Basically we’re talking about a corporate vote by proxy model. In this model the typical shareholder would not be a direct beneficiary of the vote, the only benefit they would receive is maybe a change in leadership, or direction. In our case, the voter can and often is a direct beneficiary. While I empathize your point, the subtle differences between a corporate shareholder model and a software tokenholder model, IMO, will lead to a different set of consequences and behaviors.
When we were the proponent of the IBP, we voted on our own proposal. Many large addresses came to vote in favor of it as well (
). It seemed important to those individuals that we not be the only deciding vote on that ref. There are many rationales of why they may have done this. But one of them was likely that it was important that it not be just the beneficiary of the ref who determines the outcome of the ref. How do you square this situation in a corporate shareholder vote by proxy model? As mentioned previously, KSM #180 was possibly a bad actor type situation that should have gone through even with HACN voting against it, because their KSM weight was greater than HACNs, if they had applied convictions.
In a pseudonymous setup it’s possible to draw some limited conclusions based on-chain behaviors. This is not possible in a true anonymous voting system. Isn’t pseudonymous enough? If we do ultimately proceed down an anonymous route, can we at least limit the conviction to <= 1x ? This way it is incentivized to be public or at least pseudonymous over anonymous.