On the PCF situation

Miscellaneous
1

Polkadot Community Foundation: Who Defines Its Mandate?

1. From DAO Executor to Independent Operator?

The Polkadot Community Foundation (PCF) was originally established as an entity tasked with executing decisions made through OpenGov. Its stated purpose was to act on instructions from the DAO, rather than pursue an independent agenda or roadmap.

The official Polkadot Wiki explicitly describes PCF as:

An unopinionated entity with no agenda, roadmap, or business purpose except to take actions directed to it via OpenGov referenda.

However, PCF now appears to operate with considerable autonomy. It maintains and develops infrastructure, applications, and services, including:

PCF also participates in ecosystem communications, maintains a public-facing presence, and receives amplification through official Polkadot channels.

Some of these activities have been explicitly authorized through OpenGov. For example, referendum #1082 addressed PCF’s role in owning and administering the Polkadot App, while referendum #1591 provided renewed operational funding.

Others appear to have been initiated independently, and it is unclear which existing mandates, if any, authorize them.

PCF has also continued operating and undertaking activities for which it does not request additional Treasury funding. This raises questions about the origin and allocation of the resources supporting those activities, particularly given its history of Treasury funding.

Its directors have been publicly identified, but the current distribution of operational decision-making authority, the status of DOT-holder representation, and the availability of comprehensive public financial reporting remain important transparency questions.

More fundamentally, there appears to be a growing ambiguity between PCF’s constitutional purposes, its specific OpenGov mandates, and the activities it independently chooses to undertake.

2. Who Grants PCF Its Mandate?

For example, in referendum #1954 — DOT DAO Strategy Mandate, proposed by PCF itself, the communications strategy section states:

The realm of communications remains a difficult task for a DAO to command. Lacking a specific Fellowship in this field, responsible ecosystem entities, ideally those with a track-record of quality, cost-sensitive execution, are sought after for this element of the mandate. It is noted that the Polkadot Community Foundation exists with a well-aligned mandate in this matter.

This is a strategic mandate rather than a technical specification document. It is aspirational in nature and specific technical evaluation and execution is thus left to relevant entities such as the Fellowship and aligned ecosystem parties.

What exactly is meant by PCF having a “well-aligned mandate” in communications?

The wording implies that such a mandate already exists. But which OpenGov decision established it? Is PCF referring to its broad constitutional objectives, to specific previous referenda, or to some other source of authority?

These are not interchangeable. An organization’s legal capacity to undertake an activity is not the same as authorization from the DAO to act on its behalf.

The distinction becomes particularly relevant when PCF itself proposes strategic mandates that identify PCF as an appropriate implementing organization.

A similar question arises in the Polkadot App onboarding discussion, where PCF states:

PCF acts as operator and consumer advocate. It proposes the parameters, operates the onboarding service, publishes the base apps, and covers the transaction fees for every onboarding and every publication from its own funds. No Treasury spend is requested.

The proposal explicitly seeks governance authorization for privileged on-chain operations, which is an important distinction. Nevertheless, PCF describes itself as already performing a number of operational functions.

There is an important difference between PCF acting as an independent organization that provides services to the ecosystem and PCF acting as an operator on behalf of DOT DAO.

If PCF is acting independently, who determines its priorities, who supervises its activities, and what gives those activities an official status within the Polkadot ecosystem?

If it is acting on behalf of DOT DAO, where is the corresponding authorization?

The fact that no additional Treasury funding is requested does not resolve this question. Financial independence is not equivalent to governance authorization. Nor does funding an activity from existing resources automatically establish that it falls within a previously delegated mandate.

3. Independence Without Clear Accountability?

Parity Technologies and Web3 Foundation have collaborated with PCF in various capacities, but the precise boundaries of responsibility and accountability between these organizations are not always apparent.

This creates a legitimate concern that operational decisions may be taken outside OpenGov while still benefiting from the legitimacy associated with official Polkadot infrastructure, branding, and communications.

The organizational structure can also make it difficult for DOT holders to determine who is ultimately responsible for particular decisions: PCF, its directors and operators, Parity, Web3 Foundation, or the DAO itself.

I am not suggesting that every operational decision requires a referendum, or that PCF should be prevented from undertaking independently funded initiatives. The issue is whether independently initiated activities are clearly distinguished from those authorized by the DAO.

The central question is whether PCF remains an executor of OpenGov decisions, as originally presented, or has effectively evolved into an autonomous institution capable of defining and executing parts of Polkadot’s operational and strategic agenda.

If the latter is intended, that role should be explicitly established, with clearly defined responsibilities, governance mechanisms, financial transparency, and accountability to DOT holders.

It should not emerge implicitly through accumulated operational activities and references to vaguely defined existing mandates.

2

it is good that the PCF it is now taking actions, the plunder of the Polkadot treasury showed the ecosystem is yet immature, investors felt offended how the treasury money was spend and it made all seem like a joke.

The marketing efforts instead of improving Polkadot image it tainted it. Polkadot would be far better if no money had been spend on marketing, loyal holders became fudders because they saw how the money was being spend and felt insulted.

Let me refresh your memory

Polkadot Inter Miami ($10.5M), StellaSwap incentives ($6.4M), Mythical Games swap ($6.6M), Giotto marketing proposals ($10.9M), etc.

Millions of $$ to the drain. It is good the PCF intervened on time.

3

The way OpenGov operated previously was not efficient and led to a waste of funds. With the strategy that is now up for a vote, we have a chance to align efforts and at least all work towards the same goal, instead of proposing random things on OpenGov that yield a negative ROI.

Ecosystem strategy > random OpenGov proposals

With a strategy people can still propose their ideas but at least now those ideas will focus on creating value for DOTDAO as a whole.

4

The points you raise are valid. I think the only thing those involved need to do is make it clear that PCF is managed by Parity (I have no proof, but I have no doubts either).

So far, things have been handled behind closed doors, and very little is known about the direction they want to take Polkadot in or who will be responsible for getting it there.

Personally, I’m okay with a certain degree of centralization. Honestly, if things had continued the way they were going, the Treasury would probably have run out of funds by now.

However, I do think they’re still making some questionable decisions. From my perspective, it feels like there’s no clear end goal or well-defined set of objectives. It’s more like they’re just taking things as they come and figuring it out along the way.

5

It might be worth checking Ref #1900 → PCF 2.0: Strategic Website and Tooling Renewal - Small Spender

Part of this proposal was to move the PCF from being reactive to proactive, *“advancing PCF from a reactive entity into a proactive ecosystem operator and a product-focused gateway for “The Second Age” of Polkadot.”
*
While I agree there should be more transparency re: the PCF, it seems that this is exactly what has happened.

6

Seems like the PCF’s website has changed from https://www.polkadotcommunity.foundation to https://pcf.network/

I find interesting that it mentions units, one of them being the Human Web Initiative:

“The Human Web is the vision it works towards for Polkadot: an alternative internet where we own our tools and connect as real people, to reclaim our humanity online.”

TBH I personally had not understood what was meant by units on ref 1900. But it indeed says:

“By updating our digital presence now, we signal readiness to onboard externally funded units and align our public interface with Polkadot’s shift towards a mature, product-grade platform.”

"PCF adopts a structure where external funding allows individuals
and groups to form operational units under the PCF umbrella if they bring resources by themselves, driving initiatives rather than waiting
for grants or proposals passively."

and

“Approved units will launch immediately as pilot operators.”

@birdo @pcf_network I still have a doubt, does this mean that parity’s efforts towards the development of the Polkadot App, the devnet releases, etc. are part of this “Human Web Initiative” unit? and therefore have their own external funding? Or are they still part of the previously approved funding for the Polkadot App via OpenGov?

7

Re: Who Defines PCF’s Mandate?

I agree with the core question here. I’d add that mandates and accountability matter most when the goal is attracting talent, and that’s where we keep failing.

OpenGov V1 didn’t do what it was meant to do. TwoPebbles put forward a proposal for a dedicated startup incubator, staffed by people whose job is building companies. Nearly every “expert” voice in the ecosystem voted it down. Fair enough, that’s governance. But the problem it was meant to solve is still here, and now it’s being handled through entities whose mandate, as this post shows, isn’t clearly defined by the DAO.

On the “new direction”: For more than 2 years I’ve been saying that most bounties had no clear mission, and that funds were going out without measurable outcomes. Now we’re told we’re recruiting talent and have new leaders. If the leadership model and the people are the same as last year’s, I expect the same results.

So my question to PCF, and to whoever is driving this:

How exactly are you attracting real talent? I mean founders and operators with business experience, not just recent graduates who’ve never built or sold anything. What’s the process, who is accountable for it, and how will the DAO measure whether it’s working?

Two practical suggestions:

  1. Move serious outreach to email and formal channels. Telegram has become the home of scams and fast-money hunters. Serious founders and investors judge us by where we hold the conversation.
  2. Full transparency, by default. We’ve worked through OpenGov v3 ourselves, and it can work if every mandate, budget and outcome is public and traceable. Without that, no serious talent will commit to this ecosystem, and this goes nowhere.

I’m happy to share how we’ve structured this at TwoPebbles if it helps. otherwise I’ll stay in the periphery.