basic version of DAP, collecting staking slashes. Treasury burns have stopped too. The new runtime allows us to make nominators fast-unbondable and unslashable via future OpenGov calls.

April 1st

Minimum Validator Commission Enforcement: the minimum commission has been set via referendum to 10%. This is a fair change coupled with the decrease of annual issuance and aims to help validators to operate in a sustainable manner until we can provide a separate budget for validators covering operational costs and incentivizing self-stake via vested DOT.

In previous communications, this was tied to the enforcement of the minimum self-stake requirement, but following community feedback and delays in that enactment, it is being rolled out earlier.

Timeline (Future)

May 31st

Deadline for Minimum Stake Compliance

Minimum Self-Stake Enforcement: May 31st is the definitive deadline for validators to meet the 10,000 DOT minimum self-stake requirement. Any validator not complying by then is at risk to be chilled after this date. We kindly encourage every validator to be compliant by then.

Nominator Benefits: Nominators will be made non-slashable and receive a 2-day unbonding period. This change is intended to compensate for anticipated lower nominator rewards, targeted to occur in mid-June.

Runtime Upgrade Supporting Budget Split and Self-Stake Incentive for Validators

By end of May (best case scenario depending on having related code merged and audited in time), a new runtime upgrade will be deployed on Polkadot introducing the following changes around DAP:

OpenGov will have a way to configure budget separately for multiple recipients. The code is flexible enough to accommodate for any number of outflows at runtime level.

Payment of operational costs for validators in stablecoin is still not supported.

The code will be ready to specify budgets but will preserve the current budget until a referendum in mid-June.

Mid-June: The First Iteration of the New Budget Split Model

Enactment of the initial split of outflows as described in the section ā€œInitial Budgetā€ below.

EOY

Stablecoin Issuance

A future runtime upgrade will make DAP multi-asset, allowing it to distribute stablecoins. This timeline is very tentative and depends strongly on other code upgrades and developments.

Additionally, a new referendum is planned to update the budget model. This update will introduce a fixed, flat payment to validators in stablecoin to cover their operational costs. This will also mean that the DOT-denominated self-stake incentives will be adjusted and be distributed vested.

After the DAP is able to pay out stablecoins, the process to cleanly separate validator rewards into a locked DOT component and liquid stablecoin part can be completed. The exact numbers will be part of a discussion with the community when the time comes and will be adjusted to current market conditions (referring to increased operational costs due to inflation of the USD). In general, the numbers can be tweaked via OpenGov.

Adjustments to the Active Set of Validators

To further improve how efficiently the network uses its available resources, we will explore ways to adjust the number of active validators based on actual bandwidth consumption. This includes the number of cores sold on the coretime market and potentially other metrics such as smart contract activity and broader infrastructure usage.

Polkadot’s current setup has 120 cores supporting 600 active validators. Given the current market conditions and usage, and with products still being in early development, this is beyond the current capacity requirements. Therefore, there is significant room to reduce the number of active validators. Based on current conditions, this might result in around 64 cores and 250-300 active validators. Importantly, the size of the active set should also expand once demand increases.

These considerations are still early and influenced by different aspects that are taken into account. These influence both final numbers and the timeline itself. Most notably:

  • Coretime market redesign: the implementation of RFC17 (currently in development, targeting deployment on Polkadot mid Q3) offers the possibility to dynamically scale the number of active validators based on the open market demand for coretime.
  • Improvements such as elastic scaling could mean that system chains run with more cores, naturally increasing the demand for more active validators.
  • Other developments around smart contract usage and product-related infrastructure might also increase the demand for active validators.

Initial Budget for Mid-June

As previously mentioned, the newly issued DOT is split across two separate buckets. The first is a dedicated incentive for validators to maintain self-stake. The second covers payouts for all stakers, which includes both nominators and validators, since validators also participate as stakers through their own self-staked DOT on their own validator.

In the absence of a stablecoin payment, the goal is to increase the self-stake incentive payment to capture both components and distribute these rewards unlocked. This will change once stablecoin payments are possible.

The proposed budget looks as follows:

Validator Self-Stake Incentive

The per-validator budget is calibrated to cover both the compensation for the self-stake and the operational costs. Note that the actual payout per validator depends on the distribution of self-stake within the active set, as well as the usual performance measures (captured by era points).

Incentive component and operational costs (~70% APR on 30,000 DOT self-stake):
Incentive per validator = 30,000 * 0.70 = 21,000 DOT/year

With the current number of 600 validators, this requires an annualized outflow of 12,600,000 DOT.

Staker Payouts

This bucket covers payouts for all stakers, nominators and validators alike. To calibrate it, we target ~3% APR at a staking rate of 50%, applied to the current total supply of ~1.68B DOT. Note that the APR naturally scales with the staking rate and cannot be fixed or predicted.

Yearly staker payout = 1.68 * 10^9 * 0.50 * 0.03 = 25,200,000 DOT

Reserve

This means, the issuance buffer retains ~55.8M - 12.6M - 25.2M = 18.0M DOT annualized. These DOT can be used to fund the Treasury, save for future expenses or potentially as backing of an upcoming stablecoin.

12 Likes

Thanks for the update and the clarification, @jonas

I’m not sure if this has been raised previously, but if the active set is potentially being reduced to 250–300, has there been any discussion around limiting the number of validators per individual or entity?

Thanks!

2 Likes

This is a hard problem to solve, especially in a privacy-preserving way, and there will always be ways to work around any measure put in place. We don’t have anything specific planned for now, but we’re keeping an eye out for anything relevant that comes up.

1 Like

I know it might be too late, but if you can’t ensure that 250-300 validators aren’t operated by a small group of individuals/entities, then there is a big problem of decentralization

The way I see it the solution could be:

  1. We know it and have no problem with that
  2. Finding economincal solution that will make it non logical for validators to run more than x nodes (Will be happy to help here with some ideas if it’s relevant)
4 Likes

Keeping the validator set decentralized will always be a high priority and we are constantly exploring ways to ensure this and improve it. That being said, feel free to propose ideas to the community if you think you found good mechanisms to aid with that challenge.

3 Likes

The most glaring and unforgivable flaw in this proposal is the complete absence of any formal, verifiable mathematical model behind the arbitrary 70%态3% APR allocation.
No model.
No derivation.
No rationale.
No sensitivity analysis.
No optimization objective whatsoever.

How does this exact ratio affect the minimum viable security threshold?
What is the true minimum sustainable revenue validators need to survive long-term?
At what yield level do nominators begin a mass exodus?
What are the stable operating ranges under realistic demand shocks and market stress?

This proposal answers none of them. Zero.

The proposed numbers are the result of a bunch of other posts / analyses that have been linked and provide more rationale.

Hi ,

Our community has instant unstaking since years ago, though flagship community projects providing liquid staking. Did you gather their feedback re 2 day unstaking?

3% rewards for nominators of DOT seems too little / worth the risk, did you gather feedback from Nomiantors? Which % do you expect to remain nominating?

It is true that high DOT rewards undermined efforts by DEFI community projects, massively.

Perhaps it would be worth considering that Staking would be provided though community approved DEFI projects only, and bundled with their offering making return more attractive while boosting those projects.

From my POV the steps the W3F takes miss the opportunity to create a stronger community and even in some cases undermines its work.

Yes, there were substantial opportunities for people to review the changes and provide feedback.

Changes to issuance:

Changes to inflation:

Other changes:

It is rather obvious that if the issuance/inflation of DOT lowers, then the amount of tokens you receive from staking will be lower. The positive is that there are less ā€œnew DOTsā€ being brought into circulation. See: https://x.com/NovaWalletApp/status/2031746839834157217

As always, if you have any issues with the direction of the network, you should vote and actively raise referendums to change it.

Also, just in case, the group I delegate my vote to did not vote in favour of all of the changes that were applied, but that’s how OpenGov works :slight_smile:

2 Likes

it does not present a formal model, derivation, or simulation that justifies the specific parameters.

There is no reproducible framework that leads to these numbers, nor any validation that the system behaves as intended under different conditions.

So while it explains the direction, it does not constitute a verifiable or scientific basis for the allocation.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

And what is the scoring function in DAP for selecting validators?

1 Like

OK~Who has more voting power than W3F?

I’ve noticed a very significant drop in actual staking rewards.

Overall, I think it’s a good thing to be where it is, since March, Polkadot is considered a commodity-class investment vehicle, it is NOT subjected to as stringent guidelines going forward in the future, but the current step-down was unbelievably unforgiving as I had expected it to be?

The forecasted APR is not the same as the actual APR, which is going to lead to an exodus of users leaving because there is not really much point in holding or staking DOT? I know not many people (here) care about the price of Polkadot itself, but it’s heading down to sub-$1 price point and anyone who did (or has) held it for a considerable amount of time, would see no reason to continue?

(Those that held DOT down from its peak? Yeah. I don’t blame them for absolutely hating Polkadot, this whole network has been nothing but a disappointment for the last few years)

In reality, my staking returns have dropped 70-80% since the stepdown. Idk what to you tell you, but nominators got royally screwed on this.

If Polkadot had a booming ecosystem this would be another story, but honestly it doesn’t look good.

1 Like

Interesting discussion.

I think it’s important to separate nominal APY from the overall economic model.

Polkadot is clearly moving toward lower issuance, which naturally reduces staking rewards, but also improves long-term sustainability.

So a ~3% APY should probably not be compared with previous high-inflation phases.

Another point is that validator incentives are evolving, with future models including stablecoin payouts for operational costs and potentially vested DOT rewards.

In that context, the real question might not be ā€œis 3% too low?ā€, but rather:
is the validator set becoming more efficient and resilient?

Especially if the number of standby validators decreases due to higher self-stake requirements, even small inefficiencies in the active set could become more relevant.

Curious to hear how others are thinking about this trade-off

I’m not really complaining personally, it’s a damn good thing to have a permanent maximum supply that leads to considerably better sustainability, especially with W3F/OpenGov being under strict control but, again, the step down was very large (I just checked today, and it’s a 5/6th drop from what it was).

I just hope this year’s inflation hasn’t been squandered like in past years without much to show for it?

By the looks of this forum, there isn’t much action going on here either. Now would be a good time for actual marketing and onboarding significant networks to help carry the load of a further technological adaptation.

1 Like

That’s a fair concern.

From a technical standpoint, this change is really about the security budget.

With higher issuance, inefficiencies in validator performance and capital allocation are easier to absorb. With lower issuance, the system becomes much more sensitive to how efficiently capital is actually used.

So the key question is not just whether APY is lower, but whether the network is becoming more efficient at converting stake into real security.

In a high-issuance system, inefficiencies are subsidized. In a low-issuance system, they become a direct cost.

The recent vote to reduce inflation clearly signaled that the community wants lower overall spending — across validators, nominators, and the treasury.

Raising validator rewards and restoring treasury allocation right after that feels misaligned with that intent.

More importantly, the justification relies mostly on forum discussion rather than a clear quantitative model. Protocol-level economic decisions should be backed by transparent assumptions, defined objectives, and measurable analysis — not just qualitative reasoning.

In addition, the current DAP direction still lacks a clear and concrete design — especially on one of the most critical points raised by the community: how validators are selected in a fair and objective way.

Without clarity on the allocation/selection mechanism, it’s hard to see this as a scientifically grounded approach.

1 Like

I am well aware of all referenda and discussions that took place back them. The situation has changed significantly in the ecosystem: I trust the exodous of value and projects were not unnoticed. None of those were predicted at the original discussions, on the contrary, the aim was to attract value.

Arent we supposed to discuss well before submitting referenda? Isn’t this site a forum for discussion?

@jonas Will the unbonding period of the funds be 2 days even if the nomination pool does not fulfil the new self stake network requirements? Or does the 2 day unbonding period applies to unbonding of funds on the compliant validators only on 31st May?

Taking that all of the referendums are absolutely dominated by the DAOs, I don’t see Polkadot going anywhere but down any time soon. They reject every new proposal and only vote for what is most beneficial for their vote (and they have a SUBSTANTIAL voting power).

We’ve basically abandoned funding hackathons, bringing in new developers, completely abandoned INK! after all their funding for infrastructure, the list goes on and on. No one is going to stick around for a vote, when one DAO has 30,000,000 votes from a tiny locked deposit.

Polkadot is going nowhere fast and everyone is too blind to see it?

How are you going to give 3% to the stakers who have trusted the project for years, watching the token price collapse, and 70% APR to the validators, who until now hadn’t put their own money at risk? It’s clear that whoever designed this model either has validators or is friends with people who do, because the model is completely disproportionate.