Economic Growth Incentives

[alice_und_bob]

This is a proposal to change the distribution of DOT incentives. Instead of just incentivizing staking, I propose to incentivize growing the economy. This is achieved by introducing a mechanism that algorithmically rewards parachains that capture DOT.

Economic Growth Incentives

Introduction

While current tokenomics discussions focus on DOT supply, we still have to solve creating more demand for DOT. In “DOT Alignment & Demand Drivers” I have shown that only 2% of DOT have been captured by parachains. About half of DOT is staked, the other half sits idle. 2/3 of DOT captured by parachains is again staked, putting the actual DOT utilization in the economy to 0.7%.

DOT’s primary problem is not missing a supply cap. Ethereum and Solana, the currently most successful ecosystems in Web3, are doing just fine without it. (It might help as a meme though). Our real problem is that we do not have a DOT-aligned economy. Parachains have almost no incentive to capture DOT. Our first insight is thus very simple:

We need to grow the economy!

To solve the problem, we need to create mechanisms that reward parachains to capture large amounts of DOT, put it to economic use, and increase the DOT value proposition.

The mechanism I propose algorithmically distributes a fixed amount of DOT rewards to parachains that have captured DOT. The benefits are:

• Parachains compete to capture DOT. Parachains that offer the best economic benefit will create the most value and capture the most DOT.
• DeFi protocols will (for the first time) be able to compete against DOT staking APR
• Incentivizing economic growth is cheaper than incentivizing security AND creates additional value
• Removing DOT from idle circulation creates a supply crunch

Economic growth + supply crunch is an excellent recipe to create positive sentiment.

Reducing Inflation will remove DOT demand

We need to talk about the big elephant in the room with the current tokenomics discussion. I agree that Polkadot substantially overpays for security and we need to reduce block rewards to a reasonable level. But there is a big risk: Reducing inflation removes demand for DOT. Let’s look into it in this chapter.

The currently favored model in early temperate checks is to introduce a supply cap at 2.1b DOT and halven inflation every 2 years. The intended outcome would look like this:

The problem here is that we do not know if the staking rate will be maintained. The thesis arguing for a supply cap is that DOT will be perceived as a harder asset. But it is pure speculation how strong that effect will be. On the other hand, reducing the staking APR can lower the demand for staking. The bet that is being proposed is that hard-cap-maxi sentiment will outweigh sell pressure from reduced DOT utility through staking.

It might very well turn out that the marginal staker does not accept 6.1% staking APR an will only accept 8%, which would create this situation:

If the hard cap bet fails and stakers drop out, we might see tens or hundreds of millions of DOT move from staking to idle capital, flooding supply. The opposite of the indended outcome.

Critical voices might say that staking is better than not staking and so stakers will accept even the harshest APRs reductions, as long as they believe in DOT. This argument can be easily invalidated. Consider: Why are there idle DOT at all? Currently, 45% of DOT are sitting idle, not participating in staking. There is capital that chooses to sit idle. Pushing staking APR down will further push the ratio over time.

Introducing Economic Growth Icentives creates DOT demand

Our goal is to create more demand and pull DOT into the economy so that it creates value. To do this, we need to create DOT alignment with parachains. Using DOT has to be beneficial to them. In a developed community, this will naturally come from network effects. Our challenge is to bootstrap this.

Parachains not only have no reason to use DOT, they are at a disadvantage! They have to compete with 10%+ APR for staked DOT.

We need to level the playing field for parachains to be be able to compete with staking.

To do this, I propose we introduce “Economic Growth Incentives”.

Currently, we incentivize staking with 102m DOT/year, while growing the economy is not incentivized. My model suggests to redistribute some of the incentives, so that staking and parachains both receive incentives for attracting DOT.

Economic Growth Incentives introduce a fixed amount of DOT that is algorithmically distributed proportional to the share that each parachain has captured DOT.

This rewards parachains for capturing DOT and puts them in competition against each other in captured DOT.

Example

Polkadot allocates 10 million DOT per year to parachains that capture DOT.

Initial situation

If we started today, this would be the situation:

Parachain	DOT captured	Share of DOT captured	Yearly Incentive
Hydration	7.3m DOT	59%	5.9m DOT
Acala	3.1m DOT	25%	2.5m DOT
Bifrost	1m DOT	8%	8m DOT
Moonbeam	900k DOT	7%	7m DOT

This incentive would be huge and would allow those protocols to forward a share of the incentives to users to create additional DOT demand for the protocol.

Competition kicks in

Now the game is open for parachains to capture a share incentives. Existing parachains might open up their economies to accept DOT. Mythical and Unique might push for bigger DOT markets for NFT payments. Peaq could create special campaigns to attract DOT holders to join their machine economies. If Hydration forwarded all DOT incentives to DOT liquidity provision and paid 2% over the staking rate, it could pull in another 59m DOT. etc…

Equilibrium

Eventually, we would find an equilibrium where the economy would pull in an amount of DOT that would translate to an APR

In the example above, we reduced we yearly staking rewards from 102m DOT → 51m DOT and introduced 17m DOT as Economic Growth Incentives. Since DOT in the economy creates economic value (let’s assume 2% baseline as is realistic in DeFi) we can assume an equilibrium of a subsidy base rate about 2% below staking APR in the economy.

As a result, we would have removed demand for staking. But instead of the DOT going idle, it went INTO the economy. The result under our assumptions would grow the economy from 0.7% to 18% DOT capture, a 25x increase.

While the aggregate rate of DOT that is not idle has decreased only a few percentage points, we would have an economy that is 25x more active, while having reduced costs for incentives.

Summary

My proposed model redistributes incentives from staking to economic growth. It creates competition between parachains to capture DOT, forces innovation, and creates additional utility for DOT. It removes DOT from idle supply and lowers our cost base for incentives in the system.

The model can be implemented manually (via retroactive OpenGov drops) or algorithmically (as a constantly streamed reward). The model might be adapted to Polkadot Hub to incentivice smart contracts in a similar fashion.

Let’s create DOT alignment and grow the economy.

[ChrawnnaCorp]

@alice_und_bob

DOT’s primary problem is not missing a supply cap.

Do read the mission of the Capped & Stepped supply initiative here.

Applying pressure with gradual & scheduled income reductions & a full stop deadline removes the comfortable mirage of infinite credit and forces action to create revenue that has hitherto not happened despite a LOT of ideas!

Once we’re capped turning these ideas into action becomes urgent. Great thoughts in general here!

[sudey]

Let’s do something, how long can we discuss this topic? We have been discussing the topic of inflation for a year and a half, and we will continue to discuss tougher inflation for a year. We’re just talking, but there’s not much action. All I’ve been hearing is let’s do this, let’s do that- for 2 years now. Wasn’t it clear before that it was difficult for DeFi projects to compete, with half a quota of stakes…it would be better to pay attention to why projects are leaving polkadot- manta, centrifuge perhaps phala… centrifuge, as soon as they left, they immediately had liquidity. Maybe a rude answer is an opinion, but the bitter truth is better. than a sweet lie.

[coco]

@alice_und_bob

DOT have been captured by parachains

Some half-baked thoughts on this. (I sincerely hope I’m not violating the forum rules.)

What exactly is meant by “DOT have been captured by parachains”?

Most parachains do not own their DOT by having purchased it on the open market, but rather through funding by OpenGov (or the Web3 Foundation?).

This fact makes the plan somewhat absurd - issuing a reward for holding DOT that was never actually bought creates a new vicious cycle.
This factor must be taken into account, and a distinction made between DOT that was acquired and DOT that was granted. But how can this technically be implemented?

The question must also be expanded to ask whether parachains and projects, first of all, have the financial capability and, second, the intent to acquire DOT from the open market. Their current business model, which is already heavily in use, suggests otherwise.

It appears more likely that they profit from funded DOT and then, additionally, dilute Polkadot’s value through the issuance of their own tokens. Thus, the proposed measure would only truly work if DOT remains the primary store-of-value vehicle.

A fundamental misunderstanding might be that the problem is not the freely circulating DOT supply per se. The real issue is that DOT must actually be purchased on the open market.
Only that can ultimately increase the market capitalization.

Because: It’s true that around half of all DOT are not staked.
But how come they’re not flooding the market and instead just sitting idle?
This suggests they are strategically not being staked by market participants who are sympathetic to the ecosystem.
At the very least, it disproves the claim that unstaked DOT automatically harms the market capitalization.

A theoretical example: Even if 100% of all DOT were unstaked but not sold on the open market, it would not harm market capitalization. Conversely, if all available DOT were staked or absorbed by other institutions, but no DOT were bought on the open market, it would not benefit the market capitalization.

So, we need to create incentives that fuel the open market.
That happens exclusively through narratives and creating psychological awareness that buying DOT makes sense.
That’s not exactly a revelation.
However, this proposed measure might actually harm that psychological momentum.

Why?
Isn’t it generally the case in every ecosystem that parachains, rollups, and projects are the winners, while the average token holder/market participant ends up losing in comparison?

Of course, we need projects and rollups — that’s what keeps the ecosystem and Web3 alive.
Still, it sends a dangerous signal to suggest that these already top-of-the-food-chain entities will now be artificially boosted, while the incentives for individual stakers are significantly reduced.

It could give the impression that a system is being created which further benefits already privileged participants.

If this plan is pursued, it is absolutely essential to ensure that all DOT held by parachains and projects were purchased on the open market — not received for free through various funding mechanisms.
Otherwise, the entire measure would appear absurd and would have a clear psychological backfire.

Furthermore, I’ve already explained multiple times why I don’t necessarily agree with the assumption that the “Hard Pressure Model” will cause most current DOT holders to sell their DOT - at least not their main stack (and they wouldn’t have many staking rewards left to sell anyway).

The main stack can only be sold once, while staking rewards can keep flowing endlessly.
That’s why market participants are much more reluctant to part with their main stack. It would be essentially locking themselves out of future opportunities.
If they do sell it anyway, it’s not necessarily a bad thing because those DOT would then end up in the hands of participants more positively aligned with the ecosystem and thus bring value to it.

So it’s not unlikely that a temporary market shift might occur, which, however, would then create a healthy new foundation.

Once again, a simple logic applies: A market participant always acts with profit in mind.
This can fundamentally occur in two ways:

1. Buy low, sell high. Obvious.

2. Buy and generate profit by selling staking rewards until the initial investment is recouped and beyond. Of course, the main stack can also be included in that calculation.

Any market participant who believes in the ecosystem will sell their main stack only reluctantly or only at a significantly higher market cap than the one at which they bought it.
Yes, there’s always uncertainty, but the right narratives such as scarcity and JAM (as a vision for the future) support the idea that most people, at least the right ones, will stick around.

[alice_und_bob]

Thanks @coco, I will provide some clarifications.

The value of DOT is tied to its demand. Demand can come from 3 sources:

• staking
• transactions
• usage in the economy, typically as collateral

Most people simplify too much an think value generation can only come through transactions, but that is wrong. Locking up the tokens productive manners (= demand) creates value and therefore gives value attribution to the token (mirrored in a reduction of floating supply)

Currently, DOT has almost nothing to do other than getting staked. As I outline in DOT Alignment & Demand Drivers, parachains don’t have a reason to “capture” (make users deposit) DOT. There is no game theoretic alignment that makes parachains want to capture DOT and put it to productive use. So DOT in its current condition has fairly limited utility.

My overall direction is to find ways to leverage DOT in the Polkadot economy so that its usage and utility increases.

DOT can only be valuable when the parachains/services building on top of Polkadot attribute value to it. Right now, DOT usage in the economy is disincentivized through staking. So we need a mental shift, a paradigm change. We need to find ways to remove the disincentive to use DOT.

Elastic Scaling and Polkadot Hub are partial answers, but not sufficient:

• Elastic Scaling burns DOT for coretime, but compute and DA are economic races to the bottom, so while I expect to see increasing DOT utilization incoming here, it is not an economic driver we can overly rely on.
• Polkadot Hub will increase transaction volume (and DOT burn), propably significantly, but since we have so much supply of compute in Polkadot, it will take a very long time before we max out and drive significant volume. Still, Hub will be a strong source of DOT capture.

The unanswered question is how we can give good reasons to parachains to use DOT.

I invite you to reread the proposal with the understanding that “capturing” DOT means that parachains convince users to deposit DOT to put it to economic use. I think it will lead to a very different reading of the proposal.

Cheers

[coco]

Isn’t there a fourth type on the demand side: the desire to hold DOT based on belief and expectations of value appreciation?
And isn’t this, at least in the current situation we are in, where all three other factors (especially transactions and usage) are still far from sufficient, particularly important and promising?

But alright, your clarification actually does help me.
This would give parachains the following opportunity:

By capturing DOT, they receive incentives, which they can redirect into financial products in order to distribute them to users.
These users, in turn, bring their DOT into the cycle, which again enables the parachains to receive more incentives, and to distribute these, at least in part (the part they don’t keep themselves), again to users, which leads to further inflows, etc. etc.
Seen this way, it’s a self-consistent dynamic that can indeed bind DOT or redirect it from staking into these offerings.

However, in a zero-sum game, this only works if parachains do not exploit the system by using their funded DOT to extract further capital.
It would also be very helpful if parachains were required to provide their financial products in DOT rather than in their own tokens, which in the end only dilute the capitalization of DOT.

[alice_und_bob]

@coco

However, in a zero-sum game, this only works if parachains do not exploit the system by using their funded DOT to extract further capital.

In a non-interactive game, you can just take the rewards and run. But the game is interactive (involves time and players react to each other) and these products would quickly lose share and DOT would move to other parachains.

@coco

It would also be very helpful if parachains were required to provide their financial products in DOT rather than in their own tokens, which in the end only dilute the capitalization of DOT.

Forcing market conditions and economic planning rerely work. There is alternatives to Polkadot that don’t force you into strict economic models.

The beauty of the mechanism I have outlined is that it creates an optional incentive for parachains without applying force.

[alice_und_bob]

I created a video to explain EGI: https://youtu.be/aZ5Gn4wXzY0

[coco]

Some Thoughts

First, there is the first-mover effect: With EGI parachains that have already captured a large amount of DOT receive even more DOT, which they can either distribute as incentives or put to work for themselves. This enables them, in the future, to capture relatively more incentives again, putting newer or smaller parachains at a strategic disadvantage.

I would suggest introducing a snapshot at which all parachains active at that time are treated equally. In other words, a very large parachain like Hydration with many millions of DOT should, from that point onward, be treated on equal footing with a parachain holding far less DOT. This means that only DOT acquired after that point should be included in the calculation, not the DOT already held before. As a side note, some of these DOT (especially in the case of Hydration) were provided by the Treasury and, in my understanding, should not be rewarded with incentives in the first place.

Second, the assumption that idle DOT is bad for the economy is, at first glance, perfectly reasonable. However, the fact that roughly half of all DOT are consistently idle without apparently creating any selling pressure argues against this view. On the contrary, it is actually the staked DOT that generate ongoing selling pressure through their rewards.

We also start from the assumption that inflation should be reduced as much as possible in order to minimize selling pressure. However, with this newly introduced system (EGI), an additional source of inflation would arise or rather, inflation would not truly be reduced, but merely shifted from stakers to parachains as the beneficiaries.

I know that your underlying assumption is also to limit inflation. But with this method, we are not limiting it as much as we could without EGI, at least not before reaching the point where many stakers would be driven to exit securing the network.

In other words, we are not maximizing the potential for inflation reduction; instead, we are trading that potential for the benefits of EGI, while accepting the drawback of being unable to limit inflation to the fullest extent.

There is also a point I have already made.

Limiting inflation or introducing a max supply fundamentally has two advantages:

1. Minimizing selling pressure

2. Creating the narrative of an asset with scarcity

The second point (the psychological momentum) should not be underestimated in my view.

But we can only achieve this in full strength, if our measures are not half-hearted.

The Bitcoin narrative (cutting inflation in half at set intervals until reaching 21B) is a prime example of the advantage this can bring. Any half measures will be far less convincing.

However, with the EGI method, we would have to make compromises here, because if we introduced it alongside the Hard Pressure Model, the remaining staking rewards derived from inflation would likely be too low to keep stakers and validators satisfied.

In other words, EGI would require us to take a less aggressive approach to reducing inflation. To put it briefly: EGI would certainly have market-dynamic advantages, but it would limit our ability to fully leverage the momentum of the psychological narrative and in total would limit us to some degree in the amount of inflation reduction.

[sudey]

@coco

I would suggest introducing a snapshot at which all parachains active at that time are treated equally. In other words, a very large parachain like Hydration with many millions of DOT should, from that point onward, be treated on equal footing with a parachain holding far less DOT

I totally agree with you here.

[NickD]

Thanks Tommi. This idea resonates with me. I like the idea of tying incentives to demand drivers of Dot. This is directly linked to the on-going work at Web3 Deal Desk where we are updating the criteria for deals that we fund. Future criteria will likely resemble the Dot drivers you’ve outlined be that Dot Sinks (collateral use cases) or Dot burn (e.g. via transactions) etc.

If your idea progressed, i can see us talking to Prospects considering deploying in Polkadot and not only tying grants to dot driver milestones, but also outlining how much of the incentives they could earn over time via the programme you described if they managed to execute well.

Also, DeFi dapps don’t earn that much on L2s, but if they can come to Polkadot and vacuum up dot, and be rewarded for doing so, that could be attractive to them..

[MattSanto]

I believe this proposal is excellent, and I firmly agree that this should be the path forward. The case of Bifrost is a very clear example: by incentivizing DOT purchases and rewarding those who take risks in DeFi, it generates real interest and, more importantly, concrete strategies for using liquid DOT. This is exactly what we need if we aim to maintain network security while also taking advantage of the available rewards.

Moreover, this approach not only drives active participation but also incentivizes the creation of content around the protocols. Showcasing strategies with attractive APYs allows more users to discover opportunities and understand the possibilities of using DOT dynamically—not restricted solely to traditional staking nor limited to those who already hold large volumes of the token.

Rewarding parachains for capturing DOT and creating competition among them sets up a healthy scenario where economic growth and token utility reinforce each other. As outlined, this model would not only strengthen the on-chain economy but also diversify DOT usage, reducing idle capital and generating additional value for the entire ecosystem.

In short, I believe this redistribution of incentives toward economic growth, balanced with security, is a solid, pragmatic strategy capable of propelling Polkadot to a far more competitive level compared to other ecosystems.

[rvalle]

I agree the bottom line is low economic activity. I have some random/preliminary questions/thoughts to share:

What is the amount of burned tokens as percentage of issued tokens? How long would it take for those to off-set?

And what is the percentage of inflation-issued tokens invested in growing the economic activity, versus the spent in maintaining the current economy?

do opengov projects grow the economic activity, or generate new economic streams?

Are we leaving money on the table with network fees? I know polkadot transactions are cheap, but does it make sense to charge the same for voting on a referendum as tokenising real state?

Some very healthy DAOs out there fund themselves from Transaction Fees, while their tokens remain as utility for the DAO. Since projects know how much transactions are worth in the business domain, have we considered revenue sharing with projects? i.e. 50% burned 50% for the project.

As an Ecosystem, are we creating too many tokens and fragmenting value generation? how can we generate incentives for projects to operate mainly in DOT and increase the burned amounts?

In my opinion people that invest in DOT are investing in our future. Inflation may not be bad, if it is invested in increasing the ecosystem value, and if there is a locking mechanism that shields from the effect of inflation (i.e. staking). But the bottom line is that the Economy needs to blossom.

I think it will.

[alice_und_bob]

Since other proposals were going live with tokenomics changes, I have pushed a proposal that opens up the possibility to implement EGI or a similar model in the future.

Growth Pressure Capped & Stepped Supply Schedule

[labormedia]

@alice_und_bob Interesting take on supply caps—let’s dig deeper.

1. Skin-in-the-game & concentration. If non-stakers (potential new on boarders + sitting DOT holders) have zero-skin on the staking system, why assume they share the interests of early stakers and market concentrators? Today, the top 10 DOT addresses hold ~25% and the top 50 hold >50% of supply, which is exactly the kind of concentration that turns token voting into plutocracy risk, not broad alignment. Staking economics amplify this: platform quotes and aggregators show ~12–13% native APR (varies by provider), a structural tailwind for large, compounding holders. Historically, Polkadot’s implementation stack has also been stewarded through a Foundation (W3F)–to–core dev company (Parity) pipeline, with sizable initial allocations to the Foundation—useful context for why “reduced managing hands” and high rewards have tended to favor concentration over time.

2. Issuance ≠ inflation. Reducing issuance is a monetary-supply lever; inflation is a price-level outcome. Calling “redirected issuance” a “reduction in inflation” conflates the two. In economics, inflation is the broad rise in prices of goods & services (CPI), not a token’s emission schedule. If we look at price this year: DOT is down roughly ~45% year-to-date (from ≈$7.0 on Jan 1 to ≈$3.9 on Aug 15), which is better described as asset depreciation (or loss of purchasing power for holders), not “inflation falling.” So yes—reducing issuance may improve long-term value accrual, but redirecting issuance (e.g., from staking to other uses) isn’t the same as reducing inflation in the economic sense.

3. OpenGov without an economic mission. OpenGov is token-weighted, conviction-locked voting—a governance mechanism, not an economic model. Without an explicit monetary/economic mission, it risks ossifying into “staking governance” where big tokenholders set policy, a pattern the DAO/PoS literature repeatedly flags as plutocracy/collusion-prone under high concentration.

4. The core problem is concentration. Polkadot’s “economic experiment” stalls if a small set of wallets can entrench control and harvest issuance indefinitely—regardless of whether rewards are paid to validators, parachains, or treasury grantees. That’s not just vibes; token-holder concentration + token-weighted voting is a well-documented capture vector in PoS/DAO systems. Anti-trust logic in traditional markets exists for a reason: to prevent dominant actors from perpetuating dilution/exclusion of late entrants. This includes concentrated hands on grants managements (Web3 Foundation + Parity Technology collusive operations). There are already global impact anti-trust concerns on “Algorithmic Price Fixing”, and active legislation on this direction which introduces itself as a risk in any collusive activity on Digital Tokens ( Klobuchar, Colleagues Introduce Antitrust Legislation to Take on Algorithmic Price Fixing, Bring Down Costs - News Releases - U.S. Senator Amy Klobuchar ). I am talking about coordinated global economic regulators here.

5. Where we could likely agree—make demand real and broad. Your post says only ~2% of DOT is “captured by parachains,” ~half staked, ~half idle—that’s the demand gap. Economic Growth Incentives (EGI) aim to fix the incentive mismatch (staking APR vs. real DOT usage). I’m supportive if the design avoids reflexive, insider recycling. Two concrete guardrails:

• Proof-of-Acquisition: EGI eligibility only for DOT acquired on open markets or via end-user deposits, not pre-grants; on-chain proof paths (DEX fills, CEX proof-of-reserve attestations, or custody attestations) can reduce “circular grants” risk of reinforcement-loops of capital concentration, which reduces the chance for new or unaffiliated builders/users to gain meaningful access to either attention and/or funding (Your thread already surfaces the “granted vs. bought” concern.), masks value creation of DOT not circulating on market’s usage (insider economy) and makes OpenGov look participatory while outcomes remain non-redistributive (affecting new on-boarder’s value).

• User-first distribution: A hard minimum share cap of EGI must flow to end-users providing DOT liquidity or collateral.

6. Blend caps + EGI, accurately referenced. On caps: Wish-For-Change referenda proposing capped & stepped supply (Soft/Hard/Growth Pressure variants: #1709–#1711, Aug 15, 2025). Great venue to bind a cap with an EGI budget that decays over time. Couple of concrete tie-ins:

• Dual-track stream: Split issuance into **Security (staking) and Growth (EGI) streams with independent, declining schedules** (e.g., halving-like steps for both), so we don’t just redirect—we actually reduce net issuance over time while bootstrapping real DOT use.

• Demand-responsive throttle: Make EGI **counter-cyclical to staking share**: when staking APR is high and share is above the ideal rate, EGI gets a temporary boost to help DeFi/real-use compete; when staking drops below target, EGI tapers. (Polkadot already models an staking_reward_curve.ideal_stake parameter that nudges rewards vs. treasury; EGI can piggyback on that signal.)

7. Quick reality checks to keep us honest.

• Distribution today: top-10 ≈25%, top-50 >50%. This is the alignment constraint to solve.

• Staking share & APR: ≈49% of supply staked (varies), APR commonly ~12–13% native—DeFi must out-compete that.

• Price context: DOT ≈$3.9 today (Polkassembly header), down ~45% YTD—holders feel dilution even when issuance is redirected.

Bottom line: Supply caps alone won’t decentralize who benefits with the current concentration scenario. Blend a cap with EGI designed for broad, provable user acquisition and explicit anti-concentration, anti-trust, guardrails that aligns parachains with global compliance, DOT demand and reduces net issuance over time—without entrenching the same whales. For those following caps specifically, the current proposals are #1709–#1711 (WFC)—worth aligning your EGI mechanics there so we ship one coherent monetary policy instead of parallel experiments, thus creating real governance over an aligned economic mission.

@ChrawnnaCorp curious how you see Proof-of-Acquisition and decaying EGI fitting alongside the Soft/Hard/Growth-pressure schedules you just posted.

⸻

[Maxx]

I’m actually hoping PoP actually pays off in terms of governance? Having actual input and any holder has a say vs. the biggest whales determining the direction of the network?

Not just some run-of-the-mill buy/stake/hold generic ecosystem. I want to see DeFi connect and actually expand, instead of singular networks hoarding all the activity!

This year alone I found options to not use centralized exchanges for the first time ever thanks to the Moonbeam dev team! I often can bridge assets from chain to chain without traditional bridge methods, but it can end up being very costly to do so.

Hopefully with Gavin Wood out of the shadows and back in the spotlight, and governance taking a different direction, there will be more uses for DOT in future.