Referendum 1710 put the protocol on a predictable issuance path with a clear cap, and there are two reasons burning any revenue does not fit into the picture.
First, it’s incompatible with 1710 itself. Burning in the naive sense violates inherently what the community decided in that WFC: either we hold the cap and dynamically remint what we burn, which breaks the issuance schedule, or we burn without reminting, which breaks the cap. Neither is acceptable.
Second, and just as important, it doesn’t fit the current plan of using the issuance buffer (DAP) to fund protocol expenses. The declining issuance schedule means the DAP has to start generating revenue to cover its own expenses in the future, with less and less carried by issuance over time. That’s the whole point. Any form of burning works against that, because it would mean that the income stream both from issuance and revenue dries up.
None of this rules out the underlying idea. A mechanism that “freezes” DOT and makes it permanently unusable could be worthwhile, and there may be use cases that benefit from it.