In response to the JAMKB / footprint-vs-coretime discussion, I want to focus on the specific concept of validator memory capacity in Polkadot JAM.
That capacity—let’s call it FOOTPRINT—is estimated today at around ~20 GB, and it may change over time. Ideally it can grow as more validators join and as the minimum node requirements evolve, but in theory it could also decrease depending on the number of validators and the hardware needed to run them.
If JAM is successful, then FOOTPRINT should be well allocated, and—assuming the resulting demand for CORETIME and JAM usage is real—more validators should be incentivized to enter Polkadot JAM. That would increase the overall available/allocatable footprint and thus the total coretime capacity in the network.
However, this only works if the value of $DOT grows with JAM adoption. Remember: validators must have a self-stake of at least 10,000 $DOT, and validators are remunerated in $DOT. That means $DOT is the foundation of the validator investment and their returns. For that reason, treating any token representing FOOTPRINT as if it could have a value completely detached from $DOT is not just unlikely—it is fundamentally contradictory and would likely cause severe ecosystem damage.
Think of it like this: cloud companies (Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Oracle, etc.) effectively “own” their servers and the underlying RAM/compute capacity they sell. Even though they don’t literally hand out physical property rights over distributed servers, their economic control over that capacity is central. Similarly, DOTDAO should be considered the economic owner of the RAM/compute capacity it makes available to users, even if it doesn’t directly hold legal ownership of every physical machine in the decentralized system. This “ownership/control” must be preserved over time and cannot be ceded in a way that allows third parties—however aligned at first—to develop conflicting incentives later and potentially divert the core operational asset away from DOTDAO’s mission.
Given that, I don’t see a sustainable alternative other than treating FOOTPRINT as something that is leased (i.e., rented) over time—just like CORETIME.
For CORETIME, the model is already essentially an “NFT-like” time right: the right to use a certain amount of compute power for a fixed time period, sold via periodic auctions, priced in $DOT, with $DOT then burned—creating a deflationary mechanism and value for DOTDAO.
For FOOTPRINT, Dr. Wood proposes instead using a fungible token called $JAMKB with limited issuance—initially set equal to the total GB of RAM available in the validator set—held by DOTDAO, which distributes it via governance.
My main considerations to share with the community are:
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Dynamic capacity implies dynamic supply control. If validator capacity changes over time, then total $JAMKB supply must be adjusted by minting new tokens or burning existing ones.
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No permanent “sell” of the resource. Distribution cannot be a one-way permanent transfer, because that would amount to permanently handing third parties rights over a fundamental resource required for JAM. DOTDAO would likely lose sovereignty over the use of its core productive asset.
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Primary market must enable use without permanently transferring ownership. The primary allocation of $JAMKB should be structured so it supports intended usage and limits speculation. The market may still allow “wholesale” actors that redistribute in the secondary market, but this should not turn the primary into a deed-like permanent sale.
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Primary allocations should be on-chain on Polkadot and priced in $DOT (preferably), or at least in a $DOT-collateralized stablecoin (with a small incentive/discount for the $DOT option). Importantly, the $DOT paid for temporary rights over $JAMKB should be burnable and/or directed to the DOTDAO treasury in proportions decided by DOTDAO governance, and those proportions should be adjustable over time based on network needs.
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Secondary market can be flexible, including external and centralized venues if needed early on to maximize accessibility for developers experimenting with JAM-based products.
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$JAMKB leased in the primary can be managed via Asset Hub so that tokens remain in DOTDAO-controlled wallets, while temporarily assigned to users who acquired rights. Those users can then lock $JAMKB for RAM access or transfer them onward to other eligible accounts (based on secondary relationships).
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Eligibility rules should prevent abuse. I would require at least:
- PoP (e.g., Proof-of-Personhood DIM-1)
- a minimum $DOT holding comparable to validator requirements (at least 10,000 $DOT) to ensure “skin in the game” and discourage purely synthetic brokers from operating without real stake.
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Tokens must automatically return at lease end. At the end of each rental period, $JAMKB should automatically revert to full DOTDAO control for reallocation.
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Allow medium/long-term extensions carefully. It could be possible to support auto-extensions (e.g., weekly) for pre-agreed terms (from ~28 days up to a maximum of 24 months), using weekly rent payments in $DOT (with risk-adjusted discounts) or in $DOT-collateralized stablecoin. If tokens remain in DOTDAO wallets, governance can always respond to abnormal outcomes (e.g., failure to pay).
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A controller is needed. There must be an internal controller (human or protocol automation) that monitors such long-term agreements and triggers predefined actions automatically, or escalates to governance in exceptional cases.
In conclusion: for JAM to become a success for DOTDAO and produce durable value for its members—gradually increasing $DOT price due to genuine usage and real demand (not mere speculation, as with essentially all crypto assets)—it is crucial that FOOTPRINT stays exclusively controlled/owned by DOTDAO.
The temporary right to use FOOTPRINT should therefore be leased—preferably through a weekly primary on-chain auction on Polkadot, with a protocol-based mechanism ensuring DOTDAO retains underlying control. Temporary rights would be available only to eligible Polkadot users (PoP DIM-1) with a minimum $DOT holding threshold equal to validator requirements. Medium/long-term leasing could also exist up to a bounded maximum, with periodic rent and well-defined automatic or governance-based enforcement for non-compliance.
Finally, the $DOT collected in the primary market for temporary $JAMKB rights should be designed so that it can be burned and/or routed to the DOTDAO treasury in governance-defined proportions, adaptable over time, ensuring that value capture and incentive design remain aligned with Polkadot’s evolving needs.
I acknowledge the model will need further refinement and that JAM developers must clarify the operational details—but in my view, these principles align best with Polkadot’s mission, preserve DOTDAO sovereignty over the essential productive capacity, and keep value capture tied to $DOT growth through real adoption.