Protecting your Parachain/Parathread against Expropriation

One risk in any decentralized/“democratic” system is that some consensus forms to directly or indirectly acquire or impair the property of another group/individual.

This can discourage capital investments, impede innovation and incentivize collusive/cartel ‘like’ behavior. This thread is based on the premise those side-effects are undesirable and out weigh any claimed benefits.

In the context of Polkadot this can happen if some individual/group decides they’d like to have some part of, or all of, the functionality of your Parachain/Parathread as a System (Common Good) Parachain.
Their reasons for this are many, varied and may have merit in some cases.

The objective of this thread is to explore whether Polkadot Governance can secure the property rights of Parachain/Parathread developers/investors/owners. Ideally we should also allow for a mechanism that permits Polkadot to add System (Common Good) Parachains, but in a manner that, at a minimum, preserves the property rights of Parachain/Parathread owners and does not induce the undesirable side-effects mention above.

  1. Are there currrently any enforceable governance safeguards against Polkadot expropriating your Parachain/Parathread idea? How do they work?
  2. If not, are on-chain governance safeguards feasible in the current governance code?
  3. What should such a safeguard look like? e.g. Nothing, current status is fine.

Context:
To keep the topic focused can we focus on the Statemine/Statemint plan to add a DEX:

Could you illustrate how youl expropriation safeguard would have worked in this real-world example?
Please also link to any relevant threads discussing the Statemine/Statemint plan to add a DEX.

2 Likes

I’ll kick off with my 2c

  1. Are there any enforceable governance safeguards against Polkadot expropriating your Parachain/Parathread idea?
    I don’t know with any certainty. The Statemine/Statemint DEX discussion strongly suggests there isn’t, or it is not generally known.
  2. Are such on-chain governance safeguards feasible in the current governance code?
    I’m not that familiar with the code.
  3. What should such a safeguard look like?
  • The governance should have a hard/irrevocable bar on Polkadot ever owning or operating a Common Good/System Parachain.
  • Instead all such chains must be provided on a fee-for-service basis from 3rd party Parachains, and allow for development where a new chain is required (if a new Parachain development is done with treasury funds it is open source)
  • Before a new Parachain is created/developed two thresholds ought be passed:
    a. A call for tenders from existing (i.e. no vapour-ware) Parachains must have had no winner.
    b. There is a separate tender to develop/operate the new Parachain
  • The tender & treasury processes permit paying/reimbursing tenderers to prepare non-trivial tender applications
  • All tenders are for any amount of time, say, less than 99 years, or at least cannot be awarded in perpetuity

If Polkadot wants to add a System (a.k.a. Common Good) Parachain:

i. It drafts a tender document and process in the usual way (there is lots of prior art/best practice guidance and resources in this space)
ii. The tender proposal is open for comment and feedback/amendment. Then is voted on once finalized.
iii. Calls for tenders and awards the (smart) contract i.e. runs the tender process
iv. Pays the tender winner the agreed fees from the Treasury, per the tender conditions and criteria.

Statmine/Statemint DEX

  • A tender would be prepared specifying the required DEX functionality the chain is to provide (UI/UX, metrics for price discovery, price discovery, market impact, front running etc.)
  • Existing DEX operators would respond - they do not have to have a Parachain slot, i.e. they could be operating their DEX as a standalone Substrate Relay/Parachain, or a Parathread.
  • If there is no existing chain, a new tender is prepared to create and operate a new DEX chain.

Note:

  1. I am aware that this may mean that Parity is initially (for the first generation of contracts) likely to be over represented as a tender winner or a member of a winning consortium. With the exception of a DEX tender, where there appear to be mature incumbents.
  2. I am not a DEX developer, I have no pecuniary or financial interests in any DEX at any stage of development.
  3. I have no pecuniary or financial interests in Parity.
  4. I have not discussed these ideas with anyone.
1 Like

interesting topic - i’d maybe make the title a little more accessible and the top line an easier intro into your examples/points to hand hold people into this meaty area which is not well discussed, but is important.