Moonbeam referendum 161 moved the DOT, USDC and USDT backing xcDOT, xcUSDC and xcUSDT out of the sovereign account. Moonbeam team, what is the plan?

Ecosystem
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On Aug 5, Moonbeam governance (ref 161) transferred 233,105 DOT, 107,463 USDC and 174,265 USDT backing xcDOT/xcUSDC/xcUSDT from their sovereign account on Polkadot Asset Hub into an ordinary account[1][2][3]. Holders were told the helpdesk "could not assist with an individual xcDOT migration

When (UTC) Chain, block Event
2026-08-01 00:01 Moonbeam 16,672,927 Open Technical Committee enters maintenance mode. All Balances, EVM, Ethereum and XCM calls rejected for users.
2026-08-05 14:39 to 15:58 Moonbeam 16,733,127 to 16,733,812 Referendum 161, WhitelistedCaller track. One vote of 19,000,000 GLMR. Confirmed and executed in 45 minutes. No forum post, no description on Polkassembly or Subsquare.
2026-08-05 15:58 Asset Hub 19,097,284 Sovereign account 13cKp89NgPL56sRoVRpBcjkGZPrk4Vf4tS6ePUD96XhAXozG sends 233,104.98 DOT, 107,462.87 USDC and 174,264.68 USDT to 12gMyzugTFJTY1nqeqCcfoPC6R3YeozbRZNhRmPMW5Kmjvn1. Sovereign balance after: 0.01 DOT.
2026-08-05 15:58 Polkadot 32,422,959 Relay sovereign 13YMK2eZbf9AyGhewRs6W6QTJvBSM5bxpnTD8WgeDofbg8Q1 sends 6,607.79 DOT to the same account.
2026-08-06, 08-07 Moonbeam refs 162, 163 registrar.removeLock(2004) on the relay; 1,904.64 DOT moved from the Coretime sovereign account to the para manager.
2026-08-10 07:29 to 11:36 Polkadot 32,489,786 to 32,492,253 Para manager 12KHAur… deregisters parachain 2004. Last recorded head: Moonbeam 16,796,696, state root 0xe5c38c08…4f5327eb.

At that final block the contracts still hold 233,451.67 xcDOT, 107,459.82 xcUSDC and 174,248.43 xcUSDT.

Where the backing is now

12gMyz… has no on-chain identity. As of 2026-09-28 it holds 212,116 DOT, 101,762 USDC and 19,164 USDT on Asset Hub, plus 6,608 DOT on the relay. Since receiving the funds it has:

  • paid 5,700 USDC to a Dwellir identity on 2026-08-24/25, matching Dwellir’s Q3 RPC invoice to the Moonbeam treasury, whose 5,700 xcUSDC payout is frozen on Moonbeam;
  • sent 21,000 DOT and 155,000 USDT on 2026-09-15 to fresh accounts that forwarded them within minutes to exchange-style hot wallets.

The other Asset Hub assets Moonbeam wrapped (xcPINK, xcDED, xcNCTR, xcWIFD, xcSTINK, and the Snowbridge ERC-20s) were not moved and are still fully backed in the sovereign account.

Questions for the Moonbeam team

  1. Does the Moonbeam Foundation control 12gMyz…? If not, who does, and on what basis did referendum 161 select it?
  2. What is the process for xc-20 holders? The late-claim guide covered GLMR and MOVR only and closed on 2026-09-29. A holder with 3,713 xcDOT was told the helpdesk “could not assist with an individual xcDOT migration”, while a contractor’s frozen xcUSDC was made whole from these funds within three weeks.
  3. Will outflows from 12gMyz… stop until that process exists? About 21,000 DOT and 155,000 USDT of holders’ backing has already gone to exchanges.

Three ways this can be resolved, in order of preference

A. The Moonbeam Foundation distributes. The holder snapshot exists: 11,785 xcDOT addresses covering 99.9996% of supply, reproduced independently and matching libingjiang47’s kit, plus 1,620 xcUSDC and 2,067 xcUSDT addresses, all with read proofs against the state root Polkadot recorded for para 2004’s last head (0xe5c38c08…4f5327eb).

Paying a holder needs no bridge, no portal and no contract since all externally owned Moonbeam address already has an Asset Hub account: pallet-revive’s fallback mapping, the 20 address bytes followed by twelve 0xEE bytes. From 12gMyz… it is:

  • DOT: balances.transferKeepAlive(fallbackAccount, amount). Anything from 0.01 DOT creates the account.
  • USDC / USDT: assets.transfer(1337 | 1984, fallbackAccount, amount), plus a few cents of DOT so the holder can pay fees.
  • Wrapped in utility.batch of a few hundred at a time. A batch of 500 transfers executes in one block; 11,785 xcDOT holders is a couple of dozen signed batches.

I tested the receiving side on a fork of Asset Hub: a fresh Ethereum key, credited at its fallback account, signed an ordinary legacy Ethereum transaction and spent 10 DOT out again through revive.eth_transact, paying a fee of 0.00083 DOT. Essentially, these accounts are reachable on Asset Hub. The exception is the 24 xcDOT holders that are contracts (Moonwell’s mxcDOT market, DEX pools, Safes, 3,362 xcDOT between them), whose share has to go through each protocol’s own accounting.

Holders can find their own Asset Hub account now: take your Moonbeam address, append eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee (24 hex characters), and SS58-encode the 32 bytes with prefix 0. Subscan’s address converter or encodeAddress('0x<address>eeee…ee', 0) in polkadot.js does it.

B. The Foundation returns the funds to the sovereign account or to an account Polkadot governance controls, and lets OpenGov distribute against the snapshot. This is what leaving the funds where they were would have achieved.

C. Polkadot OpenGov acts directly on 12gMyz… as a last resort.

Original thread: Advice requested: recovery path for DOT backing stranded xcDOT after Moonbeam shutdown

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That’s wallet going to be empty… First part of assets gone to Binance, second one to MEXC.

They dont make any announcement and comments, I don’t even know who except some maciej baj in current team. What should we do?

  1. Get global attention to the problem?
  2. Get technical advice ?
  3. Proposal on opengov?
  4. Gather all info in appropriate form and make collective request to law officer ?

In my opinion it should be considered as polkadot parachain governance exploit usage, but I’m not lawyer, so I think as polkadot community we should solve this somehow, or at least find current actions plan.

Once again I would not say a word to Moonbeam if funds would be permanently locked on parachain sovereign address, but situation is different and we need help and attention

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I have contacts working on Binance, I have been told GLMR and MOVR will get delisted because all of this, they don’t like these shady things Moonbeam is doing. The recent volatility on both tokens is a sign market makers are trying to make profit before the big news are released.