Addressing Concerns Related to Marketing Bounty Spends for BLAST Campaign

Hey everyone!

I would like to address the concerns that some have raised regarding Novasama Technologies, BLAST, PaiN Gaming, the Marketing Bounty, and related on-chain transactions.

Before we dive into it, I want to state that ultimately all of the following actions were done in a good faith, funds delivered to fulfill their agreed purposes. Everyone involved acted in ways to be as pragmatic as possible, and it is saddening that some members of the community feel the need to fan the flames of negative discourse. All of this is a huge drain of time and energy from productive people in the ecosystem.

There are, of course, actions that could’ve been performed in a much clearer way – but due to time constraints, myself being out of office, and co-founders being heavily focused on delivering core projects for the Polkadot ecosystem – an approach was taken to solve time-sensitive issues, which in hindsight could have been dealt with more appropriately. However, after our internal review of the processes that took place, we found no evidence of wrongdoing or misappropriation of funds in the way that has been described by some commenters.

Finally, we have sent the Web3Foundation all related contracts and invoices on 18.11.2025.
In addition, we have shared these sensitive documents with Bastian (@bkchr) and Otar (@otar) for their impartial third-party review.
They are free to comment on their findings in this thread.

Summary

The Marketing Bounty sent funds to Novasama Technologies, which covered the initial payment to BLAST and a payment to PaiN Gaming. It is important to note that all funds distributed by the Marketing Bounty were approved by multiple curators and not an individual. I hope that we can all reflect on the unnecessary potential reputational damage such misinformation & speculation can cause, and strive to improve collectively.

We have compiled a spreadsheet that contains information about these transactions. Overall, approximately 99.84% of all of the funds paid out by the marketing bounty were directly transferred to their intended recipient (i.e., BLAST, PaiN, or for the January prize pool). The other 0.16% (~843.15 USD) was either consumed by transaction fees or still exists on accounts and can be sent back to the bounty pot. This includes ~$451 of ETH which exists on this account.

This shows what a colossal waste of collective time/energy this entire ordeal was, and shows that people who were repeatedly fanning the flames of negativity did not pursue their “investigation” in good faith and appear to be more interested in causing drama.

Timeline of custody of funds

Here we will go through the timeline of funds which were assigned for the BLAST 2026 contract, PaiN Gaming, and the January prize pool. This is a supplementary commentary that should be viewed alongside this spreadsheet.

Funds for PaiN Gaming (Action 1)

On 30-09-2025, the Marketing Bounty created a child bounty (147) for 9929.31 DOT. These funds were designated to pay PaiN Gaming for marketing/activation, primarily focusing on the LATAM community.

On 1-10-2025, ~9237 DOT was swapped for 37,662 USDC [1], [2].

On 1-10-2025, 37,520 USDC was sent to Novasama Technologies.

This means that there were ~692 DOT remaining in this account from this child bounty. Along with ~142 USDC, which you can see in “Action 1” of the accompanying spreadsheet.

Funds for BLAST (Action 2)

The Marketing Bounty created child bounty #175 for 167,808.99 DOT. On the day (28-10-2025) the child bounty was raised, which represented ~526,920 USD (~$3.14 per DOT). The dollar value of the DOT token, as always, can fluctuate.

On 28-10-2025, 160,488 DOT was swapped into 492,044 USDC over the course of 24h. This USDC is designated for BLAST. This amount includes some contingency in case of FX volatility. It is important to note that when DCAing on Hydration, you set a fixed amount of an asset to sell, and cannot set a fixed target amount of the asset that you wish to buy, which can lead to an excess of the token you are buying, in this case, USDC.

On 29-10-2025, 18,000 USDC was swapped back to 5,796 DOT. This is because there was such an excess in USD/EUR value in the account that it was deemed fine to swap the excess back into DOT, as it was intended to be sent back to the bounty, which holds DOT.

On 29-10-2025, 474,100 USDC was sent to Novasama Technologies [1], [2].

On 03-11-2025, 5895 DOT was swapped into 15k USDC for the Prize Pool assigned to the Blast Bounty in January.

On 03-11-2025, the Marketing Bounty account sent 15,000 USDC (prize pool) to the Facilitator Account.

On 10-11-2025, ~7896 DOT was sent from Hydration to Asset Hub, and then subsequently returned to the Marketing Bounty.

Overall, ~511,620 USDC was sent to Novasama Technologies [1], [2], [3].

Action 3 (Novasama)

On 03-11-2025, Novasama Technologies sent 511,511 USDC to the facilitator account, which then XCM’d these USDC to Hydration.

Action 4 (Facilitator Account)

The facilitator account is an account created for the purpose of bridging funds from Polkadot to Ethereum.

This account then performs a series of swaps from USDC (PAH) to USDC (Snowbridge) [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. It should be noted that due to relatively shallow liquidity that some value was lost here (~$1,532).

The Marketing Bounty then sent 15,000 USDC to the same account (facilitator) that received the ~511k from Novasama. This 15k is for the January prize pool.

This account then bridges tokens to Ethereum via Snowbridge:

  1. Sending ETH for gas fees [1], [2]

  2. Sending 100 USDC test transaction

  3. Sending 524,360 USDC

All these actions involving the facilitator account took place on 03-11-2025.

Action 5 & 6 (Ethereum & Kraken)

On 03-11-2025, the funds on this Ethereum account were then used to pay BLAST 470,439.37 USDC [1],[2].

The remaining ~54,010 USDC was then sent to Kraken.

Out of that ~54k, 37,500 USDC was then sent to PaiN Gaming [1], [2] on 03-11-2025.

On 08-12-2025, the remaining USDC was then transferred back to Polkadot, and is designated to be used in the January prize pool, along with associated fees for the faucet, etc.

Closing Remarks

As stated previously, all actions were taken in good faith. All funds have been delivered to their planned destinations. To be precise, around 99.84% of funds have been distributed to the appropriate entities. The remaining 0.16% (~843.15 USD) is accounted for as per the accompanying spreadsheet, and the majority of those funds exist as ETH on an account which can of course be sent back to the treasury by its controller.

I hope to see the Polkadot community return to a place of good faith, where all the facts are gathered prior to accusations being made publicly. And I believe that we need to both allocate our efforts towards building a better future together, as well as respecting each other’s time and mental health (much) more.

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Hi Anton,

thanks for all the work you put into bringing clarity to this transactions. It is highly appreciated and I hope it will decrease the amount of noise around the MB.

ì very much agree that people are innocent until proven gilty :smile: and not vice-versa; good faith is also important and allow all of us to better collaborate together.

Pierre

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Thank you :+1:

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Anton is at NovaSama Technologies, not the Marketing Bounty, fyi. The issue of salaries is something else, and a good reason that most ongoing activities for Polkadot will fall under W3F or Parity’s purviews, as people at those entities are contractually engaged and not responsible to a vague “community” as those paid by treasury are.

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Hi everyone,

As mentioned, Novasama shared with @bkchr and me the contracts, invoices, and internal documentation related to the BLAST and PaiN engagements. Together, we reviewed the materials, cross-checked them with the on-chain flows, and assessed them against the explanations provided.

Here’s what we can confirm:

  • The BLAST and PaiN transactions were executed in the amounts and manner described in the documentation we reviewed.

  • The temporary routing of funds through a personal Kraken account did happen, and while the funds ultimately reached the intended recipients, this was a serious operational mistake that should not have occurred.

  • The remaining ~16k USDC has been transferred to Polkadot for use in the January prize pool.

  • Based on the materials available to us, we did not find evidence of misappropriation or diversion of funds.

At the same time, we want to be explicit that the handling of the funds, particularly the decision to route them through a personal exchange account, severely compromised transparency. Curators should never directly handle or reroute funds in this way. It introduces conflicts of interest and undermines the accountability guarantees that bounties rely on. Even if the intention was to streamline or anonymise distributions, this approach effectively breaks the audit trail and is not acceptable in treasury-related operations.

This whole situation has already consumed far more time and energy than it should have, and we hope this assessment helps close the operational questions so that the ecosystem can move forward constructively.

We’re available to clarify anything further within the limits of what we reviewed.

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@AntonTheDay7 Thanks for the timely explanation of events from Novasama perspective, and @otar thanks for the confirmation.

I am a bit puzzled by one specific event that you both mention.

What I understand from these statement is that this 16k USDC was in @Crane 's personal Kraken account all this time. Even after all the community discussion about both Marketing Bounty and Blast Payment routes. Just until 3 days ago. Please correct me if I am wrong.

May I ask, if the prize pool money was intended for January and intended to be used on Polkadot, why did it travel all this way to first Ethereum, then [Crane’s personal] Kraken wallet, then back to Ethereum to be bridged back into Polkadot?

@AntonTheDay7
As a more general question to you specifically, I also wonder if the Novasama company is unable to find any other facilitator rather than Crane, who is the person responsible for managing the department that Novasama are receiving funds from.

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The original thread exposing this suspicious payment was posted on Nov 21 (21 days ago), Crane himself posted a reply on the same day on Nov 21 (21 days ago). The fund, however, sits in Crane’s personal Kraken account for the next 15 days. Nothing was done, until the community discussion intensifies, and it was only returned 3 days ago. And you would like to convince us that this is an honest mistake but not a deliberate act.

Honestly, if this was indeed Crane’s personal Kraken account, then it would not only be us who will have a problem with this. In the next few years, you’ll also have to convince the following entities:

  • Using a personal Kraken account for business purpose is against its ToS. This is true for Kraken, and true for any exchanges and banks, due to anti-money laundering requirements. You’ll need to convince Kraken that having the fund sitting there for 15 days while you are apparently aware is an honest mistake, and not a deliberate act. Otherwise, Kraken will likely terminate your account.
  • The local tax office of Crane as well as Novasama Technologies may have a problem with this. Of course, if you can convince them that this is an honest mistake, then everything will be fine. But if they determine that this is a deliberate act, then taxes will likely be due on this fund.

I would say the community has done a really great job exposing the potential misuses on this matter, which finally leads to some detailed information as we have now. And I just want to use this opportunity to congrats them on the great work!

(I personally only became aware of the issue after moderators’ censorship last week – classic Streisand Effect, isn’t it?)

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How could you confirm everything was ok and per contracts, if Crane himself said the following: “Their previously agreed payment infrastructure (Assethub) couldn’t be used by Blast’s team.” - Did someone dig down and actually figure out why the previously agreed payment infra (our own) was not used? Was payment infrastructure part of the contracts? @bkchr @Zendetta

When you say the funds reached intended recipients, can you personally vouch that this address: USDC (USDC) | ERC-20 | Address: 0xa0b86991...e3606eb48 | Etherscan is actual address of Pain Gaming (as defined in the contract?).

Can @bkchr and @Zendetta also personally vouch they’ve seen the contracts and that this address is in control of Pain Gaming?

Without actual guarantees that this address is Pain Gaming, we are at step 1 - this transaction can be anything really, and the lengthy report only proves the approach broke the audit trail.

For the rest of the clique celebrating this report.

  1. With this report, minimum threshold of public community consensus on reporting is achieved, with a 3 week delay. Nothing to clap for, you are just confirming double standards for cherry picked projects.
  2. Otar that reviewed the story, literally confirmed what original post was saying: this approach effectively breaks the audit trail and is not acceptable in treasury-related operations
  3. Crane said: “Their previously agreed payment infrastructure (Assethub) couldn’t be used by Blast’s team.” -
    We need to understand more here. Who is the client in this scenario and who held the leverage of 500k? Why spend all those fees for bridging and transacting on Ethereum if you could do it at home and not break the audit trail as Otar said.
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Hello my lovely friend sweet carbonara,

I checked the contract and it mentions to use ETH if Blast can not provide a AH address. You can ask them for details why they could not provide such an address.

Yes the address matches the one on the invoice plus we have email confirmation from Pain + Blast that the money arrived in their accounts.

There are no double standards. Not sure how you came to this conclusion again. No one ever said that the handling was done properly. Crane will never be in such a position again. This basic handling like in a normal company. There are consequences for the operational execution of this entire thing.

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I’ll address the audit trail question directly.

Yes, the routing intentionally broke the direct on-chain connection. This wasn’t to hide anything nefarious - it was to protect the Marketing Bounty curators.

Curators operate without legal entity protection. They’re individuals with publicly identified addresses. When you’re distributing tournament prize pools, you’re sending funds to dozens of unknown recipients around the world without KYC. Creating a direct on-chain trail from identified curator addresses to mass distributions like that exposes those individuals to personal liability in ways that are genuinely risky.

Was this the right call? Looking back, probably not - at least not in how it was executed. If I had to do it again, I’d push harder for a proper intermediary structure or a dedicated distribution entity that could handle prize pools without exposing individual curators. The ecosystem needs better solutions for this, and that’s a conversation worth having separately.

The days the funds sat was me being on the road and not prioritizing the final distribution quickly enough. That’s on me. I’ve learned from this, and as bkchr noted, I won’t be in a position to make this kind of operational decision again.

But the intent was protective, not deceptive. Every cent went where it was supposed to go. Blast confirmed. paiN confirmed. The contracts were honored. Basti and Otar reviewed the documentation and confirmed the amounts and recipients match.

For me the most interesting question stays untouched here. Why was so much money spend on the BLAST campaign? What are the metrics we can use to measure success and who profited? Quoting from the initial report:

Combined costs with NovaShots App development included stand at around $1.73m so far, with outstanding payments remaining.

Please provide a breakdown where the money went (invoices) and how it was used (KPI).

On a personal level it is sad to see people walking away with millions largely unquestioned and others bashing valid initiatives spending a percentile on trying to improve the ecosystem with different initiatives, leaving no money for exploration and tinkering on different levels.

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Hello Crane, thanks for answering directly. I have a few follow up questions based on your reply.

You are saying the Marketing Bounty curators operate without legal entity protection. However, Opengov #1416 is proposed, voted on and executed in March 2025 specifically to provide a legal vehicle for the Marketing Bounty, including the ability to contract and process fiat payments through the Polkadot Community Foundation.

It states:

This proposal establishes an overarching framework through which the Marketing Bounty can execute formal contracts with service providers on behalf of the Polkadot DAO. The Polkadot Community Foundation will act as the legal counterparty for these standardized contracts.
(…)
Article 3 - Framework

  1. The objective of this framework is to create a streamlined (fast and affordable) process for providing SPs with a legal counterparty and fiat payments if they require them.
  2. The MB is permitted to instruct the PCF to process fiat payments and manage contractual relationships and related administrative work (such as KYB procedures) with SPs.
    (…)

Given that framework, why was the PCF not used in this case? Based on the timeline, there does not seem to have been a time constraint. As you confirmed, the funds stayed in your personal Kraken account for 35 days, from 3 November to 8 December.

One more point, and please correct me if I am wrong. From the earlier discussions, my understanding is that the other curators did not know this routing would be used. If that is accurate, why were the other curators not informed in advance, especially if the main purpose was to protect curators from personal risk?

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