A Proposal for a Kusama Future on JAM Prime

Thanks to everyone who contributed to the discussion following our initial post, Kusama Futures in the JAM Era. The feedback has been extremely useful and, above all, shows that people care deeply about Kusama. Special thanks to Daniel, author of WFC #573, for his candid contribution.

Full position paper

We have now published a full position paper setting out our view on where Kusama should go next:

A Proposal for a Kusama Future on JAM Prime

Summary

We propose that the KSM DAO set a direction for negotiations with the DOT DAO around a package of 16 total cores for 5 years on JAM Prime, with 450,000 JAMKB-equivalent of footprint, protected KSM control, and Fellowship-led migration and maintenance, using US$8.64 million originating from the Kusama Vision Fund as the complete-package negotiating reference and settling in DOT.

The proposal combines a finite infrastructure commitment with suggestions for a renewed vision programme for Kusama’s next era on JAM. Its terms must leave that programme funded.

Next steps

We propose continuing a 4 week discussion until 16 October 2026, after which we intend to incorporate the feedback into a revised proposal and response record to inform a direction-setting Wish for Change for Kusama’s Future. Corrections, counterarguments, alternative proposals and additional evidence are very welcome.

Who will build on Jam when the KV program that has been onboarding teams will be shutdown/squeezed out of funding ? Do you think there is a future where the KV program can continue to deliver result and on-board teams into the ecosystem? Such as the Cryptography bounty has been funding important projects that have generated a sales funnel of new teams of developers that want to build on Kusama.

Kusama Should honor web3 values of resilience, being a place where developers and new projects can run and experiment without getting censored, embodying resilience as a network. But How do you suggest to onboard new teams that want to build if they drain the KV program, which is serving as a funnel for projects to come to Kusama.

Kusama Does offer a unique place for Zero Knowledge and Cryptography developers to develop privacy applications, more efficently with PolkaVM, lots of Unique selling points are added to the stack such as the precompile that makes it easier and more efficeint for future users.

This reads to me like Kusama’s purpose is to subsidize JAM and its idle cores. Using KV funds for securing Kusama doesn’t sound like a “vision” to me. Certainly not the one I invested my time into as a kv bounty curator.

Honestly, what you’re proposing just seems like a way to loot and run away. It is very concerning that the people proposing these ideas represent Kusama.

In my opinion, the Polkadot DAO isn’t going to accept this. Besides, the Kusama DAO decided some time ago to become independent from Polkadot.

Why doesn’t Kusama just fix things, cut the number of validators in half, reduce inflation, and get to work on becoming relevant in the market?

I’m addressing the OGs and true Kusama believers: if you’d like, I can help you draft a WFC to implement the measures I mentioned.

Emiel, Arief - the position paper does things most big asks skip, and the financing route leans on something real: W3F’s 10 million DOT Vision commitment is the kind of institutional backing most ecosystems never get; how much of it remains is for W3F and KSM DAO to reconcile. It prices its own assumption in the open: the $108,000 coretime-year is declared a negotiating reference, not a market rate. And it engages the footprint question instead of orbiting it. Appendix D is also a fair summary of my earlier posts, including the parts where I push back.

On direction first - and I will say it plainly, because the thread has been weighing endings this week. Between decay as the default, a merger that prices KSM at the bottom of the chart, or an independence Kusama cannot fund, I would rather see an endowment like this priced than any of them. What the paper calls an endowment is bounded tenure, prepaid. Renewal is scheduled years before expiry. That is the lease family by another name, and the family compatibility matters more than the naming: a bounded prepaid term with explicit renewal mechanics is one of the few shapes where the counterparty does not have to hold the other side’s infrastructure hostage forever. I will argue about what the term costs and how renewal works, but not about the name.

For the DOT-side case in section 3.6, two things are still open, and the paper itself names both.

The first is footprint pricing. Inside the $8.64 million envelope it is bundled with compute at a price the paper does not break out: “Their prices are not separately derived by the formula” (section 3.2). Your template is more exact than that, though: it says the final agreement must identify “consideration and proceeds treatment for each component, including the footprint-policy requirements examined in Appendix D.3” (section 3.1). The first thing that settles is whether an allocation like this counts as a release form or a retention usage. Max (Harbour Industrial Capital) and the DAO already answered the proceeds side for release forms: 1926 burns that income outright, and your section 3.6 rightly notes that burned proceeds “would be unavailable for operating or maintenance expenditure”. If the allocation is classified as retention usage - a lease with defined renewal and return conditions - then the governing policy is the retention policy. The classification comes first; it belongs to the footprint-policy layer, not the arithmetic.

The second is renewal at expiry. Within the term, A.5.1’s protection standard is a fair ask. Because the tenure is bounded, the expiry mechanics are load-bearing: cost, terms, advance knowledge. Your answer is a year-3 review, and that gives you a process. The anchor tenant needs renewal economics published in advance; that is the property I argued from the retention side, and it is what your A.5 standard amounts to, from the tenant side. If the term’s protection standard is credible, publishing the renewal terms is cheap. If it is not credible, the review does not rescue it.

I have a DOT-side draft for exactly this slot, open for feedback in topic 18567 (Wish for Change draft: release JAM state footprint as metered leases, not freehold sales): retention stays with DOT DAO, access goes out as metered leases, release-form proceeds burn per 1926, renewal terms published, long default terms as the answer to anchor tenants. Push back where it is wrong, in the open - 18567 is the live DOT-side venue for the footprint-policy question your WFC template leaves open. Whether an endowment along your lines is priced at one of section 3.3’s three scenarios is for the electorates on both sides; the foothold they need first is a legible footprint policy.

This proposal would kill kusama, me and my kusama whale friends will down vote this. We don’t want kusama to be destroyed.

I would like to help

Shouldn’t Kusama be on it’s own JAM network (I’d call it: JAM Tomorrow)

While I would love to see Kusama integrate the features of JAM as a first-class citizen, I would hate to see my favorite Canary concede its independence and Vision as a means to secure an early bid on JAM.

I would much rather see Kusama continue in its independent (albeit limited) capacity as the cypherpunk hub and one day consider a proposal to purchase JAM cores as needed at a known market price. Handing the KV bounty back to Polkadot, sheepishly, and requesting a piggyback ride does not sit well with me.

Sometimes you need the courage to make hard decisions. Sometimes you need to admit mistakes and take responsibility for them.

Continuing to spend time and money on Kusama makes no sense. It would be better to give the Devs one less thing to maintain and fix.

At this point, Kusama feels like a dead body we keep trying to resuscitate.

Instead of coming up with increasingly disconnected solutions and visions, maybe the most logical thing to do is simply shut Kusama down.

I completely understand the reasoning for sunsetting Kusama. I could never argue that the operational costs of running, developing, and maintaining a completely separate network are inconsequential. We also see that Polkadot is pulling ahead significantly as both a mainnet and a frontier.

However, I’m not convinced Kusama lacks purpose, either now or in the future. I believe the differentiation between the networks at this time is primarily a cultural fit. While the aesthetic of Polkadot has been adopting a more alternative, edgier look, going against the grain and intentionally not following trends, it still presents as a more complete enterprise network, which I can explain to engineers and managers who are marginally aware of what the technology can do. I can point them to a dev-dot.li webview, send contract transactions, update the view, print logs on screen, and explain broadly how the application is content-addressed, verified at both ends, deployed on a virtual cloud, and highly resilient despite being hosted on the open web. It makes sense as a solution in the world of business.

I can’t do that with Kusama, and I don’t think I should. Not that Kusama should not inherit the tools and features of her bigger sibling, but that I think having a clear line of separation between what belongs in board rooms and risk assessments vs what gets shared to resistance fighters is worth the trouble. While DOT belongs on all the world’s exchanges, KSM should deserve to be banned.

I know I’m an idealist, but I think a world of inherent privacy, individual sovereignty, and digital freedom has room for two economic systems. The world at present has very powerful threats against individuals’ rights and freedoms, even in the places that speak of freedom the most. Infrastructure in the future might not accept KSM directly as payment for products or service, but it might serve as a viable tool for the oppressed people of the world.

Have been in discussion with Kusama Artist grants program for a music streaming network I’ve been working on - https://qnch.network

Conversation suddenly ended with denial and no explanation. This whole thread has me wondering how long Kusama will be around and if it’s going the way of Moonbeam/Moonriver.

This is nothing other than an ugly land grab, an attempt to appropriate funds earmarked for an entirely separate purpose, and a ruthless cannibilization of the ecosystem. However you want to describe it, this is another reason for loyal people - many of whom are fast losing faith in Polkadot/Kusama being a meaningful place to do anything constructive on - to finally turn their backs once and for all on this community.

A year ago, referendum 498 (A New Kusama Vision) passed with 139 votes (609,000+ KSM tokens) in favour, to 3 (60 tokens) against. The intention was to deploy 10 million DOT from Web3 Foundation “for the sole benefit of Kusama, in order to boost the utility and broad value proposition of the Kusama network”.

Three bounties were established on the back of this overwhelming vote: ZK Proofs, Proof of Personhood, Art & Social Experiments. There is not a single mention of JAM in that original proposal.

I have been a curator of the Art & Social Experiements Initiative since the outset. There have been challenges which I will not document here. However, we have now onboarded three projects, two of which are already in receipt of initial milestone funds. One more project is being closely assessed as having potential for funds, and more are awaiting to be assessed.

None of these projects are requesting more than $10,000 - a very small sum when considered against the enormous grants dished out by the Foundation to projects over the years, the vast majority of which have been wound up without the merest suggestion of returning any revenue at all to the ecosystem. They are thoughtful, innovative, arts projects that will bring AN ENTIRELY NEW AUDIENCE to Kusama (which is the entre point of the Kusama Vision). And yet, just as a semblance of momentum begins to be initiated, we face the grim threat of the rug being pulled entirely from under our feet.

JAM was well known about a year ago when the Kusama Vision program was outlined (and explicilty excluded from the proposal). It is arguably less well know now. Whether by design or otherwise, there is little to no publicity about JAM from Polkadot and Parity social accounts. JAM needs to run under its own steam. Leave the Kusama Vision program alone.

If Kusama was to transition to JAM Prime, and therefore cease to run its own independent validator set, how do you expect the current Kusama validators to be impacted? Is there a possible migration strategy that could allow existing Kusama validators to register JAM keys (i.e. become candidates for a certain amount of the JAM Prime validator pool)? I am not advocating for an automatically-migrated or reserved seat; however, I believe it would be beneficial to know if the existing Kusama validator architecture and operators will play a part in the new proposed model.

Thanks @emielsebastiaan for the update.

I think V2 is a big improvement over V1, especially on the sovereignty / control side.

I was already quite open to the cohabitation option in V1, so one thing I’m still trying to understand is what we’ve learned since then that makes JAM Prime the preferred direction now.

V1 kept the independent lightweight JAM as the baseline while exploring cohabitation as another option. So what changed since then?

What does Kusama actually need from JAM, and why? Where does the demand come from? How much independence do we actually want? And what do we need to guarantee on the sovereignty side?

Maybe option 5 is ultimately the right answer. I’m just not sure we’ve finished that discussion yet.

And that’s also why I’m not sure we’re ready to put the $8.64m number at the centre of the discussion.

I understand it’s a reference / negotiation number, not a final funding request. But V1 also said that resources, privileges, obligations and contingencies should be defined before valuation and funding.

I’m not sure we’re quite there yet, especially when some of the resource numbers and sovereignty guarantees are still assumptions to be validated.

Same question for the KV funds.

I really like the idea of KV funding projects, bringing builders into Kusama. That’s something I think Kusama needs badly.

So I’m not saying KV shouldn’t fund any part of this. I’m just wondering if we should look at the whole picture before deciding how much of those funds should go into JAM infrastructure.

Maybe part comes from KV, part from DOT DAO, JAM-related funding, or other actors that also benefit from the arrangement. I don’t know.

Maybe the next step is to make the Kusama requirements explicit first, then map those requirements to the JAM package and the different possible funding sources.

For me, it still comes down to:

what do we want → what do we need → what guarantees do we need → who funds what → then how much does it cost.

V2 gets us much closer, but I don’t think we’re quite there yet.

In the previous thread I mentioned my preference for the already community approved path of light and independent as a scaled down JAM can be secure enough and cheaper for early-stage privacy-focused projects that Kusama could serve well, but its just a preference, I also mentioned a path where we share JAM infrastructure with Polkadot is also fine as long as Kusama is treated as a first class citizen and gets a “good deal” … unfortunately this proposal is NOT a good deal.

It cannibalizes the budget the community has to do anything potentially meaningful, it destroys its economics if all users staking suddenly have free KSM that can only be sold and makes it pay potentially the highest price per core/JAMKB that JAM will likely see in a long while, I bet once the market prices things as an independent builder I can get a better deal to deploy services more affordably. It honestly almost looks malicious, but I bet it’s not the intention here, it it’s about recouping the DOT not trusting that the KV program will deliver to give it a different use then better say so.

Simple counter proposal:

  • Kusama gets 16 cores and the necessary JAMKB allocation for 5 years for FREE, this will enable Kusama to attract and sponsor promising service/product builders(1000 builders program?).
  • Most of the Kusama Vision budget remains untouched to be managed by the existing(re focused?) program.
  • Migration and technical maintenance is conducted by a newly formed Kusama fellowship, nothing fancy, a small focused technical group that can maintain the runtimes similar to how Paseo is maintained with a similar focused budget($62,500/quarter according the their last proposal)

A TBD would be a discussion on adapting the economics, like having people “stake” on projects from the 1K builders program the top are the ones getting cheaper/free coretime.

I was actually in favour of option 2, so honestly I’m a bit disappointed it was basically brushed aside between V1 and V2.

If Kusama is going to be an early tenant for JAM, then I agree with Olanod: why are we paying for it? Give us the 16 cores + JAMKB for 5 years and let’s see what we actually need. We don’t even know that yet…

On KV, I honestly expected more concrete results by now. Since January, there’s been pretty little to show for it imo, and maybe we also have a few too many curators. The 10M DOT are W3F’s commitment and the programme is W3F-led, so I’m not saying we should treat them as community funds. But I think we should have a proper discussion about what KV has actually delivered over the last 9 months and where it goes from here.

Let’s finish the Kusama vision first, then open a new post and figure out where we want to take KV from there.

I’d like to get back to my first question again because I believe there is a larger problem associated with it that I probably didn’t do such a good job explaining the first time.

We are talking about a potential future where Kusama moves to JAM Prime and thus will not require its own validator set. That sounds reasonable from a technical/economic perspective.

However, what about the staking economy that is currently present?

This isn’t just a matter of the 700 validators. Currently, approx. 44% of KSM issuance is in staking, and the majority of that staking comes from nominators rather than validator self-stake.

Therefore, we’re talking about a significant portion of the KSM economy.

There are still a few things I do not comprehend. What happens to the existing Kusama validators and all of the infrastructure that currently exists? Will they cease to exist as a category, or could they register JAM keys and become candidates for JAM Prime?

If Kusama doesn’t need NPoS to secure its network anymore, what happens to nominators? Who are they supposed to nominate?

Even more importantly, what happens to KSM staking itself? I agree with the concern raised here that releasing a large quantity of KSM without providing staking with another viable purpose could affect the economics of the token.

Maybe there is an alternative to consider.

If Kusama uses JAM Prime, why should Kusama only receive security from the DOT economy? Could KSM contribute in some way to that same shared security?

For example, could JAM Prime allow validator candidates backed by KSM instead of DOT?

Existing Kusama validators who wish to continue operating could register the necessary JAM keys and meet exactly the same hardware/performance requirements as everyone else. KSM holders could continue staking/nominating those candidates.

I’m not saying that today’s validators should be automatically migrated, and I’m not proposing reserved seats for Kusama. Personally, I would not support either of these solutions. They still need to compete and satisfy whatever requirements JAM establishes.

I am simply wondering whether something similar to this could enable KSM staking to maintain a true purpose while utilizing validator infrastructure and operators that Kusama already has.

Obviously, this raises additional questions about rewards, slashing, how DOT-backed and KSM-backed candidates would interact, candidate selection processes, etc. I don’t claim to have all of the answers.

However, prior to Kusama relinquishing its own validator layer, I think we must understand what is expected to replace this aspect of its economy.

Since we are still in the community feedback phase, I would greatly appreciate hearing the thoughts of the proposal authors regarding this question and my original question about the future of existing Kusama validators.

Just to better illustrate the idea I mentioned above, I was thinking about something conceptually like this:

                JAM PRIME
                    │
            Validator candidates
             ┌──────┴──────┐
             │             │
        DOT-backed     KSM-backed
             │             │
        DOT staking     KSM staking
             │             │
             └──────┬──────┘
                    │
          JAM validator set

One JAM validator set, not two separate sets. Both economies could contribute candidates and economic security, while all candidates would still have to meet the same JAM technical requirements.

Kusama in the JAM Era: A Response to the Proposal for a Future on JAM Prime

A first-principles response on Kusama’s long-term role

Introduction

There are already several serious discussions about the future of Kusama in the JAM era, including the proposal for a future on JAM Prime.

That proposal raises important questions about whether Kusama should operate on a shared JAM-based infrastructure, how resources and security might be allocated, and what relationship should exist between Kusama, Polkadot and JAM Prime.

I do not see this as a separate proposal that should be considered in isolation.

Rather, I see it as part of a broader conversation about what Kusama is meant to become in the JAM era.

Before deciding whether Kusama should run on JAM Prime, operate an independent JAM instance, or adopt some hybrid architecture, I think we should first clarify the underlying question:

What is Kusama actually for in a JAM-based ecosystem?

If we answer that question first, the infrastructure question becomes much easier to reason about.

My hypothesis is that Kusama could evolve from a “Canary Network” into something more fundamental:

an independent economic, governance and Agency domain operating on top of a common JAM computational substrate.

In other words:

JAM could become the common computational substrate.

Polkadot could become a production-oriented institutional domain.

Kusama could become a digital frontier where new forms of organization, governance, economics and autonomous Agency can emerge under real economic conditions.

I am not proposing this as a predetermined outcome, nor am I asking the community to immediately adopt a specific implementation of JAM Prime or any other architecture.

I am proposing it as a framework for evaluating the different options currently being discussed.

The question is not simply whether Kusama can technically run on JAM Prime.

The deeper question is whether a shared JAM substrate can preserve the economic, political and experimental independence that would give Kusama a meaningful long-term role.

There is also a philosophical question underneath this discussion.

What kind of order should a complex digital society seek?

Should it aim for one universal system that imposes the same rules, timing and institutional assumptions everywhere?

Or should it allow multiple forms of order to emerge, provided that they can still communicate and coordinate when necessary?

My intuition is that the second model is more promising.

A healthy digital ecosystem may need both stability and experimentation, both institutional memory and the freedom to explore, both shared foundations and independent forms of life.

This is not an argument for disorder.

It is an argument for a different understanding of order: not uniformity, but the ability of distinct entities to remain coherent while participating in a larger system.

Start from first principles: autonomy and coherence

A complex system that is expected to grow indefinitely faces a fundamental tension.

It needs both autonomy and coherence.

Too much global coherence creates coordination costs, rigidity and dependence on a single global ordering mechanism.

Too little coherence produces fragmentation and makes higher-order composition difficult.

This is not specific to blockchains.

It is a general problem of complex systems.

A useful principle is therefore:

Local autonomy + sufficient coherence = scalable organization.

The important question is not:

“How do we make everything globally synchronized?”

The more fundamental question is:

“Where is strong coherence actually necessary?”

If two entities have a strong causal relationship, strong coherence may be necessary.

If two entities are weakly related, asynchronous interaction may be sufficient.

If two entities have no meaningful causal relationship, forcing them into the same synchronization domain may simply create unnecessary coordination costs.

This leads to what I would call:

Selective Coherence, or Nested Coherence.

Instead of one enormous coherence domain, we can have multiple coherence domains that maintain their own internal consistency while interacting through defined interfaces.

This is important because future digital systems may not consist of millions of passive accounts.

They may consist of increasingly autonomous entities.

There is a philosophical implication here.

Coherence does not necessarily mean that everything must be identical or centrally ordered.

A living system is coherent not because every part is the same, but because different parts maintain relationships that preserve the integrity of the whole.

In that sense, autonomy is not the opposite of order.

Autonomy can be one of the conditions that makes higher-order order possible.

From accounts to Agency

The future computational economy may contain:

Individuals.

Companies.

AI agents.

Machines.

DAOs.

Communities.

Services.

Markets.

Organizations.

Higher-order organizations.

I use the word “Agency” here deliberately.

As a conceptual model:

Agency = Identity + Authority + Capability + Responsibility + State

This is not intended to be a formal protocol definition.

It is a way to describe the type of entities that future computational infrastructure may need to support.

An autonomous AI agent, for example, may require:

Persistent state.

An identity.

Authority over resources.

Delegated authority.

Economic balances.

Capabilities.

Relationships with other entities.

Responsibilities.

Reputation.

The ability to create or participate in higher-order organizations.

Once this becomes possible, the fundamental problem is no longer simply transaction processing.

It becomes:

How can autonomous entities form increasingly complex relationships while maintaining enough coherence for those relationships to remain meaningful?

This is what I mean by Nested Agency.

A person can participate in an organization.

An organization can participate in a DAO.

A DAO can participate in a market.

An AI agent can act on behalf of a person.

An organization can delegate authority to another organization.

Multiple organizations can form a higher-order organization.

The system becomes recursive.

Agency creates relationships.

Relationships create organizations.

Organizations create higher-order Agency.

Higher-order Agency creates new relationships.

And the process continues.

What kind of substrate does Nested Agency require?

If this reasoning is correct, the underlying computational substrate needs more than transaction ordering.

At minimum, it needs:

Persistent state

General computation

Permissionless creation of computational entities

Programmable authority and resource control

Native communication between entities

Asynchronous interaction

Parallel execution where causal dependencies do not exist

Verifiable state transitions

Resource allocation

Economic settlement and feedback

Sufficient coherence for causally related state

The ability to compose these primitives recursively

An important distinction follows.

The underlying substrate does not need to understand every social relationship.

It does not need to know what “employment”, “friendship”, “membership”, “ownership”, “delegation” or “responsibility” means.

Those are higher-level semantics.

The substrate needs to provide primitives that allow such relationships to be represented and enforced.

This gives us two different layers:

Relationship substrate.

Relationship semantics.

The substrate provides the capabilities.

The higher layer gives those capabilities meaning.

This is why JAM should not itself be expected to define the complete concept of Agency.

Why JAM and JAM Prime are interesting

This is where JAM, and potentially JAM Prime, become particularly interesting.

The reasoning should not be:

“JAM Prime is being proposed for Kusama, therefore JAM Prime must be the architecture implied by these principles.”

It should be the opposite:

First derive the required substrate.

Then examine the available architectures, including JAM Prime.

Then ask which architecture best satisfies the requirements while preserving the intended autonomy of each domain.

From this perspective, JAM has an unusual combination of properties.

JAM provides a general computational environment with persistent services, resource-based execution, asynchronous interaction, parallel computation and mechanisms for verifying state transitions.

Services can be permissionlessly deployed.

Computation can be separated into different execution phases, with stateful accumulation where necessary.

Core-time provides a native resource-allocation mechanism for computation.

The architecture does not require every computation to be forced into one monolithic synchronous execution path.

This is highly relevant to Selective Coherence.

The interesting property is therefore not simply performance.

It is the architectural combination:

shared state and coherence + distributed computation + parallel execution + asynchronous interaction + resource allocation + verifiable transitions.

The JAM Gray Paper describes the system as a “mostly-coherent trustless supercomputer.”

That concept is particularly interesting from the first-principles perspective.

The objective is not necessarily maximal global synchronization.

It is sufficient coherence combined with scalable distributed computation.

That is much closer to the underlying problem we are trying to solve.

The proposal for a future on JAM Prime is therefore interesting not merely because it may offer a technically efficient path for Kusama.

It is interesting because it raises the possibility that Kusama could share a computational substrate while retaining a distinct economic and governance identity.

But that possibility should not be assumed.

It needs to be demonstrated through explicit guarantees around authority, resource allocation, security, failure isolation and exit.

JAM is a substrate, not an Agency system

However, an important distinction should be maintained.

JAM is not itself a complete Agency architecture.

Its native computational abstraction is the service.

It does not need to define:

What an individual is.

What an organization is.

What responsibility means.

How reputation works.

How delegation should work.

What constitutes an AI agent.

How identities should relate to one another.

What a higher-order organization means.

Those are higher-layer semantics.

This may actually be a strength.

A sufficiently general substrate should be strongly opinionated about the things that must be coherent at the infrastructure level, while remaining relatively unopinionated about higher-level social and economic structures.

This suggests a layered architecture:

Layer 0: JAM

State.

Computation.

Resource allocation.

Communication.

Verification.

Coherence.

Layer 1: Agency semantics

Identity.

Authority.

Relationships.

Delegation.

Responsibility.

Reputation.

Organization.

Layer 2: Higher-order Agency

DAOs.

AI-agent organizations.

Autonomous markets.

Machine organizations.

Human/AI organizations.

Cross-domain organizations.

What does this imply for Kusama?

This is where I think the JAM transition, and the discussion around JAM Prime, create a fundamental opportunity.

If JAM becomes a sufficiently general computational substrate, then the long-term distinction between Polkadot and Kusama does not necessarily need to be based primarily on different underlying infrastructure.

Instead, they could become different coherence and economic domains built on a common substrate.

Polkadot could be a production-oriented domain.

Kusama could be an experimentation-oriented domain.

The distinction would therefore not simply be:

Polkadot = stable.

Kusama = unstable.

It would be deeper:

Polkadot = institutional core.

Kusama = digital frontier.

The proposal for a future on JAM Prime could be one possible infrastructure expression of this distinction.

But the infrastructure choice should serve the domain distinction, not replace it.

The frontier analogy

There is a historical analogy that I find useful here.

After the formation of the United States, the established states and the expanding frontier played very different roles.

The frontier was not merely a “testnet” for the established states.

It was a place where new communities, businesses, institutions, economic arrangements and forms of governance emerged under real conditions.

The frontier was valuable precisely because its institutional structure was not yet fully settled.

I think this provides a useful analogy for Kusama.

Kusama should not necessarily be thought of as:

“Polkadot, but experimental.”

A more interesting model is:

Polkadot = institutional core.

Kusama = digital frontier.

This does not mean Kusama should become chaotic or ungoverned.

It means that Kusama could provide an environment where new forms of digital organization are allowed to emerge before their long-term institutional form is known.

The important difference is:

A testnet tests technology.

A frontier tests institutions.

That is a much broader experiment.

What could a Kusama digital frontier experiment?

If Kusama were treated as a digital frontier, the experiments could include:

New governance structures.

New economic mechanisms.

New DAO structures.

AI-agent economies.

Machine-to-machine markets.

New reputation systems.

Programmable delegation.

New identity models.

Privacy-preserving organizations.

New forms of digital property.

New resource-allocation mechanisms.

Autonomous organizations.

Human/AI organizations.

New forms of cooperative ownership.

New forms of organizational accountability.

The important point is that Kusama would not merely test whether a technical feature works.

It could test whether a new form of digital organization can survive under real economic conditions.

That is a qualitatively different role.

Why the frontier needs to remain meaningfully independent

A frontier only has value if it has meaningful room to evolve.

If Kusama is simply another deployment environment for the same governance assumptions, incentives and institutional structures as Polkadot, the distinction becomes mostly cosmetic.

At the same time, completely duplicating the underlying infrastructure may be unnecessarily expensive.

This creates a very interesting architectural question:

Can infrastructure be shared without sovereignty being shared?

I believe this question deserves much more attention in the JAM era, especially when evaluating JAM Prime.

Shared infrastructure does not necessarily imply:

Shared governance.

Shared economic policy.

Shared risk tolerance.

Shared identity.

Shared Agency semantics.

Shared political authority.

The substrate can be shared while the domains remain distinct.

That is exactly the kind of structure predicted by Nested Coherence.

Shared infrastructure does not mean shared sovereignty

Consider a simple architecture:

JAM provides the common computational substrate.

Polkadot maintains its own governance and economic domain.

Kusama maintains its own governance and economic domain.

Applications, organizations and Agents exist within these domains.

The lower layer can be shared.

The higher layers can remain autonomous.

This creates a hierarchy:

JAM coherence.

Polkadot domain coherence.

Kusama domain coherence.

Organization coherence.

Agency coherence.

The important question becomes:

Which decisions belong to JAM?

Which decisions belong to Polkadot?

Which decisions belong to Kusama?

Which decisions belong to individual Agencies?

This separation of authority may be more fundamental than the question of how many cores Kusama receives, or whether Kusama should be implemented as a particular JAM Prime configuration.

For the JAM Prime proposal to support genuine Kusama sovereignty, the following questions would need clear answers:

Can Kusama control its own governance and economic parameters?

Can Kusama determine how its allocated resources are used?

Can Kusama reject changes to higher-level semantics that it does not accept?

Can Kusama isolate itself from failures in other domains?

Can Kusama exit the shared substrate with its state and assets intact?

Can Kusama maintain a distinct security and risk profile?

Without credible answers to these questions, “shared substrate + independent domain” may remain only a conceptual distinction.

Kusama could become an experiment for JAM itself

There is another possibility that I find particularly interesting.

Kusama could become not only an experimental network built on JAM.

It could become an experiment in JAM’s own multi-domain architecture.

Suppose JAM can support multiple economically and politically distinct domains.

Then Kusama could become a real-world demonstration that:

One computational substrate can support multiple autonomous communities.

This would test a much deeper hypothesis:

Can decentralized infrastructure become shared infrastructure without forcing every community into the same economic and political system?

That is a fundamental question for the future of Web3.

In this sense, the JAM Prime proposal may be more than a migration or deployment proposal.

It could be a constitutional experiment in how shared infrastructure and independent sovereignty can coexist.

But that experiment should be evaluated not only by technical feasibility or cost efficiency.

It should also be evaluated by whether Kusama retains meaningful agency over its own future.

The economic question

There is also a practical economic reason to think about this architecture.

A sovereign network has to justify its infrastructure cost.

If Kusama maintains a completely independent security and infrastructure stack, that infrastructure must ultimately be justified by the economic value generated by the Kusama ecosystem.

If a common computational substrate can instead be shared across multiple domains, some infrastructure costs could potentially be amortized across the ecosystem.

This does not imply that Kusama should abandon sovereignty.

It means that we should distinguish:

Infrastructure sovereignty

from

Economic sovereignty

and

Political/governance sovereignty.

They are not necessarily the same thing.

A future architecture could potentially provide:

Shared infrastructure.

Independent economic domain.

Independent governance.

Independent experimentation.

That may allow multiple communities to share expensive underlying infrastructure without forcing them to become the same community.

However, shared infrastructure also creates possible dependencies.

For example:

Who determines the cost of resources?

Who can change the resource-allocation mechanism?

Who bears the cost of congestion?

Who decides how security is funded?

Can one domain subsidize or extract value from another?

What happens if the economic assumptions of Polkadot and Kusama diverge?

These questions are central to evaluating whether JAM Prime would strengthen or weaken Kusama’s long-term economic sovereignty.

What should Kusama optimize for?

If this framework is correct, Kusama should not primarily optimize for being:

A smaller Polkadot.

Or:

A cheaper Polkadot.

Its differentiation should come from the kinds of systems that are allowed to emerge.

One possible way to think about this is:

How much organizational and economic experimentation can occur per unit of infrastructure?

Kusama could deliberately allow:

Higher experimentation frequency.

More experimental governance.

More unconventional economic mechanisms.

More unconventional organizations.

More autonomous agents.

More radical coordination mechanisms.

More privacy experiments.

More AI-agent experiments.

More unusual forms of digital ownership and delegation.

This does not mean that Kusama is “better” than Polkadot.

It means that it serves a different function.

Polkadot can provide an environment optimized for production-grade institutions.

Kusama can provide an environment optimized for exploration of the design space.

If Kusama is placed on JAM Prime, the relevant question should therefore not be only whether it can run there.

It should be whether JAM Prime enables more experimentation, autonomy and institutional differentiation than the alternatives.

From Canary Network to Digital Frontier

This suggests a possible evolution of Kusama’s identity.

Phase 1:

Kusama as a Canary Network.

Its primary role is to expose new Polkadot technologies and governance mechanisms to real economic conditions.

Phase 2:

Kusama as an independent experimental network.

It develops its own economic and governance identity.

Phase 3:

Kusama as a digital frontier on JAM.

It becomes a place where new forms of digital organization, Agency and economic coordination can emerge.

The important transition is therefore:

Testing new technology

to

Testing new institutions.

That is a much larger design space.

The JAM Prime discussion may represent an opportunity to make this transition explicit rather than treating Kusama merely as a network that needs a new technical home.

A possible long-term architecture

The architecture I have in mind is conceptually simple.

JAM would be the common computational substrate.

Polkadot would be a production-oriented economic and governance domain.

Kusama would be an experimental economic and governance domain.

Above both would exist organizations, DAOs, AI agents and higher-order Agencies.

Potentially, other domains could emerge in the same way.

The architecture would therefore look conceptually like this:

JAM

├── Polkadot

│ ├── Organizations

│ ├── DAOs

│ ├── Agents

│ └── Higher-order Agency

│

├── Kusama

│ ├── Organizations

│ ├── DAOs

│ ├── Agents

│ └── Higher-order Agency

│

└── Other Domains

├── Organizations

├── DAOs

├── Agents

└── Higher-order Agency

At that point, Kusama would no longer be merely a Canary Network.

It would be one autonomous domain among potentially many domains sharing a common computational substrate.

JAM Prime could potentially serve as the infrastructure through which this architecture is realized.

But the key design requirement would remain:

Kusama must be a domain, not merely a tenant.

This changes the question “Why does Kusama exist?”

Under the traditional model, the answer is:

Kusama exists because Polkadot needs a Canary Network.

Under the JAM-era model, a stronger architectural answer could be:

Kusama exists because a growing digital ecosystem needs a frontier.

The institutional core and the frontier perform different functions.

The institutional core preserves established production systems.

The frontier explores unknown organizational possibilities.

The core provides continuity.

The frontier provides variation.

The core provides coherence.

The frontier provides experimentation.

This is very close to the broader principle of:

Order + Flux.

A complex system needs both.

Too much order produces rigidity.

Too much flux produces fragmentation.

A growing system needs a structure in which experimentation can occur without destroying the coherence of the larger system.

Kusama could potentially play exactly this role.

The deeper connection to Agency

This is where I think the JAM/Kusama architecture becomes particularly interesting.

If the future Web3 economy is increasingly composed of autonomous economic entities, then we will eventually need infrastructure for:

Individuals.

Agents.

Organizations.

Markets.

Higher-order organizations.

These entities will need to create relationships recursively.

That means the system must support:

Agency.

Relationship.

Organization.

Higher-order Agency.

And these structures will need different degrees of coherence.

A small AI agent may need local autonomy.

An organization may need internal coherence.

A DAO may need another level of coherence.

A Kusama domain may need another.

A Polkadot domain may need another.

JAM may provide the underlying computational coherence.

This gives us a recursive architecture:

Agency

→ Organization

→ Domain

→ JAM

and:

JAM

→ Domain

→ Organization

→ Agency.

This is Nested Coherence expressed as an actual system architecture.

The most important unresolved questions

If this direction is worth exploring, I think the community should focus on several concrete questions, including those raised by the proposal for a future on JAM Prime.

A. Sovereignty

What exactly remains under KSM governance if Kusama uses shared JAM infrastructure?

B. Authority boundaries

Which decisions can JAM make?

Which decisions belong exclusively to Kusama?

Can Kusama reject changes to higher-level infrastructure?

C. Economic independence

How does KSM retain meaningful economic utility if infrastructure is shared?

D. Resource allocation

How should JAM resources be allocated between Polkadot, Kusama and potentially other domains?

Who controls the allocation mechanism, and can Kusama protect its access to resources over time?

E. Security

Which security guarantees are shared?

Which risks remain domain-specific?

F. Failure isolation

If one domain experiences a catastrophic economic or governance failure, how isolated is another domain?

G. Exit

Can a domain leave the shared substrate?

What happens to its state, assets and organizations?

H. Experimental freedom

What kinds of experiments should Kusama explicitly encourage that Polkadot should not?

I. Agency

Can Kusama become an economically real environment for experimenting with AI-agent organizations, DAOs and autonomous economic entities?

J. Long-term differentiation

What would make an application, organization or Agency choose Kusama rather than Polkadot?

K. Constitutional guarantees

What guarantees would need to be encoded in the architecture or governance process so that Kusama’s independence does not depend solely on goodwill from other participants?

This last question is critical.

Infrastructure alone does not create a reason for a community to exist.

Kusama needs a distinctive economic and organizational function.

My proposed framing

I would therefore suggest that we stop thinking about the JAM transition primarily as:

“How should Kusama migrate?”

or:

“Should Kusama use JAM Prime?”

Instead, we should ask:

“What should Kusama become once the underlying computational substrate is no longer the primary differentiator?”

My current hypothesis is:

Kusama could become an independent, high-experimentation economic, governance and Agency domain on top of JAM.

Its purpose would be to explore the design space of digital organizations, autonomous agents, governance, economics and new forms of coordination under real economic conditions.

Polkadot could provide a more production-oriented institutional environment.

JAM could provide the common computational substrate.

JAM Prime could potentially provide one implementation path for hosting or coordinating these domains.

Kusama could provide the digital frontier.

This creates a three-layer architecture:

JAM

= common computational substrate

Polkadot

= production-oriented institutional domain

Kusama

= experimental digital frontier

The important point is that JAM Prime should be judged by whether it can support this architecture, not merely by whether it can host Kusama technically.

This is not a proposal to simply merge Kusama into Polkadot

In fact, the argument is almost the opposite.

If Kusama’s purpose is to provide meaningful institutional experimentation, eliminating its independent identity could remove much of the value of having the frontier in the first place.

At the same time, completely duplicating infrastructure may be unnecessary if JAM can safely support multiple domains.

Therefore the interesting design space is not simply:

Complete independence

versus

Complete merger.

There is a third possibility:

Shared substrate + independent domain.

That is the architecture I think deserves deeper technical and constitutional investigation.

The proposal for a future on JAM Prime may be pointing toward this third possibility.

The question is whether the proposed architecture provides enough separation between the shared substrate and Kusama’s domain-level sovereignty.

If it does, JAM Prime could become an important foundation for Kusama’s next phase.

If it does not, then the community should be careful not to confuse infrastructure sharing with genuine independence.

Final hypothesis

There is a broader reason why I find this direction important.

If the future of Web3 is ultimately about autonomous economic entities rather than merely decentralized databases, then the infrastructure problem changes.

We will need systems that allow:

Individuals → Agents → Organizations → Markets → Higher-order Organizations

to form recursively.

This requires autonomy.

But recursive organization also requires coherence.

Therefore the architecture of the future may not be:

One global state machine containing everything.

It may instead be:

A hierarchy of coherence domains sharing a common computational substrate.

If this hypothesis is correct, Kusama could become more than a historical Canary Network.

It could become one of the first real-world laboratories for this architecture.

Not a smaller Polkadot.

Not simply a testnet.

Not merely a cheaper deployment environment.

But an economically real digital frontier where new forms of organization are allowed to emerge.

JAM may provide the substrate.

Polkadot may provide the institutional core.

Kusama may provide the frontier.

JAM Prime may be one possible way to connect these layers.

And the deeper experiment would be whether multiple autonomous communities can share computational infrastructure without giving up their ability to organize themselves differently.

That, to me, is a much more fundamental question for the JAM era than simply asking where Kusama should run.

I would be very interested in hearing where this model, or the JAM Prime proposal, is technically or constitutionally wrong.

In particular:

Which parts of this architecture cannot actually be implemented on JAM or JAM Prime?

Where would shared JAM infrastructure necessarily create shared governance?

What minimum guarantees are required for genuine Kusama sovereignty over a shared substrate?

What would make Kusama economically valuable as a distinct digital frontier?

What kinds of Agency, AI-agent economies, governance systems or organizational experiments would make sense specifically on Kusama?

How should resources, security and failure isolation be allocated between Polkadot, Kusama and other domains?

Could Kusama become a real-world test of JAM’s ability to support multiple autonomous coherence domains?

What specific guarantees would distinguish a sovereign Kusama domain on JAM Prime from a merely dependent deployment environment?

I think these questions may be more fundamental than choosing between “mini-JAM”, “full JAM”, “JAM Prime”, or “no JAM” in isolation.

Daniel (@olanod), since you have put forward a direct counterproposal (A Proposal for a Kusama Future on JAM Prime - #16 by olanod), I would like to address its two central propositions:

“Kusama gets 16 cores and the necessary JAMKB allocation for 5 years for FREE”

“Migration and technical maintenance is conducted by a newly formed Kusama fellowship”

1. Free capacity still has to be funded

DOT DAO gifting Kusama five years of capacity on JAM Prime would certainly be welcome. In our view, however, this is an unrealistic starting assumption without a compelling explanation of why DOT DAO should bear that cost.

Operating JAM Prime involves real expenditure, including remunerating validators for infrastructure, technical operations and availability. Our position paper provides an explicit operating-cost benchmark, and we welcome challenges to its assumptions. JAM is capable of provisioning its capacity (number of cores through setting active validators) to scale with demand, within the network’s operating limits. DOT DAO therefore need not maintain maximum capacity of 341 cores. This also addresses @brenzi’s remark regarding “JAM and its idle cores”. (publications/content/articles/proposal-kusama-future-jam-prime/index.md at a445bba7ab5a801e3b85168551dfa8b1e5021bc2 · sdfinst/publications · GitHub)

Even where spare capacity exists, committing it to Kusama for five years creates an obligation to keep providing it. Free to Kusama would mean funded by someone else. The relevant question is why DOT DAO would consider that commitment worthwhile.

Our proposal offers a concrete basis for negotiation: payment in DOT for an agreed package of resources, sovereignty assurances, migration and maintenance. We advance a cost-based negotiating reference that we consider reasonable for both sides, with the assumptions and final terms open to discussion. Reasonable for both sides means there is a reason for DOT DAO to accepts Kusama’s offer. (publications/content/articles/proposal-kusama-future-jam-prime/index.md at a445bba7ab5a801e3b85168551dfa8b1e5021bc2 · sdfinst/publications · GitHub)

Whether the proposed resources and protections match Kusama’s needs depends on the more fundamental question of what Kusama wants to become.

A contribution in another form could also strengthen Kusama’s negotiating position. One possibility worth exploring is a renewed canary role.

WFC #498 establishes a direction in which Kusama becomes an experiment-centric peer of Polkadot, extending its purpose beyond being merely a canary network. (A New Kusama Vision - 10 Million DOT from W3F & Transition Away From Being A Canary Network)

It nevertheless leaves room to consider where a canary function could still create value and thus enhance Kusama’s negotiating position.

For the migration path we envisage, we would expect JAM Prime to launch through a DOT DAO-approved genesis configuration, with Polkadot’s Parachain Service supporting its subsequent governance activity. Kusama’s Parachain Service could be included at genesis or established through a later DOT DAO governance decision. Under both sequences, we would not expect Kusama to migrate ahead of Polkadot, so its scope to serve as a canary for the initial transition appears limited.

Once both are operational, however, their closely aligned Parachain Service architectures could create an opportunity for Kusama to adopt service upgrades ahead of Polkadot. That could provide a tangible benefit to Polkadot (less risk for Polkadot) and strengthen Kusama’s case for more favourable endowment terms. It would need an agreed scope, willing technical stewards and a clear account of the value being provided.

Our starting point remains that security has a cost for both Kusama and Polkadot. Funding it through issuance, a prepaid endowment or an explicit subsidy determines who carries that cost and when those cost are carried.

The capacity–duration model makes the choices available to Kusama explicit. Under the proposed benchmark, reducing the total number of coretime-years (through fewer cores, a shorter term or both) reduces the compute reference and creates more room for a development programme (by a renewed Kusama Vision Programme). Within a given payment envelope, Kusama can also trade capacity against runway: fewer cores for longer, or more cores for a shorter period, subject to agreement on the remaining package costs. (publications/content/articles/proposal-kusama-future-jam-prime/index.md at a445bba7ab5a801e3b85168551dfa8b1e5021bc2 · sdfinst/publications · GitHub)

These choices should follow Kusama’s intended offering and priorities. A community that needs a modest amount of capacity and a long development runway should negotiate a different package from one that needs substantial capacity immediately. Our proposal nonetheless is a one-off negotiation for the entire duration of the endowment.

In our view, your counterproposal has yet to establish why DOT DAO would provide sixteen cores and the associated footprint for five years without payment. A persuasive case for substantial reciprocal value could improve Kusama’s negotiating position. That case needs to be developed before a free allocation becomes a credible planning assumption.

2. An independent Kusama Fellowship needs a credible delivery plan

A dedicated Kusama technical fellowship could be valuable. Establishing one capable of taking responsibility for migration and continuing maintenance would require a substantial organisational and engineering effort.

You suggest a small, focused technical group and use Paseo’s maintenance budget as a reference. That provides a starting point for discussing costs, but it leaves important delivery questions unanswered: who would undertake the work, which responsibilities would they accept, how would they be recruited and funded, and how would the handover be managed? (A Proposal for a Kusama Future on JAM Prime - #16 by olanod)

In our view, a credible proposal needs identified maintainers, a defined technical scope, a migration plan, a sustainable budget and arrangements for security review, incident response and continuity. A maintenance budget for another network does not, by itself, establish the resources required to migrate and maintain Kusama on JAM Prime.

Your earlier exchange with bkchr is relevant here. He stated that the Fellowship would accept a Kusama governance decision declining its technical assistance, and that he would then expect Kusama’s runtime logic to move out of the Fellowship repository. (Kusama system parachains recognize authority of the Polkadot Technical Fellowship by acatangiu · Pull Request #1100 · polkadot-fellows/runtimes · GitHub)

Our reading is that an independent path would require an explicit transfer of responsibility; continued support from the existing Fellowship should not be assumed.

We would consider it reckless to relinquish the existing stewardship arrangement before a capable and funded successor is ready. Those advocating that transition should demonstrate how technical continuity would be secured.

The Polkadot Fellowship plays an essential role in maintaining the technical architecture, and that work carries substantial costs. Its expenses and accountability have also been subject to scrutiny within Polkadot governance. (Replenishing the Technical Fellowship Salary Account with HOLLAR)

DOT DAO has historically financed the Fellowship’s work, while we are not aware of an equivalent financial contribution from Kusama’s side. Kusama should therefore approach continued technical support as a contribution whose scope and funding deserve explicit agreement. And with mentioned scrutiny on the Polkadot Fellowship’s activities it is a dangerous assumption that the Fellowship will continue to service Kusama’s interests while being solely funded by DOT DAO.

In the same GitHub discussion, bkchr explained the Fellowship’s involvement in Kusama by reference to the networks’ history and their continuing technical coupling. (Kusama system parachains recognize authority of the Polkadot Technical Fellowship by acatangiu · Pull Request #1100 · polkadot-fellows/runtimes · GitHub)

That alignment provides a practical basis for shared stewardship. In our view, a substantially divergent Kusama architecture would require a fresh agreement about which responsibilities the Fellowship was willing to retain.

Our proposal therefore pursues two concrete objectives regarding migration and maintenance.

First, maintain technical alignment. A similar Parachain Service migration path would keep Kusama close to Polkadot’s architecture, allowing shared expertise and engineering work to support both. It could also create the opportunity for the renewed canary function discussed above.

Second, negotiate migration and maintenance explicitly. We propose including a Fellowship-led mandate covering the agreed migration and the full five-year operating term. (publications/content/articles/proposal-kusama-future-jam-prime/index.md at a445bba7ab5a801e3b85168551dfa8b1e5021bc2 · sdfinst/publications · GitHub)

At the very least this requires DOT DAO’s acceptance, named delivery responsibilities, an agreed scope and budget, and continuity arrangements. The aim is to secure dependable technical stewardship throughout Kusama’s runway.

An independent Kusama Fellowship remains a possible direction. Its proponents need to show that it can deliver the required stewardship at a sustainable cost and manage the transition safely.

Security, migration and maintenance all require resources. A credible counterproposal must establish who will provide them, who will fund them and why the relevant parties would agree.