I put some comments in X posts recently here .
I don’t mean them as harsh criticism, I’m more trying to understand the goals and potential compromises that come with making this an iPhone/Android app.
Gist of it is that whilst there will always be a link between which appleid installed something from the App Store, there appears to be several in-app things that store/publish/reveal identity that could be configured away or solved for.
Is the intention to solve for these? What is the current goal re-in-app privacy?
linked x post content:
Genuine q from a beta user. I expected the app to be private: no email/phone/keys on device. But the repo shows Firebase contacted every launch, screen views tied to a Keychain UUID that survives reinstall, and RPC nodes seeing my IP. Which of these change in prod?
expanding a bit as I go through the repo:
Privacy gaps in the iOS beta (ios-dev-v0.1.3):
- iceTransportPolicy unset → defaults to .all → calls hand your real IP to the peer. You already run TURN. One line to fix.
- Firebase contacted every launch, before Polkadot.
Firebase = Google sees IP first, & identity_backend_url stays remotely mutable. Nothing I audit today is pinned
PostHog also logs screen views against a Keychain UUID that survives reinstall
Asks:
— Config on-chain
— Tor + light client
— TESTNET_FEATURE off in prod
— .xcprivacy