Due to OpenGov’s diligence, undelivered and red flagged referenda still remain a low percentage of the cases. But we’d like to open the discussion about what we think it’s an alternative for undelivered referenda which is inspired by the Bug Bounty Programs offered by many entities.
It is the incentivisation of entities who are in charge of the mediation and actions that lead to the successful return of funds granted by OpenGov to a proposer of failed referenda.
With an economically aligned model for all interested entities willing to intervene on undelivered referenda, OpenGov doesn’t need complex structures or gatekeeping committees in charge of failed referenda seeking fund returns as the first line of action or other less effective ways to deal with this issue, rather, a more diplomatically economically incentivized way potentially more effective to deal with honest to neutral entities who were incapable of delivering referenda.
Risks.
The only possible risk to this approach is that, referenda could potentially be presented intentionally with the option to only claim undelivered bounty funds through a third party. Though experience has shown us that OpenGov can sift through this and many other risks almost flawlessly and detect these plots well in advance.
Range.
We propose a 5% to 10% bounty for the entities that mediate the successful return of funds from an undelivered/red flagged referendum. With a decreasing curve starting at 10% for the lowest grants and ending with a 5% cap at 100k USD value at the time of return. Percentages shouldn’t be treated as completely fixed but as a suggestion of the bounty request.
Requests will be presented to OpenGov as a referendum after the successful return of funds that the party who returned the funds failed to deliver. The percentage of the bounty will only apply to the returned funds.
My main concern is that it could unintentionally encourage a kind of vigilantism, which might quickly spiral into problematic behaviour.
What starts as persuasion could easily escalate and I’m not entirely sure where I’d draw the line with what I would be comfortable incentivising, intentionally or not —
Investigating pseudonymous actors’ identities
Contacting individuals in their personal lives
Targeting other projects they’re involved in
Rewards will attract bad ones from within as well as outside the ecosystem.
There seems to be an inevitability that overzealous actors will cause unjustly damage in the name of a payday and the program be accused of legitimising unchecked collateral damage.
Strict parameters under which the bounty hunters must operate in order to be eligible for a reward would be essential.
In general is a good proposal to have a better accountability.
My two cents: Consider increasing the bounty to 25%–20%, since OpenGov deals with pseudonymous individuals who haven’t signed formal legal contracts, ergo, there’s more work involved in recovering the debt.
Honestly, a 20% - 25% seems to be the sweet spot for many to actually get in and be involved. We have interest from two teams willing to intervene and recovery and this increase should definitely help in their efforts. It seems like the curve or cliff needs to be higher/steeper, you’re right @ wariomx.
Right now, there is already vigilantism, bullying and doxxing which has gone unchecked so instead of adding fuel to the fire this is an honest attempt for others to actually solve the problems in a more or less civilized manner with results instead of going for the witch hunt route which is the current status quo actually. What you mentioned is also mainly the reason why we don’t think a " RFP" approach suggested here is the best approach either much less to use treasury funds in advance for that, though of course others are free to try it. We’ll try to keep trying to prove this idea is plausible in the less disruptive way possible.
