Thank you @giotto for your reflections on the topic. I’ll attempt to summarize your arguments in text form to reply one by one
[@giotto paraphrased by @brenzi] The size of the pie matters because it is what secures the blockchain
Agreed. We both aim for a good market cap of DOT. Quadratic voting is not a means for redistribution, therefore it’s really not about “communism vs capitalism” on my POV.
[@giotto paraphrased by @brenzi] Quadratic voting gives more power to small accounts and less power to big accounts. So, why would anyone buy a large amount of DOT? […] People will “vote with their feet” and sell their DOT […] Why would they take a risk which is higher than the representation they get?
I don’t believe that people buy DOT because it gives them representation in DOT governance. They buy it because they expect a return on investment.
Let me explain why QV is in the interest of every DOT holder, not only the small ones:
Your hypothesis seems to be that the outcome of QV voting will be systematically worse for whales than linear token voting. I disagree. As you explained nicely, people “vote with their feet” as well. This means that small DOT holder will be very careful about scaring the whales away.
I can give you multiple real world examples from Swiss democracy which is commonly understood as one of the world’s most direct democracies.
The Swiss citizens voted against an inheritance tax, although >95% of the voters would be net beneficiaries of such a tax.
- a very plausible interpretation is that the voters were afraid that many wealthy citizens may “vote with their feet” and leave the country
The Swiss citizens voted against increasing mandatory holidays from 4 to 6 weeks
- a very plausible interpretation is that businesses may “vote with their feet” and leave the country, or SME’s may earn less revenue, pay less taxes and offer less employment in consequence
Therefore, I think you’re hypothesis is wrong. Voters are not stupid. Or at least their stupidity doesn’t necessarily correlate reciprocally with wealth.
Do not forget that 1 DOT may be the same “skin in the game” for one person as 1 MDOT for another, if you measure the percentage their DOT holding represents in their overall wealth. Why would retail investors join Polkadot if they feel ripped off and ruled by early adopter whales?
Quite to the contrary of your POV, I believe it makes Polkadot much more resilient if more people feel represented in its governance. Not only because of the “wisdom of the crowd”, but also because a “sense of belonging” can be so much stronger and more lasting than pure economic (greed) incentives.
Then comes your very valid argument around corruption:
[@giotto paraphrased by @brenzi] Sybil-resilience doesn’t solve the problem becasue there is no way to prove a voter is voting as a free agent. Therefore, whales may be incentivized to buy votes.
First of all: vote buying/bribing is highly incentivized in today’s plutocratic OpenGov. So let’s measure governance designs with equal measures.
Like you, I’m very concerned with this and I don’t have an encompassing solution. In another post I have explored the opportunities of private voting, which may give us a hint on a solution: If voters have no way to unambiguously prove how they voted, vote buying is futile.