I’ve been thinking about ways we could improve the flexibility of OpenGov voting.
Why not quadratic voting (yet)?
Quadratic voting often comes up in these discussions, but I feel it’s not realistic until we have reliable, decentralized identity systems to prevent Sybil attacks. Without personhood guarantees, quadratic models can be gamed too easily by splitting wallets.
A simpler improvement: cumulative voting
In the meantime, I wonder if we could introduce cumulative voting on top of conviction voting.
Voters would have a fixed pool of weight (their DOT × conviction multiplier).
Instead of a simple Aye/Nay per referendum, they could distribute that weight across multiple choices in a single vote.
For example:
In the recent referendum about inflation parameters for Polkadot, we had to go through three separate votes for three options.
With cumulative voting, this could have been simplified into a single proposal with options A / B / C / None, where each voter decides how to allocate their voting weight (e.g., 20% A, 50% B, 30% None).
Benefits
Fewer referenda required when there are multiple valid options.
More expressive voting, allowing people to signal preference intensity.
Keeps compatibility with conviction voting (you still choose your lock period and multiplier).
Open question
Do you think cumulative voting could be a practical addition to OpenGov, or perhaps something better suited for parachains/DAOs to experiment with first?
Polkadot’s architecture is fundamentally a permissionless plutocracy with an incentive-aligned voting system. Any push to shift toward a human-centric model would erode this permissionless plutocratic foundation. The original architects gave no indication of envisioning otherwise; if they had, the design would have addressed the trust barriers inherent in concentrated markets—barriers that discourage everyday participants with minimal stakes while reinforcing plutocratic dominance.
From my ordoliberal perspective, collusion risks reframing the supposed advantages of plutocratic alignment, when in practice it tends to consolidate monopolistic market structures in a competitive space—which, in the end, proves unsustainable.
Unlike governments, which can regulate or restrict individual freedoms across entire financial systems, a protocol can only enforce rules within its own isolated sources of truth. This structural limitation produces an economic “trust barrier”: effective influence requires alignment with concentrated token holdings, not with broader democratic representation or external interests. Consequently, potential incentives for new users to engage with the protocol are weakened—or discarded altogether.
Gav and team are working on Proof of Personhood (PoP) – a unique decentralized identifier for each individual. In his talk with Kus he mentioned the idea of one person, one vote and hinted at experimenting with this model within a sub-treasury.