A fifth option: an independent Kusama on a reduced JAM, keeping its validators

We write as stakeholders in Kusama: independent validators, parachains other than the system chains, builders whose applications account for more than a quarter of active addresses on Kusama Asset Hub, and dUSD, the only US-dollar stablecoin still issued natively on Kusama. We have come to OpenGov in good faith, through treasury proposals and bounties, and put our own time and money into Kusama without engagement or support from the bodies that wrote the four options now on the ballot.

On 20 October four Wish for Change referenda went up, #671 to #674. Each moves Kusama onto JAM Prime, Polkadot’s JAM network: 8 cores for 5 years, 6 for 6 years and 8 months, 4 for 10, or 2 for 20 (the case for them). All four end Kusama’s own validator set and retire staking.

KSM holders have voted on this before. #573, “Lightweight and independent”, passed on 21 August 2025: a smaller Kusama on its own JAM network, with its own validators and KSM as its native token. #655 carried out its first step. Each of the four says it would supersede #573 if selected, but none puts #573 itself on the ballot.

What we propose

A fifth Wish for Change, now on chain as #676, in the same voting window, that continues #573:

An independent Kusama, keeping its own validator set, staking, governance and monetary policy on a reduced JAM network of its own, is scoped, priced and specified in the open, with Kusama’s validators, nominators and parachains, and put to KSM holders beside JAM Prime before any transition retires Kusama’s validators. Kusama-specific maintenance is carried by an open steward collective accountable to KSM DAO. No funds are requested.

Validators keep their seats while the comparison is made. Staking continues and nobody is forced to unbond. Parachains pay for coretime in KSM. Nothing is asked from outside Kusama: no DOT, no draw on the Kusama Vision fund.

Why it belongs on the same ballot

If #573 can be set aside by submitting different wishes, whichever of #671 to #674 passes can be set aside the same way, and the track stops meaning anything. Four options that share a premise also leave no line for anyone who wants Kusama to keep its validators. Voting no four times records a refusal, not a preference. If KSM holders still choose JAM Prime after a real comparison, #573 is reversed by a vote, which is how it should be.

Who would hold the other side

All four make Kusama’s security a promise from DOT DAO without saying which body holds it. DOT DAO is deciding 1954, which asks it to “avoid fragmented tools or efforts that don’t drive user adoption for the Polkadot Product Platform”. Its legal arm, the PCF, can reject token-holder-approved proposals, and the two board seats DOT holders are meant to elect have never been filled (two attempts failed in October 2025, thread). KSM holders would have no seat in that chain. Independence is the one line whose protections KSM holders would enforce themselves, so it needs to be a credible, priced offer.

A steward needs legal standing too, or it answers to whoever signs for it. Birdbrain is taking the opposite shape to the PCF: a Wyoming nonprofit association, a plain UNA first and a DUNA once it passes the hundred members the law requires. A DUNA has no board to overrule its members, limits their liability, and can take its on-chain votes as its governing rules. Birdbrain’s members would be its voters. The case is published as RFC 003, the governing principles are drafted, and nothing is filed until the members approve it on chain.

What it would cost

We don’t know yet, and neither does anyone else. The four options are priced on a benchmark of US$3,000 per validator per month. Nobody has asked Kusama’s validators what a seat costs them. The fifth option asks for that first: a validator cost survey, a reference configuration tested on a public network they run, and a funding model set beside JAM Prime’s, all published with workings.

The steward would be paid later, through ordinary treasury proposals, each against a milestone and a published rule. We have tried one already. #665 asked for 8 KSM to pay for memberships only for people a session’s anchored attendance record could vouch for, one person one claim, with a public checker. It was rejected on 30 September, about 60 KSM to 4,335 counted with conviction. The larger case behind it, and its numbers, offered as a model to argue with, is RFC 001.

A steward, and where this goes

An independent Kusama needs a steward that answers to KSM holders. Birdbrain was first proposed for that kind of role in March 2025, as #506, an on-chain innovation agency for a Kusama that #498 had just recognised as Polkadot’s peer. It timed out without a vote, and we built it anyway, as the open-source lab of Decent Partners. It now offers to form the steward as an open collective on Kreivo, covering runtime releases, the JAM genesis and test network, the transition plan and a quarterly report to KSM DAO. Its members work in Murmur, our open app, which we are growing into one tool for the network’s operators and contributors. It is built around the privacy and self-custody Kusama’s community has said it wants: passkeys kept on members’ own devices through Virto’s VOS, live on mainnet, and on test networks a zero-knowledge claim written in Noir, shielded payments through Kusama Shield’s pool and a members’ exchange on Decred’s DEX software (paper, Section 6). We are also beginning to onboard other collectives and their members onto the same systems. The first is Four To The Floor, the Channel 4 music film series turned platform, built as a home for arts and culture. Decent Partners is incubating it and is beginning to sign artists to new deals built around what these systems can do, backed by well-known figures in UK music, among them Matt Black, co-founder of Ninja Tune, an investor in Decent Partners. We can’t do this alone. We need JAM client teams, validators and runtime engineers, and anyone who joins with a passkey is a member with a vote.

Enactment on Kusama follows stake-weighted votes, and any holder can delegate theirs and take it back at will. Once Birdbrain’s membership is a credible association of infrastructure partners with a fully scoped, specified and costed plan, holders who want a different path can delegate to it, and enough stake would let that plan be enacted. That is the ambition, said openly, and a continuation of Kusama’s chaos. We are not asking for delegations now, and our members will publish how any are cast before we accept one.

Read, come, reply

  • The paper, written for anyone new to this: An independent Kusama on a reduced JAM, keeping its validators.
  • Monday 26 October, 15:00 UK (15:00 UTC). The Chaos Session is given to an independent Kusama, and holders, validators, builders and teams are welcome. Joining is the demonstration: a passkey on your own device makes you a member of Birdbrain on Kreivo, with no seed phrase. The call is recorded, and the door says so before you agree: birdbrain.wtf/chaos/join.
  • The resolution is on chain as #676 on the Wish for Change track, the fifth option, with this thread and the paper linked from it.
  • Questions here. We will answer each one.

We keep building on Kusama while the vote runs. If you disagree, please say so here. A no vote tells us less than a reason.

Our interest: Decent Partners supports Birdbrain and funds its members’ deposits, has a commercial interest in dUSD through Brale, builds and incubates Four To The Floor’s platform as a paid commission, counts Matt Black among its investors, is an investor in Bloque and holds about 7.17 million KAB, the token of the Kabocha parachain. Kabocha’s initial supply also made the Web3 Foundation a major KAB holder, an estimated 5 million. Decent Partners also holds KSM from the KSM:dUSD pool funded by referendum #474, withdrawn in May 2025 and treated as owed to the Kusama treasury in KSM. Birdbrain holds KSM.

Why I am voting AYE on #676 and NAY on #671, #672, #673, #674

I support an independent Kusama, and I don’t understand why the discussion seems to start from the assumption that moving to JAM Prime is what KSM holders want.

The four JAM Prime proposals are essentially variations of the same decision. They offer different core allocations and durations, but all lead to the same fundamental outcome: Kusama loses its independent validator set, KSM staking is retired, and the network becomes dependent on Polkadot’s infrastructure for security.

Where is the option for those of us who believe Kusama should remain independent?

We already voted in favor of a lightweight, independent Kusama through referendum #573. I don’t see why that direction should be abandoned without a proper technical and economic comparison.

My reasons for supporting #676 are simple:

  1. Independence matters. Kusama should control its own security, infrastructure, monetary policy, and technical direction rather than depend on decisions made by another DAO.

  2. KSM needs meaningful utility. Staking and securing the network are fundamental economic functions of KSM. Removing them without a convincing alternative economic model raises serious questions about the token’s future.

  3. Kusama should differentiate itself from Polkadot. An independent, reduced JAM could allow Kusama to experiment with faster block times, different network parameters, and applications that need high-performance infrastructure. I would rather see Kusama develop its own competitive advantages than become another environment running on Polkadot.

  4. We need real numbers, not assumptions. Before retiring validators, we should understand the actual cost of maintaining a smaller independent network, its security requirements, and how it compares economically with JAM Prime.

  5. The community deserves a genuine choice. Four variations of JAM Prime are not equivalent to offering four different visions for Kusama’s future.

I am not advocating for maintaining the current infrastructure unchanged. I recognize that Kusama needs to become more efficient, sustainable, and attractive to developers.

But independence and efficiency are not mutually exclusive.

Referendum #676 does not ask us to immediately commit to an unproven implementation. It asks for an independent alternative to be properly evaluated, tested, and costed before making a fundamental decision about Kusama’s future.

I vote AYE on #676 because I want Kusama to have its own future, not one that is predetermined by Polkadot’s infrastructure roadmap.

And I vote NAY on the four JAM Prime proposals because I do not support retiring Kusama’s independent security and staking before a credible alternative has been fully evaluated.

Kusama should be independent by choice, not dependent by default.

Analysis of Proposal #676: An Independent Kusama on a Reduced JAM Network with Its Own Validators

1. The essence of the proposal

Proposal #676 is an attempt to preserve Kusama as an independent blockchain ecosystem rather than turn it into an additional network operating on Polkadot’s JAM Prime.

The main difference between this proposal and the four alternatives (#671–674) is straightforward:

  • Preserving Kusama’s independence: its own reduced JAM network, separate from Polkadot’s JAM Prime.

  • Preserving its validators: Kusama’s existing validator set continues securing the network.

  • Maintaining KSM staking: validators and nominators retain their economic roles.

  • Independent governance: decisions remain in the hands of KSM holders through OpenGov.

  • Its own economy: KSM remains the network’s native token, while parachains pay for coretime in KSM.

  • No external funding: the proposal does not request DOT or funding from Kusama Vision.

Essentially, the authors are not proposing to abandon JAM. They want to implement it on a smaller scale while preserving Kusama’s independent economic and governance structures.

2. The main conflict: independence or integration with Polkadot?

The four earlier proposals (#671–674) envisage moving Kusama to JAM Prime.

The difference between the two approaches is fundamental.

Criteria JAM Prime (#671–674) Independent Kusama (#676)
Architecture Polkadot JAM Own reduced JAM
Validators Existing Kusama validator set is discontinued Preserved
KSM staking Discontinued Maintained
Governance Reliance on external infrastructure and decision-making Independent OpenGov
Economy Integration with JAM Prime Independent KSM economy
Independence Limited Maximum
Funding Commitments involving DOT DAO Proposed without external funding

The key question is not purely technical. It is economic and political: who will own Kusama’s future, and who will make decisions about its development?

The authors of #676 argue that transferring security and infrastructure to Polkadot creates dependency on organizations that are not directly accountable to KSM holders.

This is a serious argument, particularly from the perspective of decentralization and governance.

3. Arguments in favor of Proposal #676

3.1. Preserving economic independence

Kusama would retain its own validator system, staking mechanism, and monetary policy.

This matters for several reasons:

  • KSM retains its functional role within the network.

  • Validators continue receiving economic incentives.

  • Nominators retain their ability to participate in network security.

  • Parachains continue using their own infrastructure.

  • Kusama does not become merely another segment of the Polkadot ecosystem.

Essentially, this is about preserving an independent economy, not simply maintaining a separate token.

3.2. Protecting the interests of existing participants

The authors emphasize that Kusama already has infrastructure built by independent ecosystem participants:

  • Validators.

  • Developers.

  • Parachains.

  • Applications.

  • KSM holders and users.

  • Participants in the stablecoin economy, including dUSD.

Discontinuing the existing validator set would fundamentally change the economic conditions for current participants.

Proposal #676 therefore advocates a gradual transition in which alternatives are evaluated before a final decision is made.

3.3. Preserving the principles of OpenGov

One of the strongest arguments presented by the authors concerns the fairness of the voting process.

Referendum #573, Lightweight and Independent, was approved on August 21, 2025.

It proposed exactly this concept: an independent Kusama operating its own lightweight JAM network.

However, the four new proposals effectively seek to replace that vision without including it as a полноценный alternative in the current voting process.

The authors of #676 consider this a governance problem.

Their argument is logical: if the community is expected to choose Kusama’s future, it should be presented with all meaningful alternatives, not just four variations of essentially the same strategic outcome.

4. The most interesting elements of the proposal

4.1. Keeping validators operational until a final decision

This is arguably the most practical part of the proposal.

The authors suggest:

  • Keeping existing validators operational.

  • Maintaining staking.

  • Conducting a technical comparison of the available models.

  • Evaluating actual operating costs.

  • Publishing the results.

  • Making the final decision only afterward.

This approach reduces the risk of irreversible consequences.

4.2. The economic model remains undefined

The authors openly acknowledge that the cost of maintaining an independent Kusama JAM network is currently unknown.

The four alternative proposals use an estimated cost of approximately $3,000 per validator per month.

However, according to the authors of #676, this figure has not been validated through actual research into Kusama validators’ operating expenses.

They propose first:

  • Conducting a survey of validators.

  • Testing a reference JAM configuration.

  • Determining actual operating costs.

  • Developing a funding model.

  • Publishing detailed financial information and results.

This is the right approach from a financial transparency perspective.

However, there is also a weakness: without a concrete budget, it is impossible to objectively assess the long-term sustainability of the independent model.

4.3. Establishing Birdbrain as a governance and stewardship organization

The authors propose establishing Birdbrain as a Wyoming nonprofit association, initially operating as a UNA and eventually transitioning to a DUNA.

Its proposed responsibilities include:

  • Coordinating development.

  • Organizing work with validators.

  • Developing the JAM network.

  • Building a testnet.

  • Preparing a migration roadmap.

  • Publishing quarterly reports to the KSM DAO.

The idea is to establish an organizational structure accountable to KSM holders rather than controlled by a centralized company or foundation.

This is an interesting governance model, although its actual effectiveness will depend on its legal structure, membership, accountability mechanisms, and funding transparency.

5. Weaknesses and risks of Proposal #676

It is important to distinguish between the attractiveness of the concept and its actual ability to be implemented.

First risk: insufficient budget definition.

There is no final cost estimate for independent JAM, no approved validator compensation model, and no verified long-term funding plan.

Maintaining independent infrastructure could prove significantly more expensive than integrating with JAM Prime.

Second risk: technical feasibility.

Building an independent JAM network requires JAM client development teams, runtime engineers, security specialists, and continuous technical maintenance.

Having a concept does not automatically mean having the infrastructure needed to deliver it.

Third risk: dependence on Birdbrain.

The proposal argues against dependence on external organizations while simultaneously introducing a new organization that would coordinate a significant part of Kusama’s development.

This raises a legitimate question: how can the community ensure that Birdbrain does not become another center of influence?

Transparent accountability and leadership replacement mechanisms will be essential.

Fourth risk: conflicts of interest.

The disclosure section at the end of the publication is particularly important.

Decent Partners:

  • Supports Birdbrain and funds its participants’ membership deposits.

  • Has a commercial interest in dUSD.

  • Develops the Four To The Floor platform on a paid basis.

  • Holds approximately 7.17 million KAB tokens.

  • Owns KSM from a previously established KSM:dUSD pool.

  • Has other commercial and investment relationships within the ecosystem.

This does not establish any wrongdoing by the authors. However, it demonstrates that they are not entirely independent observers.

Their interests must be considered when evaluating the proposal.

Fifth risk: an insufficiently defined end-state model.

The proposal calls for preserving independence and continuing development, but it does not yet provide a fully developed technical and economic architecture.

Therefore, #676 currently looks more like a proposal to preserve the option of choice than a fully prepared migration plan.

6. Why this matters for the broader Polkadot ecosystem

In my view, there is a deeper strategic question here.

Kusama was originally more than just a testing network for Polkadot. It represented an independent experimental ecosystem with its own token, governance, validators, and economic incentives.

Its value came from the ability to experiment with technologies and governance models without having to replicate every decision made by Polkadot.

If Kusama moves to JAM Prime and discontinues its own staking system, it effectively changes its identity.

On one hand, this could reduce costs, simplify infrastructure, and strengthen the overall technological architecture.

On the other hand, it would eliminate part of the independent ecosystem that allowed Kusama to exist as a separate experimental network.

This raises an important question:

If Polkadot is building the decentralized infrastructure of the future, should Kusama retain the right to evolve independently?

I believe this question deserves serious consideration.

7. Overall assessment

My assessment of Proposal #676

Strategic vision

Strong

Preserving independence, its own economy, and validators has clear strategic value.

Governance logic

Strong

Giving KSM holders a genuine choice is consistent with OpenGov principles.

Economic justification

Insufficient

No final budget or verified long-term funding model has been presented.

Technical readiness

Needs validation

Working infrastructure, a development team, and a technical roadmap are required.

Independence of the stewardship organization

Questions remain

Birdbrain’s authority, accountability, and potential conflicts of interest require further examination.

8. Key conclusions

1. #676 is not simply an alternative technical migration to JAM Prime. It is a proposal to preserve Kusama as an independent economic and governance system.

2. The central conflict is between infrastructure centralization and the autonomy of the KSM DAO. The fundamental question is who controls Kusama’s development and determines its future.

3. Preserving validators is critically important. It prevents the destruction of the existing security system before a proven alternative is available.

4. The proposal correctly raises the issue of cost transparency. Long-term decisions should not be based on unverified operating cost estimates.

5. Birdbrain represents an interesting governance model, but its effectiveness has not yet been demonstrated. Its legal and economic independence must be carefully evaluated.

6. Disclosing the authors’ commercial interests is a positive step toward transparency, but those interests still require independent scrutiny.

7. The biggest weakness of #676 is the gap between a strong strategic vision and an insufficiently developed implementation plan.

9. Final conclusion: my strategic position

I would separate two questions: whether Kusama should remain independent and whether Birdbrain is the right organization to make that happen.

My answer to the first question is largely yes.

Regarding the second, there is not yet enough evidence.

There is no fundamental need to position Polkadot JAM and independent Kusama JAM as opposing concepts. Technically, they could be two different implementations of a shared architecture, developing in parallel and competing on efficiency.

Moreover, an independent Kusama could become an additional environment for experimenting with JAM, governance, staking, and new economic models.

The most reasonable approach is not to shut down Kusama’s existing infrastructure until the alternative model has been technically tested, economically justified, and approved by KSM holders.

At the same time, independence should not become an end in itself. It must be supported by real utility, developers, applications, users, and a sustainable economy.

And one more fundamental point: KSM holders should be choosing between genuinely different models for their network’s future, not between four variations of essentially the same scenario.

My main conclusion: Kusama should not lose its independence simply because it can technically become part of a larger infrastructure. Integration must be a conscious decision by the community, not an irreversible consequence of an organizational decision.

That is precisely why #676 deserves serious consideration, even though its economic and technical model still requires substantial development.

Important note: This analysis is based on the publication provided. I have not independently verified the current status of referenda #573 and #671–676, the JAM technical documentation, or Birdbrain’s legal documents. Therefore, this is an assessment of the proposal’s arguments and strategy, not an independent technical or legal audit.

I write as the author of the 3 papers on Kusama’s future and the proposal texts for referenda #671–#674:

A few corrections and additions to the analysis:

  1. The analysis conflates infrastructure independence with political autonomy. Cohabitation on JAM Prime proposes to preserve KSM control over governance, monetary policy, service upgrades and internal resources. The comparison gives insufficient attention to these protections and the authority KSM holders would retain.

  2. The analysis overstates the connection between independence and decentralization. A separate network still requires evidence of distributed operator control, resilience and sustainable security incentives. The 96-validator minimum identified in the supporting proposal remains a configuration whose security and resilience need to be demonstrated.

  3. The analysis treats preserving staking as an economic advantage without establishing its affordability. Validator and nominator rewards sustain existing roles, but their value must be assessed against the security they deliver and the ongoing burden on KSM holders.

  4. The analysis gives too much weight to the absence of an immediate funding request. Referendum #676 requests no immediate funds, but the independent path envisages continued security financing and subsequent treasury funding for stewardship. A meaningful comparison must account for the full financial obligations of each approach over time.

  5. The analysis raises a valid pricing question but leaves the economic comparison incomplete. The illustrative benchmark of $3,000 per validator-month provides a basis for quantifying an offer to DOT DAO. If accepted, funded and implemented as a complete package, that offer would cover the agreed infrastructure, workloads, security and maintenance obligations for the protected term. An independent Kusama would retain recurring financing obligations, for which a credible budget covering comparable workloads, security, maintenance and duration remains to be established.

  6. The analysis overstates the governance objection to revisiting #573. An explicit KSM vote can legitimately revise an earlier direction. The cohabitation papers and accompanying referenda set out substantive concerns about the feasibility of the path proposed in #573. Referendum #676 provides a legitimate affirmative alternative; its existence does not make proposing cohabitation procedurally improper.

  7. The analysis gives insufficient attention to the practical requirements of independence. Effective autonomy requires the capacity to finance and maintain the infrastructure through which governance decisions take effect. A stewardship organization must be supported by committed engineers, reliable funding and arrangements for operational continuity.

  8. The analysis gives insufficient weight to the economic constraints on independence. Independent JAM offers greater control over its base-layer and arguably has merits. Those benefits must be weighed against the additional obligations they entail. In our assessment, Kusama’s economy cannot currently sustain the security, engineering and maintenance requirements of that path on its own.

Thank you for your comments.

We’ve summarised #676 and the pooled deposit in a thread on X: birdbrain on X: "Someone helped fund our Kusama referendum, then voted against it. That's a useful place to begin. We're Birdbrain. For our first post: a proposal for Kusama's future, a tool we built to get it to a vote, and an experiment in making room for disagreement. 1/11" / X

Thanks Emiel.

Where you’re right. On 1, running our own infrastructure and holding political control are different things, and JAM Prime can leave KSM holders real authority. Our question is who enforces it once DOT DAO is the counterparty. On 2, 96 validators is untested, and it means far fewer than today’s 700 seats. So “keeping its validators” means keeping the role. On 3 and 4, asking for no funds today doesn’t make independence free. On 6, a KSM vote can revise #573. On 7, regarding the engineers and funding - this is part of the process - the talent to deliver and the money to enable are all in or around the project and so we see this as an emergent experiment in attracting the relevant resources to a point where the commitment is real - this is a slightly chicken and egg process, since people need a strategy they can commit to (with resources) and a strategy needs people… it is therefore necessarily a dance.

The arithmetic. These are assumptions. KSM at US$3.49 is set by the market, and it has ranged from US$2.87 to US$14.37 this year. 2.4% is #573’s figure, and holders can change it. 96 seats assumes 32 cores and three validators a core, a rule of thumb. Your US$3,000 has not been checked and tested in public and we believe variations of strategy can lead to meaningfully lower costs. On those inputs 2.4% is about US$1.6m a year, which pays for 44 seats at US$3,000 even if every coin went to operators.

Where we differ. Point 8 may be right, but it’s an assessment and not yet a budget. Your paper says “Actual independent-JAM costs remain unresolved” and that Appendix B supplies “neither a complete independent-JAM budget nor a quantified comparison of security”. Your allowance “excludes protocol development and the return required on bonded security capital”, so the maintenance in point 5 rests on DOT DAO and the Fellowship accepting it, and nobody has priced that work on either path. Your first option is 8 cores and #573 is 32, so independence should be priced at both - and also against other strategic needs. Regarding Kusama’s 54 collator slots on JAM Prime - since you lead a JAM team what would you say that work costs?

One vote won’t settle this. #671 to #674 were rejected, and #676 is still undecided. We now see this as a phased transition, where cores, seats, chains and who operates them change in steps, starting from what Kusama uses today. In the 28 days to 25 October, at most 25 of 140 cores produced blocks. We think routes should be compared as sequences, with each step costed.

Operator data. We’ll soon open the validator cost survey promised in the first post, whichever way #676 goes. Seat cost matters on every route, including yours, because your US$108,000 a core-year rests on it.

We’ll post the questions here for correction first.