I think this is probably the first question we need to settle: are we trying to make Kusama more independent, or are we trying to make it a better canary for Polkadot?
Polkadot Vibe Check #25 discussion on the proposal @ 15m15s.
An independent Kusama: a counter-proposal
Thanks to Emiel and Arief for the paper and to everyone who has replied so far. Rom1’s question at #21, independence or canary, is the one this answers.
Full position paper
We have published a counter-proposal as a full position paper:
An Independent Kusama: a counter-proposal
Our interest, declared: we are Birdbrain, a collective on Kreivo, which has no token of its own and uses KSM as its fee token. It is one of the 12 non-system parachains that §5.4 of the JAM Prime paper prices off the network. Decent Partners, which supports Birdbrain and funds its deposits, has a commercial interest in dUSD through its arrangements with Brale, is an investor in Bloque, and commissioned Four To The Floor, a music film series turned platform that keeps the artists, the performances and the room they were made in together, owned by the people who make them. Four To The Floor is also a collective on Kreivo in its own right, community 444, registered on 19 September, and is preparing to onboard its wider network of creators and talent.
Summary
We propose that KSM DAO keep the direction it already voted for in #573, a light and independent JAM, and fund it from what Kusama already has rather than by paying Polkadot. The proposal grew out of our weekly open call on 21 September, where we talked the JAM Prime paper and Daniel’s counter-offer through. The record and transcript of Chaos Session 34 are public.
- A direction: Kusama as the network where anyone can join a group early, grow a collective intelligence it owns and share in what its use earns. The group owns what that intelligence is made of: identity, membership, record, permissions, treasury and rules. The paper’s candidate visions (personhood, privacy, a stablecoin, private governance) become components of that rather than separate bets.
- Seeds, identity held by the person: a Seed is an account whose key comes from the passkey on someone’s own device, carrying their record of contribution. It sits above a personhood registry rather than competing with one: personhood proves one human at the gate, and the Seed records what they have contributed since, linkable only with their consent. That lets people draw on each contributor’s growing intelligence and assemble contributors into groups, with privacy for the contributor and an audit trail anyone can check on chain. The record and payments work for a few groups today. Assembling groups across the network is next.
- Built from parts that already exist, with credit: passkey accounts and communities from Virto’s Kreivo, memberships as NFTs on Parity’s
pallet_nfts, a record in Tony Riemer and Fangorn’s graph format, contribution accounting from ContribNet, paid queries after Karim Jedda’s select402, and dUSD settlement through Brale and Bloque. The paper lists what is on chain for each and what is not. - An on-ramp for groups: we incubate collectives in three rungs, from running on our infrastructure to holding their own keys, and the group’s own vote decides when it graduates. Its first members come from its own network, and every passkey action on its door enrols them. Four To The Floor, community 444 on Kreivo, is on the first rung.
- A first 8 KSM test, now on chain: Bounty 01 is live as Referendum 665 on the Small Tipper track, deciding until about 30 September. It funds memberships only for people a live Chaos Session can vouch for, once per person, against an attendance root anchored on Asset Hub before any payout and a checker anyone can rerun. The curator takes no fee, and awards land in the community’s own account, which no key controls. Scrutiny of the mechanism is welcome there as well as here.
- Demand from taking part, not from selling claims: crowdfunding, ICOs, Kusama’s own 2021 crowdloans (over 500,000 KSM from more than 15,000 people behind one slot bid), NFTs and DAOs all showed people will commit early, and each failed where a claim could be sold faster than the work behind it. We propose Kusama points that appetite at the work: joining a group, contributing to its record and being attributed in it, with KSM used at each step. No token sale is proposed.
- Security sized to demand: about 96 validators for #573, costing US$3.46m a year on the JAM Prime paper’s own benchmark. At today’s issuance rate it is already paid for 1.7 times over, so the open question is how fast issuance can fall. Staked KSM keeps its job on Kusama’s own set.
- The treasury as a reserve: spend below inflow, and put a rule-bound onboarding facility in place for members.
- Revenue built and measured during the runway, with issuance tapering as revenue arrives rather than on a calendar.
- A fellowship against Emiel’s seven conditions, with the Polkadot Fellowship’s stewardship kept until they are met.
Four checkpoints at 18 months say whether it is working. If they are missed, KSM DAO reopens cohabitation with a real economy on the books.
Next steps
We will take feedback here until 16 October, alongside the JAM Prime discussion, and publish a revised edition with a response record. Every figure is in Appendix A with where it was read. Corrections and counterarguments are very welcome.
Thank you for the well written proposal @emielsebastiaan .
I find it interesting to merge the security of both networks under one helm provided that both networks maintain complete autonomy over their own economies and governance and that the security deal cannot be revoked by polkadot before the agreed upon term as to not leave Kusama stranded.
I think a relationship between Kusama and Polkadot going forward should be interesting for both networks. In order to be mutually beneficial we would need to define directions for both networks and establish ways of collaboration between the two. If we are in the process of establishing a strategy for Kusama, it might be helpful to clearly have Polkadot’s laid out to define those points of collaboration for example and thus help shape the strategy of Kusama overall as well.
Some questions for the Kusama strategy:
With the vision being cypherpunk, what changes to the network do we want to push forward specifically?
Polkadot seems to be moving towards those ideals as well by embracing more privacy features for example. Where do we see the 2 networks overlap in features? Where do we see them differing?
How should the culture differ between the 2 networks?
What unique offerings do the two networks offer builders respectively? What kind of builders/apps do we want to attract to Polkadot? What kind to Kusama?
How will each network attract builders?
How can the coexistence of both networks be mutually beneficial?
I encourage everyone to read the full proposal as it lays out some interesting suggestions for areas of focus/strategy.
The only comment with sanity and logical, I’m with you on this. There’s no need to waste time & money trying to revive a dead body!
W3F need to step up and vote Aye when there’s a WFC proposal to shut down Kusama, it’s not like I’m a fan of W3F, absolutely not!
Thank you to everyone who has contributed to the discussion so far. Following my reply to Daniel, I would like to address the recurring themes across the discussion. Several contributors share concerns while favouring different solutions, so I will address the arguments together without assuming that everyone mentioned endorses the same position.
Our starting point remains that Kusama needs a distinctive purpose, the resources to pursue it and a credible arrangement for security, migration and maintenance. The configuration, duration, payment envelope and funding mix should follow from those requirements.
Our position paper advances cohabitation through a prepaid security-and-resource endowment, developed as Scenario 5B in our scenario paper. It presents the arguments and evidence for why this direction makes the most sense to us for Kusama’s future. (publications/content/articles/kusama-futures-jam-era/index.md at dece1d9091bb35c93727e40f9abfcad6bf555f6c · sdfinst/publications · GitHub) (publications/content/articles/proposal-kusama-future-jam-prime/index.md at a445bba7ab5a801e3b85168551dfa8b1e5021bc2 · sdfinst/publications · GitHub)
Within that direction, the proposed model gives the community flexibility to adjust the parameters of a Wish for Change (WFC) proposal to meet Kusama’s needs, vision and strategy. Any proposal must make a persuasive case to KSM token holders and will ultimately be decided through OpenGov referenda. At the same time any endowment proposal worth considering would also need to appeal to DOT DAO in order to be accepted. Some Kusama interest groups will be affected more severely than others. Those decisions will require difficult choices, weighing mission, strategy, token-holder interests, sovereignty, security and economic sustainability.
1. Protecting Kusama Vision requires funding both development and infrastructure
RustSyndicate, brenzi, oliversarmy1, Nukeme3, olanod and Rom1.io raise an important concern: what remains for the people who will actually build on Kusama?
We agree that a substantial infrastructure commitment would compete with project funding. Every DOT allocated to that commitment becomes unavailable for another purpose. Our proposal therefore explicitly requires leaving the development programme funded. A package that exhausts the available resources and leaves no credible delivery budget would fail that requirement.
Useful applications require dependable infrastructure, and infrastructure needs useful applications to justify its continuing cost. It is our position that we should evaluate the two budgets together: which projects and capabilities Kusama intends to support, what infrastructure they require, how long that infrastructure should be secured and what resources remain for execution.
There is also a distinction between preserving the programme and preserving its present funding composition. One possible arrangement is to use an authorised portion of Vision Programme DOT for the infrastructure settlement, while supporting development through retained DOT and separately authorised and redirected Kusama Treasury resources. That requires an assessment of commitments, liquidity, spending needs and currency risk.
We see no inherent reason why the Vision Programme could not use KSM-denominated funding for its execution. In our view, this could strengthen alignment between builders and Kusama’s future. At the same time, DOT is the currency we expect DOT DAO to accept for an infrastructure settlement.
The original 10 million DOT commitment should not be treated as an untouched balance. WFC #498 records the commitment for Kusama’s sole benefit. It is our position that securing Kusama’s infrastructure benefits Kusama solely.
The decision is how to finance a coherent Kusama offering across infrastructure and development. Capacity and duration remain negotiable. A smaller package, different funding mix or revised programme scope may produce a better balance. Programme operators should step up and help establish that balance using their experience, commitments and project pipeline.
2. Preserving independence requires a viable operating model
ultracoconut, gilescope, Nukeme3, olanod, Rom1.io, steven and birdbrain approach independence from different directions. The common concern is Kusama’s ability to determine its own future.
An independent validator network provides a particular form of autonomy: control over the underlying network, consensus and protocol. Shared infrastructure introduces dependencies on the host network. The community should assess those dependencies explicitly.
At the same time, we should distinguish control over infrastructure from control over Kusama’s governance, monetary policy, services and resource allocation. Our proposal seeks protected KSM authority over that domain while sharing the underlying security infrastructure. Its sovereignty standard requires protection against ordinary unilateral DOT-side actions that would revoke, reassign or materially impair the agreed resources and authority.
These questions are practical. Who can change Kusama’s service? Who controls its resources? Which host-side powers could override those decisions? What happens during a dispute, an upgrade or expiry? Our position paper addresses those concerns in Appendix A.
If sufficient protections cannot be implemented and accepted, the arrangement should not proceed.
An independent network should face an equally practical assessment: who secures it, who maintains it, how those responsibilities are financed and how resilient that financing remains under adverse conditions.
For experimentation, proponents should also identify which intended experiments require control of the underlying consensus rather than authority within Kusama’s own domain. That distinction would help establish where an independent validator network delivers indispensable value and where shared infrastructure could meet the requirement.
3. Purpose determines requirements and affordability informs choices
The sequencing concern raised by Rom1.io, steven and edvoki is reasonable. Kusama’s intended purpose should determine the capabilities and resources it needs.
Section 4 of our position paper offers suggestions for a KSM-centred programme, building on privacy, personhood and institutional experimentation. These are directions for discussion and specification.
We also need to bring affordability into that discussion early. Different visions imply different requirements for capacity, sovereignty, technical stewardship and continuing internal subsidies. A community choosing its direction should understand those consequences before committing to it.
The concrete package in Appendix C of our position paper gives participants something to challenge. People can argue that fewer cores would suffice, that a longer runway matters more, that a particular capability requires another architecture or that development deserves a larger share of the available funding.
The proposed figures should be revised against demonstrated needs.
The same applies to existing parachains and projects. A smaller resource allocation requires explicit choices about participation, service levels and transition arrangements. Those choices deserve discussion with the affected teams and must also be weighed against the continuing costs their requirements impose on KSM token holders. KSM token holders may reasonably choose to subsidise projects within Kusama. Those subsidies should remain within explicit limits informed by affordability.
The useful next contribution is therefore a connection between purpose and requirements: whom Kusama would serve, what those participants need, why Kusama is well placed to provide it and what delivering it would cost.
4. A favourable price still requires a willing counterparty
olanod and edvoki favour free initial capacity. Rom1.io suggests contributions from several beneficiaries. batbayar accepts negotiating a paid arrangement while asking for clearer footprint pricing and renewal terms. Those are different propositions and should be assessed separately.
An external subsidy could be part of a negotiated agreement. It requires someone to accept the cost and the obligation to deliver. Even where capacity is temporarily unused, a five-year commitment entails continuing availability and restrictions on its future allocation.
A proposal for free capacity should explain the value DOT DAO receives in return. Additional demand, differentiation, useful experimentation, architectural alignment, shared engineering or an agreed and renewed canary function could strengthen that case.
Our US$8.64 million reference is derived from the illustrative compute benchmark. We propose negotiating the complete package within that amount, including footprint, sovereignty assurances, migration and maintenance. The formula does not separately establish the cost of those additional obligations; their inclusion requires counterparty agreement.
DOT DAO would ultimately assess whether KSM DAO’s offer is acceptable and determine how to allocate and account for the one-off payment across its delivery obligations. In our opinion, our position paper advances an offer worth DOT DAO’s consideration.
Evidence supporting a lower benchmark or a more favourable contribution should improve the proposal. Equally, a forecast of inexpensive spot capacity should be compared with the actual package being sought: protected access over a defined term, together with agreed delivery responsibilities.
Our objective is a deal both DAOs have a reason to accept and the responsible teams can deliver. The negotiating reference remains open to challenge.
5. Shared-validator burden sharing requires its own economic settlement
red raises the possibility of KSM-backed participation in a shared validator set for Kusama and Polkadot. Our scenario paper examines this direction as Scenario 5A: cohabitation with burden sharing, in Section 3.5.2. This direction was discussed among JAM implementers in 2025, in the conversations referenced in that paper.
Under this arrangement, both token economies would contribute continuously to the shared security budget. Contributions could take the form of multi-token staking, validator subsidies, recurring payments or a combination. KSM could retain a role in financing security proportionate to the size of its own economy. From a technical perspective it is an entirely feasible scenario and the JAM protocol allows for such arrangement through its programmable designate service.
The economic settlement however would require agreement on each economy’s contribution, the valuation of DOT and KSM collateral, validator selection, rewards and slashing. Changing token prices and resource usage would create pressure to revisit that settlement. Our scenario paper identifies this recurring coordination burden as a central difficulty.
From our perspective, DOT DAO would need a compelling reason to accept that additional complexity and exposure. Preserving KSM staking benefits Kusama, but it does not by itself establish a reciprocal benefit for DOT holders. We do not believe DOT DAO would accept such an arrangement simply to preserve Kusama’s existing staking model. A proponent advancing Scenario 5A would need to demonstrate how the settlement improves the position of both economies.
Our position paper therefore advances Scenario 5B: a prepaid endowment secured by the DOT staking economy. DOT DAO would receive an upfront payment for a defined resource-and-security commitment, while KSM DAO would retain protected authority over its own resources and monetary design. In our opinion, this offers a more credible basis for agreement than introducing continuing, multi-token security-budget negotiations.
6. KSM needs an explicit economic role and the staking transition needs a plan
red and olanod identify a genuine transition concern: the consequences for nominators and the future purpose of their stake.
We regard KSM itself as Kusama’s greatest strategic asset. Any future offering should explain why people would acquire, use and retain it.
A transition away from a separate validator set would need to address unstaking, liquidity, monetary policy and the future participation of existing operators. An assumption that all released KSM will immediately be sold is too strong. Assuming that the transition would have no economic effect would be equally careless.
The same applies to staking linked to builder support, such as the briefly mentioned 1000-builder programme. Such a mechanism should have a defined purpose, explain what commitments it creates and establish how its rewards are funded.
Preserving staking is worthwhile where it serves a useful economic or security function. Retaining an expensive security obligation solely to preserve the existing staking mechanism would put the mechanism ahead of Kusama’s needs.
Our preferred direction opens room to redesign KSM’s economic functions. Our position paper makes suggestions, and we believe monetary redesign should be central to the migration proposal: a hard supply cap and burns designed to give KSM deflationary properties. These rules should be specified and authorised before migration so they can take effect as part of it. In our view, this should be a first major change that appeals directly to the broader community of KSM token holders.
7. Previous commitments deserve an explicit and accountable decision process
ultracoconut, oliversarmy1, brenzi and liminal raise concerns about previous decisions, funding expectations and confidence in Kusama’s future.
WFC #498 established the Vision direction, and WFC #573 established support for a lightweight, independent JAM. Those decisions deserve recognition. A change of direction should be brought back to governance explicitly, with the reasons and consequences available for scrutiny.
Governance also needs the ability to reconsider a direction when new evidence or alternatives warrant it. The appropriate standard is an informed decision that identifies what changes, why it changes, which obligations remain and whose approval is required.
For funding, that means distinguishing money already spent, binding commitments, prospective project allocations and genuinely available resources. Web3 Foundation’s authority over its contribution must be respected alongside the decisions required from KSM DAO and DOT DAO.
Publishing this proposal does not itself confer authority to redirect funds. Any eventual arrangement must pass the relevant approval processes.
For applicants and builders, the practical requirement is predictability. Programme operators should communicate existing awards, application status, decision criteria and the implications of any proposed change. The uncertainty described by liminal matters, regardless of which infrastructure direction ultimately wins.
Trust requires clear responsibilities, a reconciled budget and an honest account of the alternatives. Accusations about motives provide little help in deciding which arrangement would best serve Kusama.
8. Lower security expenditure needs a complete financing and delivery plan
ultracoconut proposes reducing the validator set. birdbrain advances an issuance-funded, lightweight JAM. olanod proposes a subsidised allocation on JAM Prime. Each seeks to reduce Kusama’s burden, through a different allocation of costs and responsibilities.
Reducing the validator set deserves consideration. A proposal that advances such change should state separately what changes in operating expenditure, validator remuneration, issuance, security and technical responsibilities. The resulting network still needs a sustainable budget. Both our scenario paper and our position paper address this issue.
Birdbrain does provide a financing argument. Its counterproposal applies our benchmark to 96 validators, estimates an annual operating bill of about US$3.46 million and identifies continuing KSM staking issuance as the funding source. It proposes reducing issuance as revenue becomes available. That is more substantive than simply asserting that a smaller network will be affordable.
Our concern is whether this establishes a resilient, complete operating model. In our assessment, comparing the market value of all staking issuance with an operator-cost benchmark can overstate the available funding. The financing should be tested against lower KSM prices, delayed revenue and the costs incurred before the smaller configuration is operational.
Birdbrain additionally proposes retaining existing Fellowship stewardship until a successor meets defined conditions. That is a sensible continuity objective. It still requires agreement from the existing stewards and a funded, deliverable succession plan.
For a free JAM Prime allocation, the corresponding missing commitment is the external subsidy provider’s acceptance. Proponents are free to pursue that direction. We are not willing to advance a free-capacity proposal.
All alternatives should identify who delivers, who pays, which assumptions remain unverified and what happens when those assumptions fail. Our own proposal must meet the same standard. In our opinion, our position paper does so by identifying proposed responsibilities, financing, assumptions and conditions for proceeding. The requested Fellowship mandate and proposed package price must become accepted delivery commitments before migration.
9. Kusama’s future should be assessed against credible alternatives
thewhiterabbitM advocates closure, CryptoJoe considers this proposal an existential threat, and liminal expresses uncertainty about whether Kusama will remain a dependable place to build. These responses reach different conclusions from a shared concern about its future.
Our judgement is that Kusama retains enough potential to justify developing a credible continuation plan. That potential needs a purpose, a budget and people responsible for delivery.
Taking the end of Q1 2027 as our planning assumption for JAM’s launch, we believe Kusama’s mission, vision and strategy should focus on being ready to make use of this development. In our view, a new infrastructure arrangement on JAM would place Kusama at the forefront of the broader industry.
Closure would surrender the opportunity to develop that future. Continuing with the present arrangement carries its own expenditure and risks. An independent lightweight JAM requires sustainable security financing and technical stewardship. A shared-infrastructure agreement requires credible sovereignty protections, acceptable terms and a funded programme that makes productive use of it.
A finite endowment could provide runway to demonstrate a distinctive Kusama offering while limiting the infrastructure commitment. During that runway, the community would need to establish useful services, sustained participation and financing for continuation.
The allocation alone would deliver none of those outcomes. They require an explicit programme, measurable milestones and decisions early enough to renew, resize or pursue an alternative.
The objective is a Kusama that can govern its own direction, finance its responsibilities and offer something people value. Preserving its current technical structure is one possible means of pursuing that objective. The community should compare it with the alternatives on their complete costs, dependencies and prospects.
Our proposal remains open to revision on that basis. Substantiated requirements, reconciled budgets, credible delivery commitments and better terms would all improve the decision available to KSM DAO.
Hi @emielsebastiaan, I have taken the time to read your 2nd paper, it is an excellent proposition on how to move forward with option 5 of your 1st paper, however I think that we are skipping some steps here if we continue in this way. The questions of what Kusama’s role is and what vision we have for the network must be answered before we start talking about a negotiation of outsourcing the security to JAM Prime.
Why are we already benchmarking and pricing something that we don’t even know if we need?
I actually agree with many of the propositions in the paper, but I feel that some, which I consider essential, are hidden deep inside the paper and drowned by the noise of the number of cores and its price, as well as the draft WFC.
I would propose to:
- First concentrate on the 10 positions you list, as a brainstorming starting point, to define, as a community, where we want Kusama to go.
- Then, define based on that, how many cores we need and what the envelope size should be
I particularly find the following ones to be essential and to me the priority order would be:
(I am quoting directly from your paper)
| Priority | Positions from Jam Prime Proposal Paper | Comments |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | “Position 4. Securing infrastructure does not give Kusama purpose. …Before final commitment, the strategy must be specific enough to establish resource needs, dependencies, priorities and funding. …We use Future Vision Fund / Programme for a prospective revision of the existing Vision Fund Programme and its authorised funding. It could receive an explicit mandate to coordinate execution of Kusama’s chosen strategy: translate priorities into funded projects, lead requests for proposal, manage delivery dependencies and report progress…” | Goal: Define the strategy |
| 2 | “Position 5. Securing infrastructure does not fund its use. A protected infrastructure term and a funded future vision programme are separate commitments. The payment ceiling for the endowment must leave resources for work outside the package, existing obligations and continuity reserves. The Future Vision Fund / Programme needs a funded delivery budget to execute the strategy, including the people, projects and operations outside the accepted infrastructure mandate…” | Define funding for the strategy (which is separate from infrastructure/security budget) |
| 3 | “Position 3. A permissionless parachain-hosting proposition is not compelling. …A permissionless non-system parachain hosting proposition needs evidence of paying demand, utilisation and achievable receipts. The historical allocation inventory supplies none of those forecasts. We propose allocating endowed capacity to explicitly supported strategic purposes…” | Evidence of paying demand for allocated cores to non-system chains? Usage and generated revenue by permissionless non-system chains? |
| 4 | “Position 8. A finite endowment provides a runway to establish sustainability. The endowment should be treated as a finite operating runway: a protected period in which Kusama can establish useful services, sustained ecosystem participation and a credible basis for financing what follows.” | A specific timeline, acting as a deadline, and putting pressure on making it worth it to spend the budget on security: Sustainability. |
| 5 | “Position 2. Kusama cannot afford an independent JAM. …Actual independent-JAM costs remain unresolved. We expect independent operation to impose a substantially greater total financing and engineering burden on Kusama than the proposed smaller, shared-infrastructure package, while providing weaker economic security…” | Being realistic about what Kusama can afford, especially without revenue or a realistic plan for it |
| 6 | “Position 1. Kusama needs an infrastructure decision now. The Scenario Analysis identifies pressure on issuance-funded security when KSM’s purchasing power weakens against externally denominated operating costs. [1] We propose a direction-setting decision followed by a timely preparation programme…” | We cannot continue in the status quo, it’s killing Kusama |
Although I have comments on some of the assumptions, especially of Appendix B (such as using Hetzner for the infra provider budget), I don’t believe it is relevant to discuss them at this stage.
I would say it’s more logical to separate the decisions into the following three steps:
- First answer the questions related to the existence, purpose and foundations of Kusama as a network, such as:
-
Then define the strategy. For this we can also use Section 4. Suggestions for Kusama’s Strategy and Vision Programme of your paper to brainstorm and narrow down the ideas, I particularly align with section 4.4: “A Cypherpunk digital economy”.
-
And based on 1 and 2, we can later discuss what technical fellowship we want, what infrastructure needs we have, how much it will cost and whether a deal of cohabitation on JAM Prime makes sense.
Emiel, the grouped reply makes the thread easier to argue with: themes together, no assumptions about who endorses what, and other people’s positions stated before being answered. Mine was stated fairly, so I will just confirm it: a paid arrangement with clearer footprint pricing and renewal terms.
The complete-package framing moves things. With footprint, sovereignty assurances, migration and maintenance inside the $8.64 million reference rather than stacked on top of it, the negotiation now has one number and a contents list. That settles the easier half of the pricing question. The harder half is the one you name yourself: “the formula does not separately establish the cost of those additional obligations” (section 4). Whether an allocation like this counts as a release form or a retention usage still settles first. I made that argument at length upthread; I will not repeat it here. It remains the open item.
The renewed canary function is the sentence I would pick out of your section 4. You offer it as a reason DOT DAO might accept free capacity. The same value runs through the paid side: if a renewed relationship is worth something to DOT DAO, the renewal terms are part of the price. An anchor tenant can only weigh its tenancy if those terms are published before expiry; a year-3 review gives it a process, and a process is not the same thing as knowing the numbers in advance. A.5.1 protects the term. The expiry is where the tenant’s decision lives.
Your section 8 takes birdbrain’s counter-proposal seriously. Having checked, I do too: the figures read back from the chain, and the paper labels its own gaps, which is rarer than it should be. What strikes me is where it lands structurally. Your paper: a bounded term with a year-3 review. Theirs: 18-month checkpoints, cohabitation reopened if they are missed. The DOT-side draft upthread: metered terms with published renewal. Three proposals from three directions, agreeing on the shape - a bounded term, and a measured decision before it ends. Whichever direction KSM DAO takes, whatever gets negotiated will be written in that shape, and the DOT side is where its policy layer gets settled.
emielsebastiaan, thank you for engaging with our financing in §8. Testing it against a lower KSM price, delayed revenue and the costs incurred before a smaller network is running is fair, and our next edition will carry that stress test.
We agree with florentina57 at #27 that the thread should take a step back: what Kusama is for has to come before pricing cores on JAM Prime. We would add a second step back. The discussion so far is about what Kusama should become. Very little of it is about how any direction would be enacted, beyond the Wish for Change itself.
W3F’s 10M DOT moves at W3F’s discretion. Everything else goes through KSM governance, where weight is balance times conviction, up to 6x for a 224-day lock, and a Wish for Change is decided by whoever turns up. The paper addresses the Fellowship, W3F’s economists and DOT DAO by name. It does not say whose KSM would pass Appendix C and reverse #573.
Across 245 referenda, one block of 24 unlabelled accounts voting in lockstep holds roughly 2.56M KSM, 13.6% of all KSM and 29% of staked KSM.
Seven of them are the source of W3F’s own Decentralized Voices delegations.
The block reversed the outcome in 12 referenda, eight this year, mostly against ChaosDAO, whose ~90k delegated KSM comes 89% from one account.
JAM Prime would end staking returns for the 8.8M KSM that is staked, and the same KSM would decide it.
#26 also makes “a hard supply cap and burns designed to give KSM deflationary properties” central to the migration. We reject that assumption outright. KSM DAO has already said no three times, to a capped schedule (#596), halving and a maximum supply (#625) and burns (#627). The teams building where Kusama’s demand is growing point the other way, as we set out in Kusama Futures in the JAM Era: issuance that buys memberships tightens supply because people are joining, not because scarcity was legislated.
This is about machinery, not motive. The full analysis, with every account and figure, is here: The Game That Decides Kusama.
Two questions before 16 October:
- Whose KSM do the authors expect to carry the WFC and which cohort are they representing?
- Will W3F and Parity say which Kusama accounts are theirs, and whether they will vote on it?
Hello @florentina57,
Thank you for taking the time to read our position paper and for your appreciation of it.
To answer your direct question: we benchmark and price infrastructure because provisioning it entails real-world expenses. When considering Kusama’s future infrastructure needs, we need to assess whether each scenario is affordable, taking available resources and the size of the Kusama economy into account. This applies whichever purpose or infrastructure model the community ultimately chooses.
We agree that resource requirements on JAM Prime should be informed by a clear mission and an accompanying strategy that can be translated into funded, executable work. As you highlight, positions 4 and 5 explicitly call for sufficient strategic clarity before a final commitment, alongside a separate budget for delivering that strategy. Both the infrastructure and the activities it supports must fit within Kusama’s means.
Our view is that purpose, strategy and affordability should inform one another throughout this process. Understanding infrastructure costs helps establish which ambitions are achievable and how much funding could remain for their execution. Developing the strategy helps determine which resources are needed and for how long. These discussions can advance together. We therefore welcome any effort you are willing to put into advancing the mission and strategy discussion.
This also relates directly to Position 1: Kusama needs an infrastructure decision now. The design of the Parachain Service on JAM is taking place now, and a sufficiently clear direction for Kusama may still be able to inform relevant design decisions. There is therefore value in establishing what Kusama expects from that service while the design space remains open.
There is also an economic reason for urgency. The current economics of the Kusama ecosystem are, in our assessment, under considerable pressure. Maintaining the existing infrastructure model indefinitely while postponing decisions about its successor carries costs of its own. We therefore believe there is a case for reaching a direction sooner rather than later, even if the accompanying mission and strategy continue to be refined.
We also believe there is value in having a tangible proposition to assess. Appendix C provides a draft WFC for that purpose. We see the proposed package as an upper-bound negotiating proposition under our assumptions that include affordability, with a fair chance, in our judgement, of being considered acceptable for DOT DAO.
The model we advance in the position paper allows the community to develop alternatives by adjusting the payment envelope, required cores, duration and accompanying commitments. Those choices make the trade-offs explicit: a smaller infrastructure envelope preserves more funding for the vision programme, while changes in capacity and duration alter what that envelope can support.
We encourage the community to use the discussion period to advance the strategy and refine those parameters, so that the eventual proposal or perhaps competing proposals connect a clear purpose to a grounded, affordable, and funded plan.
Proposal: Kusama Migration and Economic Model
If the Kusama community decides that migrating to Polkadot is the preferred path forward, I would like to suggest the following framework for consideration:
1. Polkadot covers validator costs
Polkadot would assume responsibility for paying all validators, while receiving the revenue generated by Coretime and JAMKB.
2. Kusama retains its system chains
Kusama would continue operating its system chains, paying for Coretime and JAMKB.
3. Reduce Kusama’s inflation to the minimum required for the treasury
Kusama’s inflation could be reduced to the minimum level necessary to sustainably fund its treasury. A rate of approximately 0.5% may be sufficient, although the appropriate level should ultimately be determined through governance.
4. Burn fees generated by Kusama’s system chains
Fees generated by Kusama’s system chains could be burned, creating a direct mechanism for reducing the circulating supply over time.
5. Unified Collator Pool
If Unified Collators Pool proposal is adopted, I would also suggest including Kusama:
6. Timing of the Migration
The migration itself could potentially be carried out almost immediately if the necessary technical and governance conditions are in place.
If the Kusama community considers the migration urgent, there may be no need to wait for JAM to be integrated into Polkadot. The migration and the JAM integration could potentially be treated as separate processes, allowing Kusama to move forward without unnecessary delay.
7. New Economic Narrative for Kusama
This approach would also give Kusama a fundamentally different economic narrative.
Rather than relying on relatively high inflation, Kusama could transition toward a highly scarce asset, with very low issuance and mechanisms such as fee burning contributing to a reduction in circulating supply over time.
This would provide Kusama with a clearly differentiated economic model while preserving its system chains and their utility within the broader Polkadot ecosystem.
These are suggestions for discussion, and the specific parameters could of course be refined through the appropriate governance process.
@emielsebastiaan in 4.3 you lay out a privacy economy suggestion as a potential point of focus for Kusama. As I understand none of the points mentioned under “Suggestions for Kusama’s strategy” currently have a cost or time estimate with them. Nor do they recommend a capable team for its execution.
Taking the privacy economy as a starting point for a discussion on Kusama’s strategy can you or anyone else provide estimates and a feasible implementation plan for the undertakings listed under this section: Privacy-preserving KSM, A privacy-preserving stable currency, Privacy-focused smart contracts.
Similarly at this point we are also still missing a viable strategy around the KSM token itself and I invite people to weigh in here as well.
Privacy-preserving KSM && A privacy-preserving stable currency,
Now: shield.markets
Privacy-focused smart contracts.
What you want is a private state, something chains such as aleo has been looking into: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zZ3GusbAex8
In general you want to attract privacy builders, this can be done by for example that a large chunk of ZK systems run faster on Kusama(PolkaVM/revive) and that we can do more and offer a better enviroment. This is something the Zk & Advanced Cryptography bounty is focusing on such as bringing NOIR to Kusama, having RFP’s motivating developers to utilize the cryptography specific precompiles and build developer tooling that projects can use and run wild with. https://zk.kusama.vision/
A few questions on the paper, then one thing on the canary role.
1. Why are nine cores in the package for bulk coretime sales?
Clause 7 puts 7 cores on system workloads and up to 9 into bulk coretime sales. At your own benchmark those 9 cores are US$4.86m of the US$8.64m. 5.4 says willingness to prepay at cost recovery scale is unlikely, and keeps the route in “for completeness, rather than as a financing assumption”. Sale #32 had no new purchases. That is paying US$4.86m for capacity you don’t expect anyone to buy.
2. What test decides “underfunded”?
5.1 says Scenario B and C merit consideration where the larger commitment would leave delivery underfunded. That is the right test and there is no way to apply it. The gap between A and C is US$4.32m of programme funding. What number, or what evidence, would make you recommend 60 or 40 CTYs instead of 80?
3. What is the fallback if DOT DAO buys the compute but not the bundle?
The formula prices compute. Footprint, accumulation, sovereignty, migration and maintenance are inside the envelope as a request. 5.1 says a lower price for incomplete delivery would fail the proposal’s purpose. So if the counterparty agrees to some of it and not the rest, is there a smaller package, or is there no deal?
Separately, on the renewed canary role.
Polkadot’s proof of personhood stack runs on the relay chain, Asset Hub, People and Bulletin. Parity’s tests for it run on Previewnet, Paseo and local forks. Kusama isn’t in them and isn’t in the App docs. The Polkadot App and Trinity are both built around identity. Kusama isn’t in those either.
So on the most identity critical thing Polkadot has built, Kusama was there and wasn’t used. If we’re going to price a canary role into the negotiation, we need to know why the last round didn’t come here.
Personhood doesn’t fail like infrastructure fails. It fails behaviourally. Collusion, Sybil farming, credential resale, coercion. Those only show up when there’s real value and real people involved. Previewnet and Paseo can tell you the code works. They can’t tell you what happens when a credential is worth stealing, because nothing on them is worth stealing.
Kusama is the only place in the ecosystem with real money at stake and a failure budget that isn’t catastrophic. No testnet can do that.
Kusama also has its own People Chain, and your migration baseline pays to move it. The chain this would run on is already inside the package you’re pricing.
Yes, absolutely, I agree and this analysis is very valuable, I just believe we need to use it once we clarify the purpose and strategy and not before, otherwise, it’s like we’re buying furniture before we’ve chosen or built the house or even knowing who or how many will live in it.
I agree and am happy to contribute as another member of the community. I have posted my comments so far in the new forum post from @Luuu as it seems it could be where we hold a parallel discussion:
@emielsebastiaan, the stress test you asked for at #26 is in edition 0.2.0 of our paper, as §9: An Independent Kusama.
You were right about the overstatement. We compared all staking issuance with the operator benchmark. On chain, validators keep 21 to 30% of it as commission, and the rest is nominators’ return. Held to your US$3,000 a validator-month, our plan only works above about US$5.50 a KSM. It fails at today’s price.
Two things follow. All 700 Kusama seats are filled today at about US$249 a month in average commission, so the benchmark looks high for a Kusama seat, though a set of 96 has to be run better. And the design no longer depends on settling that. Seats are paid by commission, the treasury is a backstop capped at 40% of net inflow, and when inflow runs short the draws come in a fixed order: security, the fellowship’s floor, the rest of the fellowship, onboarding. At US$2.87, the 12-month low, with half the treasury’s inflow and no revenue at all, the set is still paid three to five times today’s average seat, the reserve is untouched, and what gives is the migration timetable and onboarding.
On your §2 question, most of what we propose would run on shared infrastructure. Three things need Kusama’s own set: a job for the 8.77m staked KSM, issuance as the security budget, and groups posting their own stake. The case for independence rests on what KSM is for.
Your §8 test is a table in §9. Its weakest row is the Fellowship’s agreement, which nobody has asked for yet.
Our two questions from #29 are still open: whose KSM is expected to carry the Wish for Change, and will W3F and Parity say which Kusama accounts are theirs?
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