Polkadot patent scope: Crates

[taqtiqa-mark]

Context

This is not a thread to solicit objections to, or complaints about this patent. I am a supporter of patent systems in general, and the idea of software patents in particular. Of course patent systems can be improved - this is not about those issues.

Question

Is there any authoritative (binding) guidance on the scope of the Polkadot patent, expressed in terms of rust crates. Specifically:

• Substrate crates
• ORML crates

I’m not sure of the correct or best way to frame the questions/issues. Here are some attempts to frame this in the form of questions:

• Which crates are considered to contain elements of an embodiment of the elements/parts of the patent?
• Which crates would open the door to patent holder(s) being able to make an infringement claim?
• In terms of the Rust crates, what constitutes use of the patent?

Of course, not using any of the aforementioned crates would not immunize/indemnify you from an infringement claim.
You do have to study the patent to ensure your code does not implement ideas that infringe on the rights of the patent holders.

However, it can be useful to have and unambiguous statement that certain crates do not contain elements of an embodiment of the patent.
It would also be useful to know if certain use cases are considered out of scope of the patent, e.g. any permissioned/permissionless chain use case is in-scope/out-of-scope, etc.

The Polkadot patent

US20190058581A1 - Methods and Systems for a Heterogeneous Multi-Chain...

Related

The following are threads that are likely relevant to topics or questions that could be construed as related to, but off-topic in, this thread. Please consider posting in one of these:

How should we choose a license?

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Polkadot: The centralized decentralized ecosystem - a cartel?

This contradiction arose from the observation that if you’re developing some solution around a Parachain, your solution likely won’t scale out-the-box: Proof that Poltadot is a choke-point is the fact that Polkadot Parachain slot auctions are a permanent feature and not a temporary workaround (“A parachain slot is a scarce resource on Polkadot as only a limited number are available”). Further, I observe Parachains seem to develop their own: Tokens/coins Governance Is it possible that, for…

Protecting your Parachain/Parathread against Expropriation

One risk in any decentralized/“democratic” system is that some consensus forms to directly or indirectly acquire or impair the property of another group/individual. This can discourage capital investments, impede innovation and incentivize collusive/cartel ‘like’ behavior. This thread is based on the premise those side-effects are undesirable and out weigh any claimed benefits. In the context of Polkadot this can happen if some individual/group decides they’d like to have some part of, or all …

[taqtiqa-mark]

A community member suggested in a DM that the patent might be purely defensive in nature. I’m skeptical for the following reasons:

1. This page explicitly cites the patent, and there is no suggestion that the rights were sought for defensive reasons:
   Polkadot Consensus Part 1: Enhanced Economic Security via NPoS
2. There is the Google Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge model (creative commons licensed), and that has not been adopted. IIUC this would still allow for some patent rights to be asserted, but it would potentially clarify some use cases:
   Open Patent Non-Assertion Pledge - Google
3. There is the Crypto Open Patent Alliance, and that has not been joined. This too would appear allow for some patent rights to be asserted, but it would potentially clarify some use cases. There are mentions of an Exhibit C, which is absent from the online PDF I was able to find, so this is a little murky:
   https://www.opencrypto.org/

Has anyone launched a DOT alternative, say using NPoS, built on Substrate, and seen no objection from Parity?
That would seem to be the purest test of the patent position of Parity.

[burdges]

I do not speak for Parity, and IANAL, but one agument for defensiveness would be:

1. “The European Patent Convention (EPC), Article 52, paragraph 2, excludes from patentability … programs for computers”. Asian nations have “interesting” views on software patents of course.
2. “Patents are territorial rights. In general, the exclusive rights are only applicable in the country or region in which a patent has been filed and granted, in accordance with the law of that country or region.” (WIPO)

I’d naievely think US blockchain patents should only pertain to the US market, and so enforcement action should discuss active pursute of the US market, which then invites the US SEC down upon you. Afaik these projects chase away the US market specifically so they do not antagonize the US SEC.

[taqtiqa-mark]

After reviewing the patent, I’ve reached the conclusion that Claim 15: “Shared security” is self evidently invalid (yes, examiners have been known to make mistakes). Confirmation of this comes via @burdges acknowledgement (in a different, but still relevant, context):

@burdges

If DOT valuation collapsed then relay chain accounts have no value anyways, both by definition, and because our assumptions break.

This is also consistent with previous observations that strongly suggested the game theoretic claims were similarly either false or mistaken:

Tellling the story of the game theory behind FRAME pallets

To substantiate this remark: The following establishes that while you can often show that a game equilibrium exists (Nash), you can’t appeal to a similarly universal statement that efficient dynamics enjoy the universality of Nash’s existence theorem “Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria” Or in other words, yes that is "… a very sweeping negative result,” and "If you’re trying to figure out if your game will easily find an equilibrium,…it’s on you to provide the argument w…

The non-crypto-obscurantist translation for all that is: this is pure scam - security is by assumption alone, and the various crypto-obscurantist claims seek to obfuscate that simple fact.

The patented shared consensus security claims depend on a token value >$0. Specifically, as I read the patent detail @rphmeier and @gavofyork either never possessed such an invention for the shared security properties they claim (see para [0145]), or were mistaken. Either way I don’t see any invention disclosed that supports their assertions.

Detailed description elements which are vacuous when the token (stake) is near worthless or worthless (DOT=$0), among possibly other paragraphs:

• [0052]
• [0064] - [0066]
• [0077]
• [0091]
• [0098]
• [0100]
• [0102]
• [0103]
• [0145]
• [0262]

Interestingly, this is the only patented Ponzi-style scheme I am aware of. It is also the most sophisticated.

How to understand this in the context of prior Ponzi schemes:

• Cryptography projects are to crypto-currencies what charities were to Madoff; they provided a veneer of respectability, real prestige, and good-will.
• Crypto-obscurantism as a old-school confidence trick (SEC Investor Alert: Ponzi schemes Using virtual Currencies):
  • “…the latest innovation, technology”: Cryptographic security, distributed consensus proofs etc
  • “…the promise of high returns”: double digit returns to staking
  • “…rather than engaging in any legitimate investment activity”: the stored data loses its secured property whenever… DOT=0 or some neighborhood of that value